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9 Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
On Friday afternoon, the ninth of May 2008 a ‘house fire’ was reported to the fire station of 
the fire brigade Eelde, The Netherlands 1. While the first unit of fire fighters was on its way to 
the fire, it became clear that it concerned a fire in a boatshed at a shipyard in the village of 
De Punt. During the drive to the shipyard the fire fighters, most of whom were familiar with 
the premises, discussed the dangers associated with the operation. When they approached 
the boatshed they saw thick brown-yellow clouds of smoke coming from the backside of the 
building. Based on the possible dangers inferred from this, the commander scaled up the 
situation to an ‘intermediate level fire.’ However, when the unit arrived at the location and 
the fire fighters looked into the shed, they only saw small clouds of smoke at the back of the 
shed and they were told by a police officer at the location that it concerned a burning vehi-
cle. Based on this new information, they considered the situation as a ‘vehicle fire in a cov-
ered space’ and adjusted their expectations and operation plans accordingly. 
Unbeknownst to the fire fighters working from the front of the shed, the situation in 
the backside had rapidly deteriorated. The fire was affecting polyurethane insulation foam 
that was being sprayed to the ceiling of the building, which led to the emission of highly 
flammable nitrate fumes. There were several reasons that may explain why the fire fighters 
had not perceived this danger. Before their arrival lack of oxygen might have reduced the 
fire intensity, the wind might have blown the smoke to the back of the shed, and smoke that 
might have drifted to the ceiling was not clearly visible from their position in the front. 
While some fire fighters entered the building to investigate and extinguish the fire from 
inside, the smoke cloud increased until the flames reached the flammable fumes. This re-
sulted in a fire outbreak that spread with heavy pressure throughout the whole building. 
The burning smoke resulting from this outbreak was pressed through the front entrance, 
rendering it unavailable as an exit route and resulting in the deaths of three fire fighters that 
were trapped inside the building. 
The above described sequence of events indicates that the disastrous outcome of the 
fire was at least partly due to a lack of fit between the fire fighters’ representation of the 
situation and the actual state of the fire. Although the fire fighting team demonstrated adap-
tation when they reconsidered the situation as a ‘vehicle fire in a covered space’ and ad-
justed their expectations and operation plans accordingly, the situation was still inadver-
tently labeled as a ‘fire in a building’ instead of ‘a building in fire.’ Whereas in the first type 
of situation the fire may well be controlled with classical indoor extinguishing procedures, 
in the second type of situation, due to specific construction parts of buildings, fires may be 




1 The following account is based on the final report of the evaluation of a fire at De Punt on May 9th 2008 by: I. 
Helsloot, R. Weever, and E. Oomes (2009).  
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difficult to reach from inside and parts of the building should be deconstructed in order to 
suppress the fire. A report from the research committee investigating the fire fighting opera-
tion and a number of similar fires, suggests that this misfit may be attributed in part to a lack 
in adaptation of fire fighters knowledge and procedures to novel developments in construc-
tion techniques. Over the last years, increasing requirements for building insulation have 
resulted in the use of a wider variance of insulation materials. In addition, due to lighter 
building constructions, collapse of structures has become more likely. These developments 
have resulted in changes in risk profiles of fires. Because these changes were not yet fully 
incorporated in the education and training of the fire fighters at De Punt, they lacked the 
appropriate knowledge structures and procedures to timely recognize and appropriately 
adapt to the situation (Helsloot, Weewer, & Oomes, 2009). 
Like the fire fighting unit described above, in many situations teams function as the fi-
nal safeguards responsible for the health and safety of many individuals (E.g. Faraj & Xiao, 
2006; Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006; Smart & Vertinski, 1977). For example, emer-
gency management teams, health prevention teams, nuclear power plant operating crews, 
and pilot crews all carry high responsibilities and need to be able to rapidly adapt to a vari-
ety of often unexpected highly challenging situations. Although the body of knowledge 
concerning factors that impact team performance has increased over the last decades (e.g. 
Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), relatively few studies, 
specifically address how teams adapt to novel and challenging circumstances (LePine, 2005; 
Waller, 1999). This is all the more critical since it is particularly during novel non-routine 
situations that effective team performance becomes most crucial and at the same time most 
difficult to uphold (Waller, Roe, Gevers, & Raes, 2005). 
Moreover, although researchers have in their reasoning often applied team cognition 
concepts to explain team adaptation, studies that explicitly investigate the role of team 
cognition constructs in team adaptation are relatively scarce (some notable exceptions 
include Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000; Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005). With team cogni-
tion, I refer to both the cognitive structures—structured knowledge team members have 
regarding their task or team—and cognitive processes—cognitive actions, such as informa-
tion gathering, interpretation, and decision making that are performed by the team mem-
bers during their task (Salas & Fiore, 2004). Cognitive structures may facilitate or hinder 
adaptation and often have to be changed in order for a team to adapt (Marks et al., 2000; 
Weick, 1995) and cognitive processes are generally considered to lie at the heart of the team 
adaptation process (e.g. Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006; Letsky, Warner, Fiore, 
& Smith, 2008; Waller, Gupta, & Giambatista, 2004). Therefore, in order to add to our un-
derstanding of how such teams adapt to dynamic and challenging circumstances, this disser-
tation focuses on the role of cognition in team adaptation. More specifically, in this disserta-
tion I aim to investigate how characteristics of team members’ cognitive structures impact 
team adaptation, how these cognitive structures change over time, and the role of team 
cognitive processes in team adaptation to novel task situations 
This introduction will proceed as follows: After starting with a short description of 
what I mean with a team, I provide a definition of team adaptation based on existing litera-
ture, and I clarify this definition by expounding on its components. I provide an introduction 
of the role of the cognitive constructs I use in the dissertation and develop a cognitive model 
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of team adaptation that provides the background of the studies in the dissertation. Thereby, 
I show that team cognition—in terms of team cognitive structures and processes—plays an 
important role in the team adaptation process. I close with an overview of the structure of 
the remainder of the dissertation. 
Teams 
In this dissertation I look at adaptation of teams. Etymological accounts of the word ‘team’ 
relate it back to a set of animals yoked together to collectively pull a vehicle (Hoad, 1996). 
From there on, the concept developed through its application in sports games into its con-
temporary meaning of a ‘number of persons in concerted action.’ In the scientific literature, 
a team is formally defined as “a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact, 
dynamically, interdependently, and adaptively toward a common and valued 
goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, 
and who have a limited life-span of membership” (Salas et al., 1992, p.4). Teams can be 
distinguished from groups by the interdependence of the members and a common goal; 
however, in the extant literature the concepts of team and group have often been used 
interchangeably. Therefore, and because the notion of a group is generally seen as more 
encompassing than the notion of a ‘team’—all teams are groups but not all groups necessar-
ily have to be teams—I will draw from literature on both groups and teams in this disserta-
tion, referring as much as possible to the terms used by the original authors of the articles I 
describe. 
What is team adaptation? 
Although many definitions of adaptation have been posed in the team literature (e.g. Burke 
et al., 2006; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999; LePine 2003; Marks et al., 2000) au-
thors do not seem to agree on the exact nature of the concept. In particular, disagreement 
exists on whether adaptation is a process, a capability, or an outcome, and on the nature of 
the content of that which is adapted. Therefore I will present a definition based on a com-
mon denominator of existing definitions and I will distinguish team adaptation from related 
concepts. I refer to team adaptation as the effective process whereby, in response to changes 
in its task situation, a team changes its configuration, over a specific period (e.g. Marks et 
al., 2000; Waller, 1999; LePine 2003, 2005). The first element of this definition, effective 
process, indicates that adaptation is explicitly considered as a process—a collection of ac-
tions—and is thereby distinguished from the capability and the outcome of adaptation. 
Moreover, the addition effective is added to indicate that team adaptation refers to processes 
that positively contribute to team outcomes. The second element, changes in the task situa-
tion, refers to that to which the team adapts itself. It indicates that adaptation occurs in 
response to changes that are external to the team and relevant to the team task. The third 
element, a change in configuration, refers to the actual content of that which is changed by 
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the team—in terms of structures, behaviors, and cognitions. And the fourth element, over a 
specific period, indicates that there is a specific time period over which adaptation takes 
place. In the following paragraphs I will further clarify each of these elements. 
Team adaptation as an effective process 
The definition given in the previous section explicitly considers team adaptation as a process 
and thereby distinguishes it from the capability and the outcome of adaptation. Some schol-
ars have defined adaptation as a team’s capability to adapt to changing circumstances (e.g. 
Klein & Pierce, 2001; Kozlowski et al., 1999). For example Kozlowski and colleagues (1999) 
defined adaptation as the “capability of the team to maintain coordinated interdependence 
and performance by selecting an appropriate network from its repertoire or by inventing a 
new configuration.” However, the capability of a team to adapt should not be equated with 
the actual process of adapting—less capable teams may be able to adapt under beneficiary 
circumstances and a capable team may choose not to adapt. Therefore, I will reserve the 
term adaptation for the process and use the term adaptability to denote a team’s general 
ability to adapt. 
It should be mentioned that adaptation is not a singular process; rather scholars have 
depicted adaptation as a more encompassing process comprising a number of phases or sub-
processes that have to be successfully fulfilled in order for a team to adapt. Kiesler and 
Sproull (1982) posed problem sensing—noticing, interpreting, and incorporating stimuli—
as a necessary part of adaptation. Marks and colleagues (2000) suggest that teams adapt by 
surveying their task environments, interpreting its meaning with regard to the team goal, 
deciding on a strategy for action, and executing the novel strategy. Burke and colleagues 
(2006) depict team adaptation as a recursive process consisting of a situation assessment 
phase, a plan formulation phase, a plan execution phase, and a team learning phase. So 
team adaptation is used as the general term that comprises the specific sub-process teams 
may execute sequentially or in parallel and that together make up the adaptation process. 
Adaptation is defined as an effective process, indicating that whether specific team 
processes can be considered to be adaptive can only be judged from an outcome variable—
inappropriate changes leading to performance decrements are not considered as team adap-
tation (Burke et al., 2006). Therefore, in empirical work team adaptation is sometimes seen 
as an outcome and operationalized in terms of performance during a novel or non-routine 
situation. The rationale behind an operationalization of team adaptation as an outcome is, 
that if a team attains a satisfactory level of performance in a novel task situation, it is likely 
that it has engaged in the appropriate adaptation processes. Success measures of adaptation 
behaviors have therefore been operationalized in terms of teams’ scores on outcome vari-
ables relative to the scores of other teams or relative to their own scores in a pre-change 
period. For example, several researchers have assessed team adaptation as team perform-
ance after an environmental change or under novel task circumstances (e.g. LePine, 2003; 
Marks et al., 2000; Woolley, 2009). Analogously, researchers have identified adaptation 
behaviors by comparing the communication of teams with high performance with that of 
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teams with low performance under novel or non-routine tasks circumstances (e.g. Kanki, 
Folk, & Irwin, 1991; Waller, 1999; Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009). 
Recently scholars have argued that team performance should not be conceptualized 
merely as an end product or retrospective summary of the result of team actions but as the 
dynamic trajectory of team performance indicators over time (Kozlowski, et al. 1999; 
Landis, 2001; Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). Applying this notion to team adaptation suggests that 
adaptive performance is a temporal phenomenon that is characterized by a demarcated time 
interval with clear and theoretical meaningful beginning and end points that manifests 
specific dynamics over time (Roe, 2008). Consistent with this notion, on the individual level, 
scholars have started studying adaptation by more explicitly incorporating its temporal 
nature and modeling adaptation as a function of performance over time (e.g. Chen, 2005). 
For example, Lang and Bliese (2009) showed that there are actually two different types of 
performance indicators for adaptation: transition adaptation referring to the relapse in 
performance immediately after the task change and reacquisition adaptation referring to the 
rate at which performance increases again after the task change. Findings of these studies 
are also relevant for a dynamic assessment of adaptive performance on the team level. How-
ever, it should be noted that in order to avoid confusion, I will use the term adaptation to 
refer to the process—the cognitive and behavioral actions team members execute to realign 
their configuration with the task situation—and I will use the term adaptive performance to 
refer to the outcome of adaptation. 
Changes in the task situation 
The second element of the definition of team adaptation indicates that a team changes its 
configuration, in response to a change in its task situation. As our definition of teams indi-
cates, teams are task-oriented—team members have a common goal or mission, and team 
processes are oriented towards fulfilling that mission. Team goals are often defined in broad 
terms and the specific manner in which the task is accomplished is at the discretion of the 
team (Steiner, 1972)—it is up to the team itself to set specific subgoals, distribute subtasks 
among the members, and decide on the specific actions and coordination mechanisms they 
will use for goal attainment. 
Although in laboratory situations, team tasks situations are often fixed and teams are 
treated as isolated entities, in field situations task situations are often dynamic and linked to 
the environment in which the team operates (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000). McGrath 
and colleagues (2000) argued that teams research has a long history of ignoring the envi-
ronment and assuming that teams are static, closed systems. Instead they propose a view of 
teams as complex, dynamic, open systems in which team tasks are intrinsically linked with 
the environment in which the team operates. Because teams are embedded within and 
interacting with their environment, team tasks do not exist in isolation but are influenced 
and shaped by the team’s environment. As Kozlowski and Ilgen note “a team is embedded in 
a broader system context and task environment that drives team task demands; that is, the 
task requirements necessary to resolve the problem or situation presented by the environ-
ment and the load placed on team members’ resources and the team task changes with 
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respect to changes in the environment” (2006, p. 78). Therefore, the effectiveness of a 
team’s configuration for goal attainment depends on the specific characteristics of the task 
situation—the part of the team’s environment that is relevant for team task execution, in-
cluding aspects such as the relationship among task variables, the resources available for 
task performance, and the information a team can attain about the task. Given that the task 
situation may change over time, a team will have to adapt its configuration to fit the task 
situation it momentary faces in order to attain its goal. For example, the task of the fire 
fighting teams from the opening example is to contain fires and rescue victims but the spe-
cific actions they use to accomplish these goals may vary as the situation unfolds and differ 
across specific fires. 
Over repeated series of task performance in stable task situations, teams gain experi-
ence with the task and developed standardized procedures for dealing with recurring task 
elements (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). Empirical research indicates that on recurring stable 
tasks, team performance reaches an asymptotic level (Argote, 1993) and that standardized 
interaction patters or routines constitute a major source of the speed and reliability in task 
performance (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). For example, as a team of fire fighters recurrently 
works together on a specific type of fire, they will develop an efficient division of roles and a 
sequence of behaviors that enable them to effectively contain that type of fire. However, 
when team members are faced with a considerable change in the task situation, they have to 
‘think on their feet’, modify existing structures, and rapidly develop and apply new task 
practices (Waller, 1999). Although the broadly defined team task remains similar, important 
elements of the task situation change, and the activities that led to successful task fulfill-
ment in the past will no longer be effective. For instance, the fire fighters in the opening 
example used practices that had worked effectively for a ‘fire in building’ but failed in the 
novel ‘building in fire situation’. Therefore, a common approach to study team adaptation is 
by means of the task-change paradigm (e.g. Marks et al., 2000 LePine, 2003, 2005). In this 
paradigm, teams are trained to reach a basic level of task proficiency, after which the task 
situation is changed so that the team has to realign its structures and behaviors to fit the 
novel task situation (Lang & Bliese, 2009). 
A change in configuration 
Till now I have discussed adaptation in terms of a team’s configuration relative to its task 
situation without indicating specifically what it is that a team has to adapt—in other words 
what is the substance of adaptation? A perusal of the literature indicates that scholars have 
described team adaptation mainly in terms of alterations in a team’s structures or behavioral 
patterns. Hutchins (1991) located a navigation team’s adaptation to a sudden loss of equip-
ment in the alteration of the team’s stable work configuration. Kozlowski and colleagues 
(1999) view team adaptation as a revision or reconfiguration of the team-level role net-
work—the set of task relevant relations among team members occupying specific roles. 
LePine (2005) locates team adaptability in “the extent to which a team is able to modify its 
configuration of roles into a new configuration of roles” (p. 1154). Marks and colleagues 
(2000, p. 972) refer to team adaptation as occurring when “teams are able to derive and use 
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new strategies and techniques for confronting novel elements in their environment.” Finally, 
Burke and colleagues (2006, p. 1190) describe team adaptation as manifested in “the inno-
vation of new or modifications of existing structures, capacities, and/or behavioral or cogni-
tive goal-directed actions.” The common denominator among these definitions seems to be 
that adaptation occurs within the structures that shape team members’ interaction behav-
iors. 
Structure refers to the recurrence in the patterns of behavior by team members. As, 
Ranson, Hinings, and Greenwood notice “(t)he concept of structure is usually understood to 
imply a configuration of activities that is characteristically enduring and persistent; the 
dominant feature of organizational structure is its patterned regularity” (1980, p. 1). Within 
the team literature, this notion of structure is closely related to the concepts of team rou-
tines and interaction patterns. Habitual routines are formally defined by Gersick and Hack-
man (1990) as “when a group repeatedly exhibits a functionally similar pattern of behavior 
in a given stimulus situation without explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behav-
ing.” Whereas this definition emphasizes that habitual routines are triggered and executed 
without conscious deliberation, interaction patterns are defined simply as “regular sets of 
verbalizations and nonverbal actions intended for collective action and coordination” (Sta-
chowski et al., 2009, p. 1537). Hence the term seems to be less stringent and more neutral to 
whether the recurring behaviors are consciously selected and executed. 
A cognitive perspective recognizes that interaction is represented by a cognitive com-
ponent that resides within the minds of the team members (Weick, 1979). For instance, 
Feldman and Pentland (2003) distinguish between ostensive and performative aspects of 
collective routines. Whereas the performative aspect consists of the specific actions by spe-
cific people at specific times, the ostensive aspect represents the ideal or schematic represen-
tation of the routine. This ostensive aspect is embedded within the subjective understanding 
the participants have of the routine—within their cognitive scripts or procedural knowledge 
structures that represent the sequence of events associated with a specific situation (Abel-
son, 1976; Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). Past interactions in similar circumstances are stored in 
cognitive structures that function as drivers and constraints for future behaviors (Abelson & 
Black, 1986; Walsh, 1995). Because team members brings to the team their own specific 
knowledge structures it is from the compilation of the participating members’ knowledge 
structures, which can be considered to be a structure as well, that typical patterns of interac-
tion arise (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). Therefore 
apart from changes in structures and behaviors, alterations in team members’ knowledge 
structures also constitute an important part of team adaptation. 
It should also be noted that team adaptation is a path dependent process in that teams 
always adapt relative to their previous state (Beersma et al., 2009; Moon et al., 2004). Be-
cause a team’s previous configuration provides the starting point from which it changes into 
a new configuration, the extent to which a team is able to adapt will depend on the differ-
ence between the existing configuration and the requisite configuration. Under some condi-
tions adaptation may therefore be asymmetric; it may be easier for a team to move from one 
configuration to another configuration than the other way around (Hollenbeck, Ellis, Hum-
phrey, Garza, & Ilgen, 2010; Moon et al., 2004). So, team adaptation is a path dependent 
process of adjustment in which a team’s future state is not only determined by efforts to 
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synchronize with its task situation but also is also constrained and enabled by its previous 
configuration. 
Over a certain period 
The final element of the proposed definition of team adaptation indicates that adaptation is 
a process that occurs over a specific time period (Roe, 2008). With respect to the duration of 
adaptation, a distinction can be made between two perspectives: singular and continuous 
adaptation. A singular perspective—often endorsed by empirical researchers—considers 
adaptation to have a clear starting and end point. The adaptation process can be considered 
to start at the moment a relevant change occurs in the team’s environment or when this 
change is noticed by one of the team members and finishes at the moment when the team 
has adapted its configuration to the novel environment (e.g. LePine, 2003; 2005). 
However, apart from a perspective of adaptation as the process of an entity adapting to a 
single change in its task situation, another perspective—often endorsed by field researchers 
and in theoretical papers—takes a broader perspective and views adaptation as an ongoing 
process (e.g. Burke et al., 2006). This view of adaptation considers adaptation as an inher-
ent aspect of the team’s task and implies that a team may engage in ongoing adaptation 
processes (e.g. Kozlowsky et al., 1999). This form of adaptation particularly applies to teams 
functioning in dynamic contexts characterized by high ambiguity, complexity, and inconsis-
tent relations between actions and outcomes. In such task situations, change is an inherent 
element of the task and therefore, adaptation processes such as scanning the relevant task 
environment and modification of task strategies are likely to occur on an ongoing basis. For 
example, a production team may rapidly reach asymptotic performance levels as it repeat-
edly executes a similar or comparable task, and may only have to adapt during specific time 
intervals when a new product is being taken into production. An emergency management 
team, on the other hand, is often faced with novel and unique crises, and therefore needs to 
continuously engage in deliberate cognitive processing and adjustment of task practices. 
The duration of the adaptation process in cases such as the later cannot be restricted to a 
single adaptive episode and are therefore bracketed by the duration of the task or the life-
time of the team. 
The role of team cognition in team adaptation: 
presentation of a model 
Now I have provided and elaborated on the definition of team adaptation I will use in the 
present dissertation, I will discuss the role of team cognition in team adaptation. I make a 
distinction between cognitive structures—the structured knowledge team members have 
regarding their task or team—and cognitive processes—occurring as team members per-
form their tasks (Salas & Fiore, 2004). Cognitive structures may hinder or facilitate team 
adaptation and are often part of the content of that which teams have to alter in order to 
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adapt. Cognitive processes constitute an important element of the adaptation process and 
are the drivers of change in the cognitive structures. In the following section I will present a 
model that depicts how these cognitive aspects relate to team adaptation. I will start with a 
general description of the model, then I will describe the role of cognitive structures, and 
finally the role of cognitive processes in the adaptation process. Then, based on this model I 
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Figure 1 depicts a cognitive perspective on team adaptation. In the model the passing of 
time is depicted from left to right. The top of the figure represents ‘that to which the team 
adapts’—the team’s task situation. The middle of the figure represents the teams’ configura-
tions or ‘that which is adapted’ – the team knowledge structures and the interlocking actions 
team members perform to execute their task. The teams’ knowledge structures and interac-
tion processes are enclosed by team adaptation processes in order to indicate that altera-
tions in these team configurations represent team adaptation processes. Team adaptation 
processes are written in italics and are provided with an arc to indicate that they occur over 
time with a specific duration. In line with Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro’s (2001) temporal 
framework of team processes, the patterns are repeated to indicate the ongoing and recur-
sive nature of team adaptation. So, team cognitive processes impact team configurations, 
which then may impact subsequent team cognitive processes and so on. The present model 
deviates from models prevalent in group development theories that consider groups to 
linearly progress through a number of group stages (e.g. Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jen-
sen, 1977; Worchel, 1994). Instead teams are considered to adapt relative to changes in their 
task situation. So, the emphasis is not on development factors that are driven by factors 
internal to the team but on team adaptation driven by teams’ contextual dynamics—factors 
in the team’s external environment (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000). Moreover, the 
sequence in which teams’ cognitive processes occur is not considered linear, as teams may 
for example engage in action execution and information search concurrently and decision 
making may follow as well as precede information search. 
Changes occurring over time in the team’s task situation are depicted in the top of the 
figure as a capricious form in order to depict the typical irregularity and unpredictability of 
adaptation requiring environments. The task situation is depicted as a formless mass in 
order to indicate that it is only through their pre-existing knowledge structures that team 
members make sense of their task situation (Weick, 1979). Changes in the task situation can 
be partitioned in momentary changes in the environment—for example, the spreading of a 
specific fire—and changes in the recurring structural relationship between elements of the 
environment—for example, alterations in the use of construction materials that change how 
building fires spread in general. Information about the environment becomes available as 
team members engage in active information search or passively absorb information cues, 
which are depicted in the figure by the long grey arrows. 
Team cognitive structures and interaction processes 
In the middle of the figure the cognitive structures that impact the team’s adaptation to the 
task situation are depicted. Which cues a team picks up and the interpretation team mem-
bers form based on these cues depends on team members’ mental models (e.g. Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Walsh, 1995). Mental models are organized knowledge structures of a spe-
cific domain or system, consisting of concepts as well as structures relating these concepts 
(Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). Mental models need not be technically accurate 
but they must be functional—they must enable humans to effectively interact with the sys-
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tem (Norman, 1983). When people interact with a system, they form cognitive representa-
tions of that system that enable them to “generate descriptions of system purpose and form, 
explanations of system functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future 
system states” (Rouse & Morris, 1986, p. 351). With team mental models I refer to the specific 
compilation on the team level of the mental models of the individual team members 
(Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). In the figure, team members’ mental models are depicted 
by grey circles. The circles are partly overlapping and partly unique, to indicate the shared 
and distributed nature of team level knowledge (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001). 
From the interaction of cues and mental models, team members derive representations 
of the situation or situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; Weick, 1995). Situation awareness 
refers to the momentary understanding people have about a specific task situation. It con-
sists of knowledge about facts, interpretations based on these facts, and anticipations of how 
the situation may develop in the near future (Endsley, 1995). For example, from the moment 
they first heard of the incident, the fire fighting team from the opening example, gradually 
received novel cues about the fire and, based on these cues they interpreted the situation 
subsequently as a ’house fire’, ‘an intermediate level fire’, and a ‘vehicle fire in a covered 
space’. Team situation awareness refers to the common understanding of the situation by the 
team members, as well as, to the representations of the situation that are unique for each 
team member (Endsley, 1995; Wellens, 1993). Because compared to team members’ mental 
models, situation awareness is a much more dynamic construct—in rapidly changing situa-
tion, people also rapidly adjust their representations of those situations—, I have depicted 
team members’ situation awareness as a sequence of snapshots (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-
Bower, & Stout, 2001). 
Another cognitive structure that has been related to team adaptation is a team’s trans-
active memory (Lewis et al., 2005; , Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). A team’s transactive 
memory consists of the knowledge of the individual members of the group combined with 
members’ knowledge of the content of information held by other members of the group. 
Through their experience of working together, team members not only achieve individual 
task experience but also develop an understanding of the knowledge and fields of expertise 
of their group members. This knowledge of “who knows what” enables group members to 
arrange their tasks in such a way as to optimally benefit from the variety of experience 
available within the team as a whole. 
The symbol depicting team mental models is repeated over time to indicate that not 
only mental models influence team situation awareness, but also the other way around; 
team members’ understanding of the situation will influence which mental models or which 
aspects of their mental models will be activated (Uitdewilligen, Waller, & Zijlstra, 2010). 
Moreover, mental models may change over time as team members update them and learn 
new associations of relationships in the environment. Note that the rate at which change 
occurs is likely to differ between the different types of knowledge structures (Cooke, Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000). Whereas in dynamic situations, situation awareness is 
likely to be in a constant flux, as the team continually updates its image of the situation, 
mental models and transactive memory will evolve more gradually as team members gain 
experience with the task and with each other. 
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Below the team cognitive structures the team interaction patterns are depicted. With 
interaction patterns I refer to recurring sequences of behaviors team members execute dur-
ing task performance (Stachowski et al., 2009; Zellmer-Bruhn, Waller, & Ancona, 2004). For 
example, in a team of fire fighters, when reaching the location of a fire, one member may 
start surveying the premises, while two others prepare the fire engine, and a fourth gathers 
information from the residents. As soon as they have finished their initial activities they start 
extinguishing the fire and possibly enter the building. I depict team interaction patterns as 
interlocking puzzle pieces in order to depict the interdependent nature of team work and to 
indicate that individual team members’ actions are often related to their specific role within 
the team (LePine, 2003). 
I follow the distinction made by Feldman and Pentland between ostensive and perfor-
mative aspects of routines (2003). The ostensive aspects of team interaction patterns are 
relatively fixed; whereas the performative aspects may be more easily adapted as team 
members adjust their actions relative to the demand of the situation. The arrow pointing 
downwards from the team knowledge structures indicates that the ostensive aspect of team 
interaction patterns are embedded within the cognitive scripts or procedural knowledge 
structures team members have of the sequence of events and actions that should occur in a 
specific situation (Abelson, 1976; Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). The symbol for ostensive inter-
action patterns is repeated to indicate that over time, as they adjust their performative in-
teraction patterns, team members develop new and adapt their existing interaction patterns. 
Team cognitive processes and team adaptation 
Team cognition refers to the collection of team knowledge structures, but also to the cogni-
tive processes team members collectively engage in during team performance (Salas & 
Fiore, 2004). Scholars have depicted adaptation as a process consisting of a number of 
phases or sub-processes that have to be successfully fulfilled in order for a team to success-
fully adapt. This view of team adaptation is based on a conceptualization of teams as infor-
mation processing systems—as entities that acquire, process, store, exchange, and use in-
formation (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). Although a wide variety of processes have 
been related to team adaptation, for sake of parsimony I will focus on four generic processes 
that consistently appear in information processing models of team adaptation (Burke et al., 
2006; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Marks et al., 2000): team information search, team situation 
awareness communication, decision making and planning, and action execution. Below I 
will give a short description of these processes and describe how they are related to cogni-
tive structures and team interaction patterns. 
Team information search is often considered the initial subprocess of team adaptation 
(Burke et al., 2006). In complex and dynamic environments, the extent to which teams take 
into account all aspects of their task situation is crucial for task performance (Burke et al., 
2006; Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, & Philips, 1995; Waller, 1999). Teams must 
collect information in order to recognize the need for change in their task strategies and to 
make informed decisions on team actions. For instance, the literature on team situation 
assessment indicates that particularly in highly dynamic task situations, continuous scan-
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ning of the relevant task environment is crucial for team performance and viability (Artman, 
2000; Mosier & Chidester, 1991). On the individual level, scholars have argued that the type 
of information team members’ perceive and the interpretations they form based on this 
interpretation depends on a person’s existing knowledge structures (Endsley, 1995; Starbuck 
& Milliken, 1988). Extrapolating this reasoning to the team level implies that characteristics 
of the composition of the team members’ knowledge structures impact how a team selects 
and processes information from the task situation (Hinsz et al., 1997). For instance, if the 
members of a team hold diverse mental models, they are likely to attend to a variety of 
information sources, whereas if team members have similar mental models, they are likely 
to attend to similar information sources and draw similar interpretations. Moreover, if a 
team has a well functioning transactive memory system, responsibilities for attending to and 
remembering information can be efficiently distributed among the team members (Liang, 
Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996, 1998). 
Team situation awareness communication. Information gleaned from the task situation 
becomes part of team members’ situation awareness. Although team members’ initial situa-
tion awareness arises from an interaction of their mental models and cues from the envi-
ronment, team members also engage in team situation awareness communication through 
which they share information about the situation, influence each others’ understanding, and 
co-construct their situation awareness (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996; Weick, 1995). 
Team situation awareness communication is closely related to team sensemaking “the proc-
ess by which a team manages and coordinates its efforts to explain the current situation and 
to anticipate future situations” (Klein, Wiggins, & Dominguez, 2010). While engaging in 
active task execution, team members must construct and continually update their under-
standing of the dynamic task situation as it unfolds over time. Moreover, in order for the 
team members to align their actions with one another and to function as an integrated en-
tity, team members must share crucial aspects of their situation understanding (Endsley, 
1995; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 
2008). 
Team decision making/ planning. When team members have developed their under-
standing of the task situation, the next step is to translate this novel understanding into 
decisions and plans for task execution. When the task situation has changed, team members 
need to reprioritize subtasks and redistribute responsibilities over the team members 
(Waller, 1999). Even though teams may have developed initial plans prior to their task 
performance, unexpected developments in the task situation requires teams to reflect on 
these previously formed plans and adjust them incorporating the new information 
(DeChurch & Haas, 2008; Weingart, 1992). Research on individual decision making in field 
situations indicates a direct link between recognition of the situation and the selection and 
execution of an appropriate action (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). How-
ever, on the team level, team members need to ensure that the actions of individual mem-
bers are attuned to one another, so that the team functions as an integrated entity. There-
fore, collective decision making and the development of an integrated plan of action consti-
tute an important element of team adaptation. 
Although team decision making may under some circumstances be a horizontal process 
in which all team members have equal influence, in many situations hierarchical distinction 
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are likely to impact how decisions are formed (Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, & Hedlunc, 1995). 
Threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981) suggests that: particularly during 
threatening crisis situations, teams are likely to experience constriction of control, whereby 
decision authority becomes concentrated within one or few team members. Constriction of 
control is likely to have an effect on how the compilation of team members’ knowledge 
structures impacts team decisions. For example, in a study with students performing in a 
team decision making simulation, Walsh, Henderson, and Deighton (1988), found that the 
knowledge structures of the most influential members had more impact on for team deci-
sion outcomes than those of less influential members (Walsh, Henderson, and Deighton, 
1988). Driskell and Salas (1991), however, found in an experimental study that under 
threatening conditions, high status team members accepted more influence on their deci-
sion from low status members than under non-threatening conditions. 
Action execution (Implicit/ Explicit coordination). The fourth process, action execution, 
refers to the actual implementation of plans and execution of team members’ synchronized 
actions. A wide variety of studies emphasizes the role of coordination of team members’ 
action for successful task performance (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995; 
Mathieu at al., 2008). The arrows pointing down from team situation awareness indicate 
the link between the sharedness and accuracy of team members’ representations of the 
situation and team implicit and explicit coordination (Rico et al., 2008). Implicit coordina-
tion refers to a team’s coordination of team members’ actions without the need for overt 
communication (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989). Implicit coordination is based on anticipations 
of the actions and needs of the other team members and the ongoing adjustment of team 
members’ actions in order to maintain concerted goal directed interaction patterns (Rico et 
al., 2008). Implicit coordination depends on the availability of appropriate ostensive inter-
action patterns for the specific task situations, as well as, on the appropriateness and shar-
edness of team members’ situation representations. 
If a team’s repertoire does not contain ostensive interaction patterns that fit the task 
situation or team members diverge in their representation of the situation, they have to 
engage in explicit coordination—overtly communicating their actions and intentions—
during task performance. For example, if in a ‘burning vehicle in building’ situation, all 
members of a fire fighting team have been trained on conducting the actions belonging to 
their role for that specific situation, and each individual fire fighter correctly labels the 
situation, there will be little need for explicit coordination. However, in case the fire fighters 
encounter a situation for which they have not been explicitly trained or that cannot be un-
ambiguously categorized, they will have to engage in team situation awareness communica-
tion and explicit planning processes to synchronize their actions. 
Levels of cognitive processing and cognitively switching gears 
The distinction between implicit and explicit coordination is related to the notion that in-
formation processing can take place at different levels. Literature on individual level cogni-
tion indicates that cognitive processes may occur at two (Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977) or 
three (Rasmussen, 1982) different levels. For example, Rasmussen (1982; 1986) distin-
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guished between three levels of cognitive control in task performance. The first, skill based 
control, is associated with the highly automated integrated patterns of behavior of people 
when they are highly experienced with a task. The second, rule based control, occurs when 
people are familiar with but do not have extensive experience with a task and is based on a 
linkage between the recognition of a situation and rules for actions derived from previous 
experience or from instruction. Third, in novel situations where proper rules are not avail-
able individuals engage in knowledge based regulation—controlled analytical processing in 
which people draw on their declarative knowledge to make sense of their task situation and 
infer goal appropriate actions. 
On a more general level, scholars have made a distinction between automatic and con-
trolled processing (Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Automatic processing is a fast, rigid, and 
relatively effortless form of information processing based on experience in similar situa-
tions. With controlled processing, on the other hand, people actively and consciously proc-
ess information. It is therefore more flexible, much slower, and it puts heavy demands on 
attentional capacity. Moreover, the type of knowledge structures people rely on in the dif-
ferent modes of processing varies. Whereas task performance in an automatic mode of 
control relies on procedural knowledge—relatively automatic and inarticulate memory 
providing the steps and action sequences required for task performance (Cohen & 
Bacdayan, 1994), controlled processing involves the conscious application of higher level 
knowledge in the form of declarative knowledge structures or mental models (Rasmussen, 
1993). 
On the team level, routine based interactions can be considered a form of automatic 
processing (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick & Hackman, 1990). As Cohen and Bacdayan 
indicate “(r)outines arise in repetitive situations where the recurring cost of careful delib-
eration can become a heavy burden” (1994, p.555). Routine based interaction facilitates 
coordination by contributing to the predictability of the behavior of other team members. 
Moreover, due to its cognitive efficiency routine based automatic processing may be optimal 
in many task situations—if tasks are automatically executed people have at their disposal 
spare attentional resources, which enable them to engage in additional activities, such as 
scanning the environment for possible alterations and the rehearsal of future responses 
(Thorngate, 1976). However, when teams are faced with novel task situations, teams require 
controlled processing in order to make sense of the task situation and critically reflect on the 
appropriateness of their interaction practices (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994). 
Louis and Sutton (1991) argued that it is not so much the mode of operation that is im-
portant but the extent to which individuals and teams are able to switch between modes. In 
other words, teams have to be able to sense when the task situation has changed to such an 
extent that a reliance on automatic routine processing becomes detrimental to performance 
(e.g. Stachowski et al., 2009). This is consistent with findings of Waller (1999) that it is not 
so much adaption processes per se, but the timing of these processes directly following non-
routine events that enable a team to maintain high performance. Likewise, the argument of 
Louis and Sutton (1991) implies that as soon as the team has developed and incorporated 
interaction patterns that fit the novel task situation, the team should shift gears back again 
into automatic functioning. 
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A cautionary note: limits to the positive effects of team adaptation 
Finally, although I have defined team adaptation explicitly as an effective process, a cau-
tionary note should be made that this does not mean that all adjustments to the environ-
ment are equally positive. Discrepancies between short term and long term outcomes and 
between team goals and higher level system goals may render some forms of adaptation 
undesirable. I will shortly consider these boundary conditions to the beneficial effects of 
team adaptation. 
First, an adjustment that positively contributes to team performance in the short term 
may have negative performance effects in the long run. Research by Rudolph and Repen-
ning (2002) indicates that an accumulation of small interruptions can shift an organiza-
tional system from a resilient, self-regulating regime, to a fragile, self-escalating system. 
Comparably, too much adaptation aimed at short term outcomes may lead to instability in 
the team in terms of its interaction patterns and cognitive structures, which in the end may 
become detrimental to team performance. The more instable the team interaction patterns, 
the more difficult it becomes for team members to anticipate what actions they can expect 
from the other members, which may lead to breakdowns in coordination (e.g. Kanki et al., 
1991). Moreover, instability in knowledge structures may create uncertainty in team mem-
bers about their knowledge structures, which might temporarily paralyze team members. As 
an example, a soccer team that continuously adapts its playing style to its opponents may 
win some games but will ultimately fail as it fails to develop its own playing style. Besides, if 
teams are faced with successive adaptation requiring situations, the accumulation of atten-
tional resources this requires may overtax team members and eventually lead to cognitive 
breakdowns. Therefore, under some circumstances it maybe optimal to take a short term 
performance loss by not adapting, in order to secure stability and long term performance. 
Alternative strategies teams may apply is shielding itself from external influences or engag-
ing in adaptation only after a critical mass of changes has accumulated (Miller, 1978). 
Second, adaptation that has positive outcomes for a single team may have negative 
outcomes for a higher entity in which that team is embedded. Given that teams often consti-
tute part of a wider system, adaptation of a single team, may, although positive for the 
outcomes of that team, have detrimental effects on the performance of the overall system. In 
particular, adaptation of one team may have a disruptive effect on the linkage of that team 
with other teams. For example if a fire fighting team deviates from standard operating pro-
cedures regarding their treatment and location of victims, expectation of the medical teams 
about the procedures that will be followed may diverge from the actual situation and there-
fore between-team coordination breakdowns may occur. This implies that, if adaptation of 
lower level entities is not coordinated with adaptation of other entities that are interde-
pendent with that entity, the outcomes for the higher level entity may be negative. This 
suggests that adaptation should not only be investigated at the team level but also on the 




To summarize, team adaptation is aimed at attaining congruence between the team’s con-
figuration (members’ knowledge structures, interaction patterns) and a changing task situa-
tion. Team situation awareness and performative interaction patterns are relatively respon-
sive to the immediate changes in the environment, while this responsiveness is less for the 
more fixed aspects represented by team mental models and ostensive interaction patterns. 
However, cumulative deviations in team situation awareness and performative interaction 
patterns will cause team mental models and ostensive interaction patterns also to change 
over time, leading to updating and learning in mental models and the development of new 
performance routines. Team cognitive processes can be seen as the drivers of change in 
team cognitive structures and interaction processes. Finally, it has to be noted that there 
also is an inverse relation from team actions to the environment. An embedded system 
model of teams suggests that teams are not merely passively reacting to their environment 
but may also actively shape and influence the environment in which they are embedded 
(Arrow et al., 2000; Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Weick, 1988). 
Aim and overview of the dissertation 
As the model described above indicates, team cognition constitutes an essential element of 
team adaptation. However, although this model is based on existing theory and research, 
the effect of most of the cognitive structures and processes on team adaptation outcomes 
have not been empirically investigated. Therefore, in the present dissertation I take a cogni-
tive perspective to team adaptation, viewing teams as collective information processing 
systems (Hinsz et al., 1997) and investigate the role of cognitive structures and processes in 
team adaptation. The aim of this dissertation is threefold. First, I aim to unravel the rela-
tionship between characteristics of the described cognitive structures and team adaptation 
and I aim to investigate how team cognitive structures interact with team processes in pre-
dicting team adaptive performance. Second, I aim to investigate the nature, antecedents, 
and consequences of change and development of cognitive structures. Third, I aim to inves-
tigate the nature of teams’ cognitive adaptation processes and their effect on team adapta-
tion to novel circumstances. In the dissertation I present five chapters in which I focus on 
and elaborate on aspects of the presented cognitive model and contribute to the research 
aims stated above. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the first research aim, unraveling the relationship between cogni-
tive structures and team adaptation. The chapter provides an extensive review of the role of 
three team cognition constructs in predicting team adaptation: shared mental models, a 
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transactive memory system, and team situation awareness. We2 provide an extensive review 
of existing literature on these concepts and critically investigate how each of these concepts 
relates to team adaptation. We find that overall much of the research in the extant literature 
suggests that these cognitive structures facilitate the coordination and communication 
necessary for teams to adapt in turbulent and dynamic task settings. However, we conclude 
with a critical note, questioning the basic assumption that these structures always facilitate 
team adaptation. Moreover, we find that research on team mental models has mainly fo-
cused on characteristics of similarity and accuracy whereas aspects such as mental model 
complexity and change, which are likely to also be important for team adaptation, have 
been underexposed. 
In line with the second research aim, in Chapter 3 we investigate the nature, antece-
dents, and consequences of change and development of cognitive structures. We present a 
study in which we investigated the effects of team situation awareness, adaptation behav-
iors, and changes in mental models on post-change adaptive performance. For this study we 
constructed a task-change simulation scenario in which the team task structure changed 
halfway the simulation. We measured team situation awareness before the change and 
mental models before and after the change. In addition, we analyzed team communication 
and assessed the extent to which the teams applied repetitive patterns in their behaviors in 
the performance period after the change. The results indicate a positive relationship be-
tween the extent to which team members updated their mental models relative to changes 
in the task situation and team adaptive performance. Moreover, this relationship was par-
tially mediated by team interaction patterns. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the relationship between cognitive structures and team adapta-
tion and on the interaction between cognitive structures, processes, and performance. The 
chapter describes how theories that advocate cognitive similarity and theories that advocate 
cognitive diversity seem to lead to opposing inferences regarding team performance under 
dynamic circumstances. Shared mental model theory advocates similarity in cognitive 
knowledge structures among team members, while transactive memory theory emphasizes 
the benefits that can be gained from cognitive diversification. We attempt to unite these 
theories by introducing the notion of cognitive complexity—teams require external align-
ment in order to deal with complex environments and internal alignment to coordinate their 
information processing. We conducted a study in which teams performed in a dynamic 
complex management simulation. In contrast to the previous study, the team task does not 
contain a single adaptation event but instead the teams had to repeatedly adapt their tactics 
and strategies to a dynamically changing task situation. Findings of the study indicate that 
both internal and external cognitive alignments are crucial for team performance develop-
ment over time. Team mental model complexity, transactive memory systems, and shared 




2 Because I have worked together with a number of different co-authors on the studies re-
ported in this dissertation, I use the term ‘we’ to designate myself and the co-authors with 
whom the various studies were executed.  
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mental models had an influence on team performance trajectories. In addition, we found a 
moderation effect of team mental model complexity on the relationship between team 
information search and team performance over time. 
In chapter 5 we explore the third research aim, the nature of teams’ cognitive adapta-
tion processes. We present a case study on a single team in which we investigate how this 
team alters its understanding of an unexpected dynamic situation over time. We analyzed a 
sample of the audio communication of the operations team of NEADS— the organization 
responsible for coordinating the air defense of the northeast quadrant of the United States 
during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. From our analyses of the data we con-
cluded that in ambiguous situations, teams construct temporary ‘working hypotheses’ of the 
situation that enable them to maintain sense and coordinate their actions. The formation 
and abandonment of these working hypotheses over time consisted of an iterative process of 
using and discarding working hypotheses as events unfolded and sensemaking occurred. 
In Chapter 6 we investigate how the central command teams of an emergency man-
agement system developed an understanding of an unfolding crisis management situation 
and make decisions on what actions to take. In this chapter, we take a communication per-
spective on team cognition (Keyton, Beck, & Asbury, 2010; Waller, 1999), as we investigate 
teams’ situation awareness formation from the communication among the team members. 
We analyze video recordings of emergency management command teams as they perform in 
a crisis management simulation. Our findings indicate that the team communication process 
can be divided into a two phase structure. An initial phase aimed at setting the structure of 
the meeting and sharing individually held information and a second decision making phase 
in which the teams focus on making decisions on actions to take. Our results indicate that, 
compared to average-performing teams, high-performing teams spent more time on the 
initial phase and make decisions more rapidly  in t h e d ec i si on  mak i ng  p h a se .  M or e ov er ,  
high-performing teams engaged in more collective interpretation processes during the 
decision making phase compared to average-performing teams and schematic use of the 
whiteboard influenced the extent to which teams engaged in collective interpretation proc-
esses. 
Finally in Chapter 7, I provide an overview of the main findings of each study. I discuss 
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In this chapter we aim to unravel the relationship between cognitive structures and team 
adaptability. The chapter provides an extensive review of the role of three team cognition 
constructs in predicting team adaptation success: shared mental models, a transactive 
memory system, and team situation awareness. We provide an extensive review of existing 
literature on these concepts and critically investigate how each of these concepts relates to 
team adaptation. We find that overall much of the research in the extant literature suggests 
that these cognitive structures facilitate the coordination and communication necessary for 
teams to adapt in turbulent and dynamic task settings. However, we conclude with a critical 
note, questioning the basic assumption that these structures always facilitate team adapta-
tion. Moreover, we find that research on team mental models has mainly focused on charac-
teristics of similarity and accuracy whereas aspects such as mental model complexity and 
change, which are likely to also be important for team adaptation, have been underexposed. 
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Introduction 
Given the increased unpredictability, complexity, and turbulence of organizational and 
economic environments, organizations are relying on teams of individuals to analyze situa-
tions, solve problems, make decisions, negotiate agreements, and generally keep things 
running. Teams provide an efficient means of arranging work in many organizational struc-
tures (Zaccaro & Bader, 2003), and researchers for some time have trained their focus on 
understanding how teams successfully and unsuccessfully manage the aforelisted tasks. One 
particular team characteristic has emerged as critical, given the dynamic situations within 
which many teams now find themselves embedded: adaptability. 
It is no longer adequate, in countless organizational situations, for teams to follow the 
“rational” prescription of scanning the environment, collecting and analyzing data, develop-
ing alternatives, and solving problems or making decisions. Teams may be peppered with 
non-routine events as they struggle to follow accepted guidelines and operating procedures 
(Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009). Team decision rules meant for relatively stable con-
ditions may become obsolete as competitors run and change at Internet speed. Instead, 
these and similar situations that call for proactive anticipation and agile adaptation require 
teams with members who are connected in very particular ways. 
In this chapter, we present a review of recent research published within the last 15 
years about those “particular ways”—specifically, the shared mental models, transactive 
memory, and team situation awareness (TSA)—that are suggested to enable teams to sense 
and manage unexpected events in their dynamic task environments. Briefly, shared mental 
models are mental representations of knowledge, relationships, or systems that are similar 
across team members. Transactive memory has been defined as the division of cognitive 
labor in a team with respect to encoding, storing, and retrieving knowledge from different 
domains (Lewis, Belliveau, Herndon, & Keller, 2007)—or more colloquially, the system of 
knowing who on the team knows what. Finally, team situation awareness differs from 
shared mental models and transactive memory in that it is shared contextual knowledge 
about the current situation, team members’ knowledge of each other’s goals, and their cur-
rent and future activities and intentions (Roth, Multer, & Raslear, 2006). 
Overall, much of the research to be reviewed in this chapter suggests that each of these 
team cognitive structures facilitate the coordination and communication necessary in teams 
attempting to successfully anticipate and react to turbulent, dynamic task settings. In our 
conclusion to the chapter, however, we question the building assumption that these types of 
shared cognition always facilitate the adaptability needed by teams facing unexpected and 
turbulent situations, and explain how the level and type of dynamism in teams’ environ-
ments may significantly influence the positive effects of shared mental models, transactive 
memory, and shared situation awareness in teams. Additionally, given our focus on these 
aspects of shared cognition, we pay particular attention in this review to work pertaining to 
“action” teams—that is, teams that face unpredictable, dynamic and complex task environ-
ments, and both react to and influence those environments (Chen, Thomas, & Wallace, 
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2005; Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000). Where appropriate in our review, we highlight 
how each of the three types of shared cognition is thought to facilitate adaptability in teams, 
and we include suggestions for future research. 
Adaptability 
Several models of team adaptation have appeared in the teams literature in recent years. 
Referring to their advanced conceptual model of team adaptation, Burke and colleagues 
define team adaptation as “a change in team performance, in response to a salient cue or 
cue stream, that leads to a functional outcome for the entire team” (Burke, Stagl, Salas, 
Pierce, & Kendall, 2006, p. 1190). These scholars suggest that teams adapt in a recursive, 
cyclical nature over time to their changing contexts, and specifically suggest that teams with 
accurate and flexible mental models and heightened levels of TSA will be better able than 
other teams to notice and correctly identify important changes in their task situations. Le-
Pine (2005, p. 1154) refers to team adaptation a “nonscripted” response that calls for action 
other than learned routines, or as a “response to an unforeseen change that creates prob-
lems for which the team has had limited experience or training”, and suggests that individu-
als’ cognition levels provide an important antecedent to team-level adaptation. Marks and 
colleagues (2000, p. 972) refer to team adaptation as occurring when “teams are able to 
derive and use new strategies and techniques for confronting novel elements in their envi-
ronments.” Marks and colleagues also suggest that the similarity and accuracy of teams’ 
mental models will facilitate team adaptation efforts. Chen and co-authors (2005) suggest 
that the transfer of training in teams involves adaptive expertise, or “the capacity to modify 
knowledge, skill, and other characteristics acquired during training to meet novel, difficult, 
and complex situations” (p. 828). 
Thus, the recent work on adaptation in teams is fairly consistent in characterizing team 
adaptation as change undertaken by a team in terms of (1) specific task performance behav-
ior, (2) strategies for planned behavior, or (3) collective knowledge, in response to or an-
ticipation of some unexpected, novel, non-routine, complex event. This work is also consis-
tent in suggesting that elements of shared cognition in teams, most often shared mental 
models, facilitate teams’ efforts to make these necessary and often time-pressured changes. 
Consequently, we turn now to review the literature on shared mental models in order to 
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Shared mental models 
Probably the most widely researched concept pertaining to shared cognition is the shared 
mental model notion (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Mathieu, Heffner, Good-
win, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and the related concept 
of shared schema (Rentsch & Hall, 1994). Mental models are organized knowledge struc-
tures consisting of the content as well as the structure of the concepts in the mind of indi-
viduals that represent a specific task or knowledge domain (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kieras, & 
Bovair, 1984; Orasanu & Salas, 1993). Reasoning based on mental models is a form of top-
down information processing in the sense that cumulated knowledge from past experiences 
is used to make sense of information environments and to guide action (Abelson & Black, 
1986; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Walsh, 1995). Hence, mental mod-
els are functional structures that enable people to describe, explain, and predict a system 
with which they interact (Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008: Rouse & 
Morris, 1986). For example, machine operators may possess a mental model that depicts the 
cause and effect relations of the internal functioning of a machine. To the extent that their 
mental models properly mirror the actual functioning of the machine, operators will be able 
to deduce what the parameters on the machine display signify about the system’s state and 
be able to infer the consequences of alternative actions. 
Since the introduction of the concept of mental models to teams research in a number 
of seminal theory papers (e.g. Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; 
Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; Rentsch & Hall, 1994), teams researchers have embraced this con-
cept and provided an ongoing stream of articles and studies covering team-level properties 
of mental models, which we will refer to here as shared mental model theory. The basic 
tenet of shared mental model theory is that congruence in team members’ mental models 
facilitates efficient teamwork and consequently leads to high performance (Cannon-Bowers 
et al., 1993). On the basis of this principle, researchers have suggested that shared mental 
models may facilitate team performance and decision making in a wide variety of situations 
(e.g. Langfield-Smith, 1992; Smith & Dowell, 2000; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Milano-
vich, 1999; Walsh & Fahey, 1986) and facilitate team adaptation in challenging and novel 
situations (Burke et al., 2006; Marks, et al., 2000; McIntyre & Salas, 1995; Waller, 1999; 
Waller, Gupta, & Giambatista, 2004). 
The field has now reached a point where a substantial number of empirical studies 
have been published in the area, allowing us to draw more informed conclusions regarding 
the consequences, antecedents, mediators, and contingencies of shared mental models. 
Here we seek to provide an update of the state of the field, and focus in particular on the 
empirical evidence that has been found, identifying some outstanding issues for which 
empirical tests are still wanting. In the following section we will first describe some concep-
tual issues related to shared mental models. After this we will discuss the measurement 
techniques that have been used to elicit mental models from team members and report team 
outcomes and processes that are associated with shared mental models. Then we will review 
antecedents of shared mental models and contingency factors that influence the impact of 
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shared mental models. We will end with some outstanding issues in research on shared 
mental models and present directions for further research. 
Types of Shared Mental Models 
Researchers in the area have generally agreed that different types of mental models may be 
active simultaneously in teams. Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) suggested that at any 
given point in time, multiple mental models may be shared among the members of a team. 
Regarding mental model types, Cooke and colleagues (2000) distinguished between three 
types of knowledge that individuals‘ mental models may contain: (1) declarative knowledge, 
containing the facts, figures, rules, relations, and concepts of a task domain; (2) procedural 
knowledge, consisting of the steps, procedures, sequences, and actions required for task 
performance; and (3) strategic knowledge, consisting of the superseding task strategies and 
knowledge of when they apply. It has also been suggested variously that mental models may 
consist of collections of these different knowledge types (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and 
that each type of knowledge may be considered as a separate mental model (Banks & Mill-
ward, 2007). 
Whereas the aforementioned division applies to the type or form of mental models, 
team members may also hold mental models for different aspects of their task. Cannon-
Bowers and co-authors (1993) identified mental models for four aspects of a task that may 
be required for successful team performance: (1) a model of the equipment used in the 
execution of the task, (2) a model representing aspects of the task itself, such as task proc-
esses, strategies, and likely scenarios, (3) a team interaction mental model, representing 
team members interaction and communication patterns, roles, and responsibilities, (4) a 
team member model, containing knowledge about other teammates’ knowledge, skills, 
abilities, attitudes, beliefs, and tendencies. An examination of empirical studies on shared 
mental models indicates that most researchers have used a somewhat simpler division, and 
have—on the basis of a classical distinction of Morgan, Glickman, Woodward, Blaiwes, and 
Salas (1986) between a taskwork track and a teamwork track of team development—
collapsed the first two and the second two mental model types into task and team mental 
models (e.g. Cooke et al., 2003; Fleming, Wood, Gonzalo, Bader, & Zaccaro, 2003; Lim & 
Klein, 2006, Mathieu et al, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 
2005). However, many other scholars have focused on a single mental model (e.g. Ellis, 
2006; Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 2002; Marks, et al., 2000; Rentsch & Klimoski, 
2001). 
In sum, shared mental models are a configural type of team construct indicating the 
degree of similarity among the mental models of members of a team (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000; Mathieu et al., 2005). 
Measurement of Mental Models 
The measurement of mental models is a topic that has garnered increasing interest and 
concern among teams researchers. On the basis of a review of the various techniques avail-
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able to measure mental models, Mohammed, Klimoski, and Rentsch (2000) concluded that 
researchers must base their choice of measurement technique on a careful consideration of 
the research question and research context. They also called for the inclusion of multiple 
measurement techniques in single studies in order to assess their relative benefits and in-
crease their predictive validity. 
In a number of methodological articles and reviews, researchers have noted a wide va-
riety of elicitation, representation, and analysis techniques available for assessing mental 
models that could be applied to a team context (see, e.g., Cooke et al., 2000; Hodgkinson & 
Healey, 2008; Langan-Fox, Code, & Langfield-Smith, 2000; Mohammed et al., 2000). Elici-
tation techniques have included: cognitive interviewing, questionnaires, process tracing and 
verbal protocol analysis, text based content analysis, and a variety of conceptual methods 
including visual card sorting, repertory grid, causal mapping, ordered tree technique, and 
matrix based and pairwise ratings. Analysis and representation methods included: path-
finder networks, multidimensional scaling, and UCINET techniques based on proximity 
ratings, cause mapping based on interviews and questionnaire data, and text-based cause 
mapping involving the systematic coding of documents and transcripts. 
Whereas Mohammed and colleagues (2000) indicated that the most common elicita-
tion methodologies in the study of team mental models were similarity ratings and Likert-
scale questionnaires, it seems that the popularity of Likert-scale questions has decreased 
while the use of similarity ratings and concept mapping seems to have increased in recent 
empirical studies. With similarity ratings, researchers typically derive, by means of a task 
analysis, a number of concepts that are relevant for team task execution. Respondents are 
asked to rate the similarity—in terms of causality, relatedness, proximity, or association—
they perceive between these concepts. Outcomes of this ratings process are subsequently 
subjected to systems such as Pathfinder or UCINET to derive and analyze the mental models 
(see Edwards et al., 2006 and Mathieu et al., 2000 for examples). With concept mapping 
methods, team members are asked to place concepts in a pre-specified hierarchical structure 
(Mohammed et al., 2000). For example, Marks and colleagues (2000) asked team members 
to indicate on a timeline the sequence of actions they themselves would take, as well as the 
actions the other team members would be taking at the same time during team task per-
formance. Similarity is typically subsequently calculated by assigning points for each in-
stance in which team members located similar concepts or actions within the predefined 
structure. Using a different method, Carley (1997) employed a textual analysis technique 
that helped automate the approach for deriving mental models from written text. In her 
study, participants answered an open-ended essay question regarding their team task. Con-
cepts were derived from the words team members used in their texts, and the relationships 
among those concepts were obtained from the proximity of the location of these concepts 
within the text. 
Webber and colleagues (2000) distinguished between consistency measures of similar-
ity and consensus measures in their work. According to this conceptualization, consistency 
only requires similarity in rank ordering between raters, whereas consensus requires essen-
tially the same ratings. Weber and colleagues’ results indicated that although team mental 
model consistency was not significantly related with team performance, team mental model 
consensus was. On the other hand, Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, and Kraiger (2005) only found 
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significant relationships between mental model similarity and team performance with a 
consistency-based measure of similarity and not with a consensus measure of this construct. 
Some researchers have suggested that in particular situations, there may not be one 
single most accurate mental model; instead, multiple mental models of equally high quality 
may exist at the same time (Marks et al., 2000; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2001). Mathieu and 
colleagues (2005) noted that measures of mental model accuracy that depend on a single 
referent or “ideal” model cannot distinguish mental model similarity from mental model 
quality at the high end of the continuum—that is, if team members’ mental models highly 
resemble the referent model, they will, as an artifact of the measurement method, also 
highly resemble each other. To remedy this limitation, they developed a measure of quality 
as an alternative to accuracy of mental models that does not depend on reference to “ideal” 
models; as a result, the new measure leaves open the possibility of several structurally dif-
ferent, high quality mental models. These researchers derived referent task mental models 
by identifying clusters among the mental models of a group of experienced flight simulation 
players and referent team mental models by clustering mental models of a sample of teams 
researchers. 
To summarize, it appears that the techniques often used by researchers to measure 
various aspects of mental models provide relatively straightforward measures of accuracy 
and similarity. However, these techniques may be restricted in that participants’ mental 
models are constructed with a limited amount of concepts that are often predefined by the 
researchers. This may render these measurement techniques less than optimal means to 
investigate richer and more idiosyncratic aspects of mental models, such as mental model 
complexity (Curseu, Schruijer, & Boros, 2007) or flexibility in the cognitive processes and 
structures that may facilitate adaptation (Chen et al., 2005; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). 
However, a number of recent advances in the measurement of individual-level mental mod-
els reported in Organizational Research Methods seem to provide a promising avenue for 
more complex operationalizations of the structural aspects of shared mental models (e.g. 
Clarkson & Hodgkinson, 2005; Hodgkinson, Maule, & Bown, 2004; Nadkarni & Narayanan, 
2005; Wright, 2008). 
Outcomes of Shared Mental Models 
Direct effects of shared mental models. Previous reviews of shared mental models have 
indicated that despite several articles and chapters describing shared mental models, the 
empirical record of evidence supporting the beneficial effects of shared mental models on 
team performance is still wanting (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger & Wenzel, 1997; 
Mohammed et al., 2000). An investigation of studies appearing in the trail of these publica-
tions indicates that researchers have clearly taken these comments to heart and have gone 
beyond applying mental models merely a posteriori to explain relationships between team 
behavior and performance; instead, researchers have moved towards directly eliciting the 
mental models held by team members and relating them to a variety of team outcomes. 
Over the past two decades, an accumulating body of research has supplied evidence for a 
direct effect between the similarity of team members’ mental models and team task per-
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formance in a large variety of domains, including simulation studies (e.g. Cooke, Kiekel, & 
Helm, 2001; Cooke et al., 2003; Ellis, 2006; Fleming et al., 2003; Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, 
& Nagele, 2007; Marks et al., 2002; Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 
2005) and also field studies on air traffic control teams (Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, & Kraiger, 
2005), work teams (Rentsch & Klimoski, 2001), combat teams (Lim & Klein, 2006), and 
basketball teams (Webber, Chen, Payne, Marsh, & Zaccaro, 2000). 
Similarity and accuracy. Several scholars have indicated that it is not only similarity or 
overlap in team mental models but also the accuracy of those mental models that is required 
to benefit team effectiveness (Cooke, et al., 2000; Rentsch & Hall, 1994). Team mental 
model accuracy refers to the extent to which the mental models of the team members ade-
quately represent the structure of the system it models (Stout, Salas, & Kraiger, 1997). Men-
tal model accuracy is most often assessed by comparing participants’ mental models with a 
referent mental model developed by one or a few task experts (e.g. Cook et al., 2001; Lim & 
Klein, 2006) or by having experts rate the quality of participants’ mental models (e.g. Ellis, 
2006; Marks et al., 2000). Team mental model accuracy is subsequently calculated as the 
average accuracy of the team members’ mental models (Cooke et al., 2003; Lim & Klein, 
2006; Webber et al., 2000). 
Results of a number of studies indicate that team mental model accuracy is sometimes 
(Cooke et al., 2001; Cooke et al., 2003; Edwards, Day, Arthur, & Bell, 2006; Lim & Klein, 
2006; Marks et al., 2000) but not always (e.g. Webber et al., 2000) directly related to team 
performance. Interestingly Marks and co-authors (2000) found an interaction between the 
effects of mental model similarity and accuracy on performance, such that teams with less 
accurate mental models seemed to benefit more from mental model similarity than teams 
with more accurate mental models. Additionally, in a study directly comparing the predic-
tive accuracy of team mental model similarity and accuracy, Edwards and colleagues (2006) 
found that mental model accuracy was a stronger predictor of team performance than men-
tal model similarity 
Scholars have posited that shared mental models influence team performance through 
their effect on team interaction processes (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Moham-
med, 1994), and this seems to have been supported by empirical studies indicating mediat-
ing effects of coordination, communication, and collaboration processes on the relationship 
between shared mental models and team performance (Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 
2000; Mathieu et al., 2005). Below, we review in greater detail work that has examined each 
of these three mediating processes. 
Coordination. Congruence in team members’ mental models is considered to affect 
team functioning through its effect on team coordination processes. Coordination processes 
refer to those behaviors that are aimed at attuning the resources and activities of individual 
team members towards the concerted goal directed behavior of the team as a unit (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1995). A crucial aspect of coordination is the harmonization of interdependent 
activities performed by the different members of the team. Shared mental models are ex-
pected to affect team coordination by providing mutual expectations from which accurate, 
timely predictions can be drawn about the behavior of other team members (Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993). In particular, shared expectations are considered to facilitate tacit 
coordination—coordination based on unspoken assumptions about what actions other 
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members are likely to pursue and what information they require (Wittenbaum, Vaughan, & 
Stasser, 1998). 
Especially in high-workload situations, implicit coordination may be the optimal way 
to manage intra-team interdependencies because it requires only a limited amount of com-
munication overhead, time, and cognitive energy (Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Macmillan, Entin, 
& Serfaty, 2004). It is, therefore, not surprising that a number of studies have indicated that 
coordination mediates the relationship between mental model similarity and performance 
(e.g. Marks et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 2000; 2005). 
Apart from facilitating coordination through attuning actions, overlapping knowledge 
also comprises a source of robustness for a social cognitive system in the face of error and 
interruption (Hutchins, 1995). In case a team member is unable to perform his or her ap-
pointed responsibilities, cognitive redundancy makes it possible for the team as a whole to 
perform its team task because another team member may be able to take over execution of 
the task. Salas and colleagues (2005) emphasized the importance of shared mental models 
in two processes related to the robustness of the system: mutual performance monitoring 
and back-up behavior. The ability to keep track of other team members’ task performance 
while executing one’s own task and to correct errors and assist others if necessary is impor-
tant to guarantee consistent team performance, in particular under non-routine, stressful 
circumstances (Marks & Panzer, 2004). Empirical evidence indicating back-up behavior as a 
significant mediator between mental model similarity and team performance seems to 
support this reasoning (Marks et al., 2002). Thus, a shared understanding about team tasks 
enables members to assess if other team members are falling short of task performance and 
to give assistance if required. 
Communication. Research also suggests that shared mental models are positively re-
lated to the quality of communication in teams (Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000; 
2005). Marks and co-authors (2000) found that mental model similarity was positively 
related to quality of team communication as well as to team performance. Additionally, 
mental model accuracy was positively related to team performance, but a linear relation 
between mental model accuracy and quality of team communication was not supported in 
these researchers’ results. Team members with similar mental models are also more likely to 
communicate information that is required by others at the time it is required, and in a way 
that is understood by the recipient (Fussell & Krauss, 1989; Krauss & Fussell, 1991). Espe-
cially during periods with strong time constraints and high stress levels, the ability to com-
municate can be highly reduced (Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989); therefore, in order to function 
effectively as a team with minimum amounts of communication, it is essential for team 
performance that members share a similar understanding of the task situation. This allows 
team members to coordinate implicitly without the need for overt communication (Klein-
man & Serfaty, 1989; Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Johnston, 1997). Ironically, however, main-
taining a shared understanding may be especially problematic under stressful circumstances 
(Driskell, Salas, & Johnston, 1999). Ellis (2006) found that acute stress negatively affected 
team interaction model similarity and accuracy, which consequently had a negative impact 
on performance. This suggests that, for those situations in which a shared understanding is 
most essential for task performance, maintaining this shared understanding may be most 
difficult. 
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Collaboration. With respect to collaboration, the existence of shared mental models 
can reduce a team’s investment in time and resources for reaching consensus, and can de-
crease the occurrence of friction due to cognitive divergence and misunderstanding. Re-
search on group3 negotiations has indicated that a common understanding of each party’s 
problems and possible solutions constitutes an essential ingredient for reaching the maxi-
mum joint outcome (Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007). In newly formed teams, 
members often require a considerable proportion of their time getting to know each other 
and establishing a shared understanding of the task structure and the actions that are ap-
propriate for performance (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). Constructing a shared un-
derstanding about the nature of the task and the norms for team interaction may involve 
political processes and negotiation (Walsh & Fahay, 1986). Therefore, teams in which 
shared mental models are present before task performance may need less time for clarifying 
and agreeing upon strategies. Consequently, such teams may have more time and resources 
for task execution and performance monitoring than other teams. Mohammed and col-
leagues (2000) have suggested that if team members even perceive that their mental models 
are similar, this perception may lead to positive affective reactions and facilitate the devel-
opment of trust within the team. 
Antecedents of Shared Mental Models 
A number of researchers have investigated the conditions under which accurate and shared 
mental models are most likely to arise in teams. Kraiger and Wenzel (1997) suggested four 
categories of antecedents of team mental models: environmental, organizational, team, and 
individual. Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) emphasize group formation, development, and 
training as important factors that may affect the course and speed of team mental model 
development. There is supportive evidence for each of these aspects. 
Teams researchers have indicated the necessity of considering the broader system con-
text in which a team operates for understanding the functioning of individual teams (Arrow, 
McGrath, & Berdahl, 2000; Hackman, 2003; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999). One 
way in which the environmental context influences team functioning is by shaping the men-
tal models the team members bring with them to their team task. Although some research-
ers have set out to identify aspects of mental models that are generic and transfer over dif-
ferent contexts (Druskat & Pescosolido, 2002; Johnson et al., 2007), most mental models are 
learned and developed within, and are idiosyncratic to, a specific context—for example, a 
department, organization, or industry. As individuals spend time within an organization, 
they learn and become socialized as to the ‘dominant logic’ prevailing within that organiza-
tion (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Also, selection criteria used in member recruitment and self-




3 We will use the terms “group” and “team” interchangeably in the present review, reverting 
as much as possible to the terms used by the original authors of the articles we describe 
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selection processes may contribute to ensure that organization members hold similar orien-
tations to their work and tasks (Mohammed et al., 2000). 
Two field studies provide support for this kind of contextual influence on shared men-
tal model formation. In a study addressing the antecedents of team member mental model 
similarity, Rentsch and Klimoski (2001) found that similarity in education and organiza-
tional level, average team experience, and whether a team member was actively recruited to 
the team were positively related to mental model similarity. In a study among navy person-
nel, Smith-Jentsch and co-authors (2001) found that higher ranking personnel had more 
accurate team mental models—as measured by similarity to a referent model—than lower 
ranking personnel. Additionally, they found that higher ranking individuals and individuals 
who had spent more time in the navy held more similar mental models of teamwork than 
lower ranking officers and individuals who had spend less time in the navy. 
Whereas such organizational assimilation effects can lead to congruence of mental 
models within teams from a single organization, for teams consisting of members originat-
ing from different organizations (e.g. temporary teams such as inter-agency crisis manage-
ment teams), it may be particularly difficult to attain such a shared understanding (e.g. 
Smith & Dowell, 2000). Cronin and Weingart (2007) noticed that when members hold 
different functional backgrounds in which different mental models prevail, teams may 
suffer from ‘perceptual gaps’—misunderstanding between team members about what is 
needed for the team to be successful. There also is some evidence of task contextual influ-
ences on team members’ mental models. In an experimental simulation, Driskell and col-
leagues (1999) found that, relative to teams performing in a low-stress condition, team 
members performing the task in a high-stress environment became more individualistic and 
self-focused, which manifested in more individual and less collective representations of the 
task. Building on these findings, Ellis (2006) conducted an experimental study in which he 
directly investigated the effects of acute stress on team cognition. The results of his study 
indicated that acute stress negatively affected the similarity and the accuracy of team mem-
bers’ team interaction mental models as well as their transactive memory systems (TMSs). 
Another oft-investigated antecedent of shared mental models is the effect of team 
training. Several studies have measured mental models repeatedly over time during team 
training or task execution; results, however, are inconclusive and inconsistent. Cooke and 
colleagues (2003) found that their teamwork mental model showed improvement in team 
knowledge accuracy over time, but their task knowledge measure showed no change be-
tween two sessions. Xinwen, Erping, Ying, Dafei, and Jing (2006) found a significant in-
crease in task mental model similarity but not in team interaction mental model similarity 
when teams increased the time spent on task implementation. Mathieu and colleagues 
(2000; 2005), as well as Edwards and colleagues (2006), did not find a significant increase 
in similarity and accuracy of team members’ mental models over time. Levesque, Wilson, 
and Wholey (2001) actually found that the mental models of software development team 
members became less similar over time as team member interaction decreased due to in-
creased specialization. This seems to imply that simply having team members train and 
work together on a task may not be sufficient to increase the accuracy and similarity of team 
members’ mental models, and deliberate actions may have to be taken in order to ensure 
team mental models remain congruent. One way to do this is by administering training 
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programs that are specifically aimed at improving the similarity and accuracy of team mem-
bers’ mental models. A distinction should be made here between individual level training 
programs in which team members are individually trained in facilitating adequate team 
mental models, and team level training programs in which the team is trained as a whole to 
collectively execute the task. Individual level training programs can improve the accuracy of 
the team members’ mental models; however, they can only indirectly enhance the similarity 
in team members’ mental models by increasing the similarity of each team member’s mental 
models with an ideal mental model (and hence with each others’ mental models). Team 
level training programs, on the other hand, can directly increase mental model similarity; 
through team interactions, team members are encouraged to explore, harmonize, integrate, 
and conjointly construct their mental models (Van den Bossche, Gijselaers, Segers, & Kir-
schner, 2006). 
At the individual level, Day, Arthur, and Gettman (2001) found that the improvements 
in accuracy of individuals’ knowledge structures of a task developed together with the ac-
quisition of skill in executing the task. Stout, Salas, and Kraiger (1997) found that after 
receiving training aimed to improve their knowledge structures, navy helicopter pilots’ 
mental models became more consistent and displayed more resemblance to an expert men-
tal model, which translated to improved performance on a subsequent team task. Smith-
Jentsch and colleagues (2001) found that after exposure to a computer based training pro-
gram, trainees’ teamwork mental models became more similar to an expert mental model; 
moreover, they became more consistent and more similar to the mental models of other 
trainees. Finally, the work of Marks and co-authors (2000) indicated that teams with mem-
bers who received video-based team interaction training developed more accurate and more 
similar mental models than teams in a control condition. 
Some researchers have suggested that because team members often have different 
roles within a team, team training should not simply be aimed at increasing similarity in 
mental models, but instead at increasing the understanding team members have of the roles 
and accompanying requirements and contributions of the other members (Blickensderfer, 
Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; Volpe, Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Spector, 
1996). Cross training has been defined by Volpe and colleagues (1996) as “an instructional 
strategy in which each team member is trained in the duties of his or her teammates” (p. 
87). Marks and colleagues (2002) conducted two studies on the effect of three types of cross 
training differing in depth and method: (1) positional clarification, consisting of a verbal 
presentation of information about the roles of the other team members; (2) positional mod-
eling, consisting of verbal discussions and observation of other members’ roles; and (3) 
positional rotation in which team members gain active experience in carrying out the duties 
of their team members. In the first experiment, they included only positional clarification 
and positional modeling training, and found that both were positively related to team-
interaction mental model similarity. In the second experiment, they also included positional 
rotation, and they found that all training conditions positively influenced mental model 
similarity, and that positional modeling was more effective than positional clarification. 
Cooke and colleagues (2003) designed a cross-training program in which team members 
were trained either actively in executing the role of all the other members or passively in 
only learning the role knowledge of the other team members. The results of their study 
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indicated that only the active cross training condition was effective in facilitating the devel-
opment of shared mental models and accurate knowledge structures regarding the other 
team members’ roles. In sum, cross-training seems to provide an effective method for facili-
tating the development of shared mental models; however, results are inconsistent regard-
ing the type and depth of cross training that is required to gain these positive effects. 
The effectiveness of team training on mental model accuracy and similarity may also 
be moderated by individual difference variables. Day and colleagues (2001) found that 
general cognitive ability was positively related to mental model accuracy at the end of a 
training period, and Edwards and colleagues (2006) found that general cognitive ability 
was a significant predictor for the development of accurate and similar mental models. 
Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaros (2001) suggested that teams alternate between action 
periods in which they engage in acts that contribute directly to the goals of the team and 
transition periods in which teams focus on evaluation and planning activities that play a 
more supportive role towards team goal accomplishment. Given an ongoing sequence of 
team performance episodes, these transition episodes may have both a forward looking 
function during which team members actively prepare for the task ahead and a backward-
looking evaluative function, during which team members collectively make sense of their 
functioning in preceding task episodes. These transition periods may provide a particularly 
good time for team leaders to play a role shaping and developing shared mental models 
(Hackman & Wageman, 2005; Kozlowski, Gully, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 1996). 
Previous research indicates that both forward- and backward-oriented transition proc-
esses may function to facilitate the construction of shared mental models for ensuing task 
periods. Stout and colleagues (1999) found that the quality of the planning process prior to 
a team mission was positively related to the similarity in team members’ mental models. 
Similarly, Marks and co-authors (2000) found that teams receiving leader briefings before 
the actual performance episode developed more accurate and more similar mental models 
than teams in a control condition. Other studies indicate that team feedback and debriefs, 
taking place after task performance episodes, can positively affect the development of rich 
and accurate mental models (Ellis & Davidi, 2005; Xinwen et al., 2006). In particular, 
guided team self-corrections during which the team is guided in critically reflecting upon 
and discussing its own functioning, fosters the construction of more accurate (Smith-
Jentsch, Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, & Salas, 2008) and more similar (Blickensderfer et 
al., 1997) mental models. A study by Rasker, Post, and Schraagen (2000) suggested that the 
extent to which a team has the ability to engage in performance monitoring and self-
corrections, positively relates to the ability of the team to construct high quality mental 
models. More generally, it can be stated that the extent to which a team explicates and 
overtly reflects on its objectives, processes, and strategies positively relates to the quality 
and similarity of team members’ mental models (Gurtner et al., 2007; Massey & Wallace, 
1996; Müller, Herbig, & Petrovic, 2009). 
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Contingency Factors Influencing the Impact of Shared Mental Models 
Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) have called for research specifying the conditions under 
which shared mental models may affect various team level outcomes. Various authors have 
suggested contingency variables that could influence when shared mental models are more 
or less important for team functioning. Stout, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1996) theorized 
that the importance of mental model similarity is contingent on the demands a task poses on 
the team. If task demands are low and team members have ample time, shared mental mod-
els may be less important than when task demands are high and the team has inadequate 
time to communicate and strategize. Supporting this line of reasoning, Minionis, Zaccaro, 
and Perez (1995) found that shared mental models enhanced performance on tasks requir-
ing interdependence among team members, but had no significant impact on tasks that 
could be completed without coordinated team actions. 
Espinosa, Lerch, and Kraut (2004) noted that teams may make use of two types of 
mechanisms to manage interdependencies: implicit team cognition based mechanisms, and 
explicit mechanisms, based on schedules, plans, and procedures. They argue that there may 
be complementarities, tradeoffs, and interactions between these mechanisms, and that 
various team and contextual variables may influence which mechanism may be most suit-
able for teams to complete a specific task. For example, if team coordination can be effi-
ciently managed by configuration management systems such as project schedules or elec-
tronic planning systems, shared mental models may be less important for team perform-
ance. 
Finally, the work of Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, and Spencer (2008) demonstrated 
that mental model similarity improves decision making quality. However, when a team has 
strong norms for constructive confrontation—that is, when team members value open ex-
pression, disagreement, and the avoidance of negative affect—less, instead of more, mental 
model similarity improves decision making quality. The authors reasoned that mental 
model dissimilarity indicates a diversity of perspectives from which teams can reap benefits 
as long as they have norms that help them avoid the negative consequences of conflict. 
Additive and Compatible Mental Models 
Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) noted the ambiguous nature of the term “shared” in 
t h at  it  may  r ef e r  t o o v er l ap p i n g  or  s im il ar  k n ow l ed g e  as  w el l  as t o d iv id ed  or  d iff er e nt  
knowledge; similarly, Cannon-Bowers and Salas (2001) added that “shared” may also refer 
to similar or identical knowledge and to compatible and complimentary knowledge. Al-
though the majority of studies on shared mental model theory seem to concern the benefi-
cial effects of congruence in team member’s mental models, there seems to be general rec-
ognition that not all knowledge should be held by all team members (Cannon-Bowers & 
Salas, 2001; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994; Rentsch & Hall, 1994). Cannon-Bowers, Salas, 
and Converse (1993) suggest the possibility that different mental models may be accurate. 
They argue that it is not so much the overlap in team members’ mental models that is re-
lated to team performance, but the common expectations that team members derive from 
these models. Accordingly, they suggested that teams may not need similar so much as 
compatible and supplementary knowledge structures, for example differences in expertise. 
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When team members have distinct team roles, they are likely to develop knowledge 
structures considering their own specific subtasks, which do not necessarily have to be 
shared among the team members. In effect, it would often be cognitively impossible or at 
least inefficient if all knowledge were held by all team members (Banks & Millward, 2000; 
Mohammed & Dumville, 2001). The theory of distributed cognition (Banks & Millward, 
2000; Hutchins, 1995) indicates that it is not merely overlap in knowledge that is required, 
but instead that the team as a whole needs to be able to understand the complexity of the 
system. Some empirical evidence suggests that similarity in team mental models may not 
always be beneficial for team performance. Cooke and colleagues (2003) found that teams 
with members who had a thorough understanding of their own roles but lower similarity in 
taskwork knowledge tended to be the best performing teams. Similarly, Banks and Millward 
(2007) found in a simulation study that even though similarity in members’ declarative 
knowledge was positively related to team performance, similarity in members’ procedural 
knowledge was negatively related to performance. 
The shared mental model perspective emphasizes the effects of mental models on team 
interaction behavior (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Mathieu et al., 2000; 2005), while the 
distributed cognition perspective of team mental models focuses on the extent to which the 
team members’ mental models cover the relevant task environment—that is, provide the 
requisite expertise to perform a variety of actions and perceive and interpret a variety of 
stimuli (Conant & Ashby, 1970; Weick, 1979). This implies that two opposing mechanisms 
may intervene between mental model similarity and team performance. On one hand, men-
tal model similarity facilitates team interaction processes. On the other hand, mental model 
diversity may be required to ensure the requisite variety of expertise and skills in complex 
task environments. The effect of similarity in mental models on team performance may thus 
depend on the relative importance of each of these mechanisms in accomplishing the par-
ticular team task at hand. 
Other researchers have associated diversity in underlying knowledge structures with 
the ability to generate a wide range of perspectives and alternative solutions (Milliken & 
Martins, 1996; Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999). The integration of these various viewpoints 
is considered to lead to deep information processing, the emergence of new insights (Jehn, 
Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Levine & Resnick, 1993), and team ability to reconsider assump-
tions and come to more creative and high quality solutions (De Dreu & West, 2001; Nemeth, 
1986; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). However, because mental models are 
essentially interpretations and simplifications of an external system (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), 
they may compromise the ability to make decisions in complex environments (Walsh, 1995; 
Weick, 1979). Moreover, Starbuck and Milliken (1988) posited that knowledge structures 
function as lenses which filter the information that is received from the environment and 
determine how this information is interpreted. Thus, it may be that diversity in team mem-
bers’ mental models facilitate the probability that important information is noticed by at 
least one team member. 
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Beyond Input-Process-Output Conceptions 
Most teams researchers have explicitly or implicitly embedded the construct of shared men-
tal model in an input-process-output (I-P-O) framework of team performance, in which 
team inputs are considered to impact team processes that in turn shape team outcomes 
(Hackman, 1987; McGrath, 1964). Recently, however, authors have warned against adopt-
ing overly simplistic interpretations of the I-P-O framework by pointing to interaction effects 
that may occur between inputs and processes, and by emphasizing the temporal and ongo-
ing nature of team functioning (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005; Marks et al., 
2001). In consonance with this dynamic view, Marks and colleagues (2001) categorized 
team cognition constructs as emergent states, which they define as “constructs that are 
typically dynamic in nature and vary as a function of team context, inputs, processes, and 
outcomes” (p. 357). They argued that team emergent states describe dynamic properties of 
the team and should be distinguished from team processes, which describe the nature of 
team member interaction. Since team cognitive structures can both serve as inputs and 
outputs of team processes, a cyclical framework—one that takes into account the observa-
tion that outcomes and emergent states from previous cycles may be inputs in subsequent 
performance cycles—may be more appropriate than a purely linear view of the relationship 
between team inputs, processes, and outputs. Despite the increasing recognition among 
researchers for this more dynamic temporal perspective on team cognition, longitudinal 
studies that address antecedents and consequences of changes in shared mental models 
over time are still scarce. An alternative way by which researchers can provide for a more 
dynamic view of team cognition is by distinguishing between the relatively stable notion of 
the mental models and the more dynamic concept of situation awareness (SA) described 
later in this chapter. 
Future Directions 
A recent review on diversity literature (Harrison & Klein, 2007) warned against the prob-
lems of adopting overtly simplified conceptualizations of diversity and suggested that re-
searchers go beyond simply looking at similarity and diversity. Similarly, teams researchers 
may look at more complex compositions of knowledge within teams. Research by Walsh and 
colleagues seems to indicate that for some tasks only the mental models of the most influen-
tial member may be important for team functioning (Walsh & Fahey, 1986; Walsh, Hender-
son, & Deighton, 1988). But what happens if a team is divided into two equally powerful 
subteams that possess equally appropriate but different mental models of the team task (cf. 
Cronin & Weingart, 2007)? And what are the effects on team functioning if one member 
holds a more accurate mental model than the other members? Under what circumstances 
are such minority members able to influence the other members to accept their understand-
ing of the task? 
Future research may also go beyond similarity and accuracy to take into account char-
acteristics such as the flexibility or complexity of the mental models, or the extent to which 
the team’s mental model covers the relevant task environment. Previous research on indi-
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vidual level mental models indicates that experts hold more detailed mental models than 
novice task performers (Murphy & Wright, 1984; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991). Complexity of 
mental models is considered to increase the amount of information that can be garnered 
from the environment (Bartunek, Gordon, & Weathersby, 1983; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
Another promising future direction, proposed by Huber and Lewis (2010), is cross un-
derstanding, or each member’s understanding of the mental models of the other team mem-
bers. The cross-understanding notion bears similarity to the transactive memory concept in 
that it comprises team members’ understanding of the knowledge of other members. How-
ever, unlike a TMS, cross understanding does not necessarily imply a distribution of exper-
tise. Huber and Lewis (2010) indicate that team members may also benefit from an under-
standing of other members’ mental models when knowledge within the team is not differen-
tiated. For instance, Rentsch and Woehr (2004) indicated that team effectiveness may be a 
function not only of the similarity in team members’ cognitions, but also of the extent to 
which “a team member’s schema of a target matches the target’s actual schema” (2004: 22). 
Of the three types of shared cognition reviewed in this chapter, the literature on shared 
mental models is the most mature and wide-ranging. However, many teams scholars have 
focused their attention away from the “sharedness” of mental representations and instead 
on the understanding of the distribution of different knowledge and expertise across team 
members. The literature on and understanding of these transactive memory systems in 
teams has grown in recent years, and we turn now to a review of this work. 
Transactive memory systems 
The theory of transactive memory was developed by Wegner and colleagues (1985, 1987) to 
explain how individuals can expand their own limited memory capacity with external aids, 
including other people. Wegner uses the analog of a computer to describe how transactive 
memory functions. Computers with separate hard disks can share each other’s memory if 
they have a directory containing an abbreviated record of the contents and location of the 
other memory systems (Wegner, 1995). Correspondingly, a group’s transactive memory 
consists of the knowledge of the individual members of the group combined with members’ 
knowledge of the content of information held by other members of the group. 
Initially, Wegner (1985) developed the notion of transactive memory as a theory de-
scribing the interpersonal division of memory tasks in intimate couples. For instance, in an 
experiment testing this theory, Wegner, Erber, and Raymond (1991) compared performance 
on a memory task between natural pairs—couples that had been in close dating relation-
ships for at least three months—with impromptu pairs of strangers they had put together 
specifically for the experiment. They found that if pairs could decide how they would divide 
the memory tasks between them, the natural pairs were clearly superior, whereas when the 
researchers assigned a structure for how the memory task should be divided between the 
members, the impromptu pairs outperformed their natural counterparts. These results 
indicate that the memory advantage that natural pairs develop through prolonged interac-
tion is based on an efficient, implicit structure for dividing memory tasks. When pairs are 
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forced to adopt an alternative structure, however, this benefit breaks down, and the persis-
tence of their previously established structure may even negatively influence the adoption of 
a new structure. 
Although transactive memory theory was originally developed to explain how intimate 
couples formed a division of labor for remembering and accessing information, soon re-
searchers noticed the merit of the concept for explaining group and team level phenomena. 
Moreland and colleagues applied the notion of transactive memory to the group level in 
order to explain the performance advantage of groups that had been trained together rela-
tive to groups whose members had been trained apart (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; 
Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996; Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1998). Their reasoning 
was that during the collective training process, group members not only achieve individual 
task experience but also develop an understanding of the knowledge and fields of expertise 
of their group members. This knowledge of ‘who knows what’ enables group members to 
arrange their tasks in such a way as to optimally benefit from the variety of experience avai-
lable within the group as a whole. In this way, the group can make optimal use of their 
cognitive resources; specifically, remembering and accessing a specific information element 
will cost the group member with the most experience with that type of information fewer 
cognitive resources than it would cost the other, less experienced and less knowledgeable 
group members. In sum, a transactive memory system (TMS) functions in groups as a cogni-
tive structure that bridges the gap between individual and group level information process-
ing by efficiently tying together contributions of individual members into collective group 
performance (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Larson & Christensen, 1993). 
Early in the development of the concept, scholars referred to the content of transactive 
memory as pertaining mainly to facts and information; later, scholars broadened the con-
cept to also include knowledge of team members’ skills or expertise (Moreland & My-
askovsky, 2000) and external relationships (Austin, 2003). Scholars have emphasized the 
importance of a TMS for groups functioning in a wide variety of domains, including work 
teams (Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2004; Littlepage, Hollingshead, Drake, & Littlepage, 2008; 
Zhang, Hempel, Han, & Tjosvold, 2007), action teams (Ellis, 2006; Pearsall & Ellis, 2006), 
disaster response groups (Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007), management 
teams (Rau, 2005; Rulke, Zaheer, & Anderson, 2000), and virtual teams (Cramton, 2001; 
Griffith & Neale, 2001; Kanawattanachai & Yoo, 2007). 
Conceptual Aspects of TMSs 
With the notion of a TMS, scholars refer to two separate but interrelated components of 
cognitive structures and group interaction processes that enable groups to efficiently divide 
their cognitive labor with respect to the encoding, storage, retrieval, and communication of 
information among their members (Hollingshead, 2001; Lewis et al., 2007; Moreland, 
1999). The knowledge component, often referred to simply as transactive memory, refers to 
the memory content, skill base, or external relationships of the individual members in com-
bination with the meta-knowledge of who knows what within the team. Whereas this trans-
active memory component emerges as a team level compositional construct from the 
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knowledge components of the individual group members, the process component consists of 
the dynamic interaction processes involved in the acquisition, storage and retrieval of in-
formation among the group members, and therefore comprises a pure group level construct 
(Hollingshead, 2001; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000; Lewis, 2003). 
This dual component structure manifests itself in the various frameworks and dimen-
sions of TMSs that have been proposed by scholars. Some scholars have focused specifically 
on the structural aspects of TMSs. For instance, Moreland (1999) distinguishes between 
three structural aspects of TMSs: (1) the accuracy in team members’ understanding of each 
other’s knowledge, (2) the extent to which group members agree about who holds what 
knowledge, and (3) the complexity in terms of the extent of specialization of expertise 
within the group and the level of detail of this understanding. Austin (2003) identifies four 
structural aspects of TMSs: knowledge stock, consensus, specialization, and accuracy. 
Knowledge stock refers to the total knowledge of the group that is composed of the knowl-
edge of the individual members. Specialization refers to degree of differentiation in knowl-
edge and expertise of the different team members. Accuracy considers the extent to which 
team members are correct in identifying knowledge of other group members. 
Regarding the process component of TMSs, scholars have relied heavily on Wegner’s 
(1995) model, which includes directory updating, information allocation, and information 
retrieval. Directory updating refers to the establishment or refinement of team members’ 
representations of each others’ knowledge base. Information allocation refers to the process 
of forwarding information to the group member who is considered to hold expertise within 
the area relevant for that information. Retrieval coordination refers to the process of access-
ing information from team members based on an understanding of their relative expertise. 
Others have proposed alternative TMS frameworks that include both structure and 
process components. For instance, Liang and colleagues (1995) identified three components 
reflecting the operation of a TMS among group members: memory differentiation (i.e. the 
tendency of group members to remember different aspects of the task processes; task coor-
dination (i.e. the ability of the group members to work together efficiently) and task credi-
bility, (i.e. the level of trust in the knowledge of the other group members). This tripartite 
framework also served as input for a collection of studies by Lewis (2003), who developed 
and validated a measure for assessing TMSs in the field, thereby providing additional sup-
port for the dimensionality and validity of Liang and colleagues’ framework. Similarly, 
Brandon and Hollingshead (2004) identified three dimensions of a TMS: accuracy, the 
extent to which group members perceptions about other group members’ knowledge are 
accurate; sharedness, the degree to which team members have a shared understanding of 
the division of expertise within the group; and validation, the extent to which the team 
members contribute their expertise knowledge during actual task performance. In addition, 
they introduced the concept of TMS convergence, reflecting the extent to which groups are 
characterized by high levels on each of these dimensions. In a somewhat similar vein, Faraj 
and Sproull (2000) identified (1) knowing where knowledge is distributed among the team 
members, (2) recognizing when knowledge is needed, and (3) bringing to bear expertise in 
a timely manner. Unlike the other dimensions reviewed earlier, which are explicitly identi-
fied by their originators as TMS dimensions, Faraj and Sproul locate their constructs under 
the umbrella of “expertise coordination.” 
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Overall, it appears that a variety of comparable but slightly deviating frameworks of 
the dimensions of TMSs have been developed by scholars in this area. Some frameworks 
cover only structural aspects of the TMS notion, others only process aspects, while still 
others cover both aspects of TMSs. 
Measurement of TMSs 
In studies of dyads, pertinent TMS constructs are often operationalized indirectly, inferred 
from the collective output of the dyad on memory tasks (Hollingshead, 1998a; 1998b; Holl-
ingshead, 2001; Wegner, 1987). The reasoning behind this approach is that the more infor-
mation a pair of individuals is able to accurately recall, the higher the quality of their TMS. A 
comparison of recall performance of individual members with the collective recall perform-
ance of dyads allows researchers to disentangle the individual members’ memory contribu-
tions from the collective memory component. 
A wider variety of measurement techniques have been used to study TMSs in group set-
tings than have been used in the study of dyadic TMSs. Lewis (2003) has distinguished 
among three methods for measuring group level TMSs: recall measures, measures that 
capture observed behaviors, and self-report measures of group members’ expertise. 
Observation measures are based on the scoring by raters of behavior indicative of TMS 
functioning. Following the work of Moreland and colleagues (Liang et al., 1995; Moreland, 
1999; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000) one method commonly applied entails the use of 
independent judges to provide overall ratings of the quality of each team’s TMS, based on 
their observations of the quality and/or extent of memory differentiation, task coordination, 
and task credibility within the teams (e.g. Prichard & Ashleigh, 2007; Rulke & Rau, 2000). 
Other researchers have coded the actual behaviors involved in the transactive memory 
processes. For instance, Ellis (2006) used additive indexes of the occurrence of directory 
updating, information allocation, and retrieval coordination behavior among the team 
members, while Rulke and Rau (2000) conducted a more fine-grained analysis of the encod-
ing process of the TMS. 
Researchers have also used self-report measures of TMSs. These measures have been in 
the form of Likert-scale questionnaire measures that reflect the various dimensions of TMSs 
enumerated. Faraj and Sproull (2000), for example, developed a Likert scale item-based 
questionnaire measure for expertise coordination in which they asked participants to indi-
cate if they knew how knowledge was distributed among the team members, how team 
members recognized when their expertise was needed, and the extent to which they 
brought their expertise to bear in a timely manner. Lewis (2003) developed and validated a 
questionnaire measure of TMS for use in field settings, consisting of 15 items covering her 
“knowledge specialization”, “credibility”, and “coordination” dimensions. Given its ease of 
administration, this instrument has been adopted in a growing number of field (e.g. Michi-
nov et al., 2008; Peltokorpi & Manka, 2008; Zhang et al., 2007) and experimental (Pearsall 
& Ellis, 2006; Pearsall, Ellis, & Stein, 2009) studies. 
Another form of self-report measures, known as expertise identification measures, 
have been used mainly in field studies of teams. Adopting this method, researchers start 
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with an analysis of the field and interviews with field experts to formulate a list of possible 
areas of expertise, knowledge or skills. Then team members are asked to indicate from this 
list their own and their team members’ areas of expertise. Measures of the group’s knowl-
edge stock are calculated by aggregating the fields of expertise of all individual team mem-
bers, and team TMS consensus is calculated by assessing the level of agreement concerning 
the location of expertise within the team (e.g. Austin, 2003; Rau, 2005; Rulke et al., 2000; 
Yuan, Fulk, & Monge, 2007). 
TMS Outcomes 
Outcomes of TMSs have been studied extensively both at the dyadic level and in larger 
groups and teams (Peltokorpi, 2008). Our focus here is on the group- and team-level stud-
ies; however, given the theoretical foundation provided by the dyad-level research, in our 
discussion of the development of the TMS construct, we will mention and elaborate upon 
findings from this research stream whenever relevant and appropriate. Regarding the out-
comes of TMSs, we rely on the general finding that people in intimate relationships develop 
efficient implicit systems for remembering and retrieving information, providing them with 
an advantage over impromptu couples on collective memory tasks (Hollingshead, 1998a; 
1998b; Johansson, Andersson, & Rönnberg, 2000; Wegner et al., 1991). 
A number of studies compared the performance of work groups in which the individual 
members were trained apart, with groups in which the members were trained together (e.g. 
Liang, Moreland & Argote, 1995; Moreland et al., 1996; 1998). The latter groups outper-
formed groups consisting of individually trained members, suggesting that in addition to 
task related skills, groups that are trained together also develop a TMS with beneficial ef-
fects for group performance. Liang and colleagues (1995) scored videotapes of group tasks 
on typical TMS behaviors and found that the difference in performance between the two 
conditions could be attributed to the higher amount of transactive memory behaviors dis-
played by the collectively trained groups. Additional experiments confirmed that this effect 
was due to the development of a TMS, as opposed to general group building benefits (More-
land et al., 1999), or improved communication (Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000). 
In addition to studies demonstrating the beneficial effects of TMSs in experimental 
group settings, a number of studies have demonstrated positive performance outcomes in 
field settings. In a study of continuing work teams in a sporting goods company, Austin 
(2004) found positive relationships between the task and external relationship aspects of 
TMSs and internal and external team performance measures. Lewis (2004) similarly found 
positive relationships among MBA consultancy teams between TMS development—
measured by means of her field scale covering the components of specialization, coordina-
tion, and credibility—and team-rated performance, client-rated performance, and the abil-
ity of the team to continue working well in the future. Using the same scale in a cross-
sectional study among 193 nurse and physician anesthetists, Michinov, Olivier-Chiron, 
Rusch, and Chiron (2008) found that TMSs predicted members’ perceptions of team effec-
tiveness, job satisfaction, and team identification. Also using Lewis’ TMS questionnaire, in a 
multi-organizational study Zhang and colleagues (2007) found that TMSs resulted in effec-
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tive performance across diverse organizational settings. Similarly, Rau (2005) found a posi-
tive relationship between awareness of the location of expertise within management teams 
and an objective measure of performance. Finally, in a study of software development 
teams, Faraj and Sproull (2000) found a strong relation between expertise coordination and 
team performance. 
TMS Development 
S c h o l a r s  h a v e  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  T M S s  d e v e l o p  naturally as group members form awareness 
about each others’ knowledge and expertise base and develop processes and routines for 
dividing and accessing information among them (Hollingshead, 1998a; Wegner, 1987). 
Brandon and Hollingshead (2004) identified three interdependent processes of TMS devel-
opment: (1) team members must perceive that they are cognitively dependent upon each 
other to perform their task; (2) they must develop knowledge structures linking specific 
tasks to expertise to group members—so called task-expertise-person units; and (3) they 
must reconcile these perceptions among the group members. When group members per-
ceive dependence upon each other for reaching goals, the development of a TMS begins 
with directory updating; group members start acquiring information about the knowledge 
and skills of the other members through self-disclosure or shared experiences and form 
knowledge structures representing the associations among tasks, expertise, and people 
(Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Wegner, 1995). The concept of directory updating can also 
be found in research on expertise recognition; studies in this area suggest that group mem-
bers are able to indicate the individual with most expertise after a brief discussion period 
(Henry, 1995), and that this recognition and utilization of expertise is positively related to 
performance on a wide variety of tasks (Austin, 2003; Henry, 1995; Littlepage, Robinson, & 
Reddington, 1993; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995). 
Studies indicate that active sharing of information about expertise early on in group 
development processes, facilitates the development of an effective TMS. In a study examin-
ing the encoding process of a TMS, Rulke and Rau (2000) found that in groups that had 
developed high quality TMSs, members declared expertise early during group interaction 
and increased the frequency of expertise evaluations over time. Similarly, in a study on the 
development of TMS in virtual teams, Kanawattanachai and Yoo (2007) found that the 
frequency and volume of task-oriented communications, particularly in the early stages of 
team development, were important for the development of expertise location and cognition-
based trust. 
It is not only actual expertise but also team members’ perceptions about each other’s 
expertise that influences the amount of specialization and diversification that occurs. If 
people perceive others to have expertise that is different from their own, they are more 
likely to focus on processing information from their own areas of expertise while trusting 
the others to take care of information from their areas of expertise (Hollingshead, 2000; 
2001). Borgatti and Cross (2003) proposed and tested a model specifying four factors that 
influence the likelihood that an individual will seek information from another person: (1) 
awareness that the other has the knowledge; (2) the extent to which the knowledge is per-
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ceived as valuable; (3) the ability to timely access the knowledge from that person; and (4) 
the perceived costs involved in accessing the knowledge. These researchers found that the 
perceived knowledge and accessibility factors mediated the relationship between physical 
proximity and information seeking, while the cost factor did not. 
Scholars have identified a variety of ways in which group members form an under-
standing of each others’ expertise. Group members can self-disclose their expertise by com-
municating their qualifications and relevant experiences or by indicating their ignorance 
regarding a topic. Alternatively, team members can infer the expertise of their coworkers by 
monitoring their actions and judging their contributions. Finally, they can actively question 
and evaluate each others’ expertise (Hollingshead, 1998a; Rulke & Rau, 2000). However, 
initial group interaction is not a necessary prerequisite for the development of a TMS. More-
land and Myaskovsky (2000) found that groups with members who were trained apart but 
who received information about one another’s skills performed nearly as well as groups that 
had been trained together. Even in the case of no direct information regarding expertise, 
team members may use available stereotypes, such as gender roles, to infer expertise of 
others (Hollingshead & Fraidin, 2003). However, although stereotypes may in some in-
stances provide basic information about a person’s expertise, the benefits of using such 
highly inferential information may easily become overshadowed by its drawbacks. In par-
ticular, research from the social identity tradition indicates that relying merely on stereo-
types may result in the development of subgroup biases and suboptimal team performance 
arising from inaccurate perceptions (van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & Homan, 2004). 
The existence of an initially-varied distribution of expertise in teams facilitates the de-
velopment of a TMS (Lewis, 2004). Hollingshead (2001) argued that when team members 
perceive their own expertise to differ from those of others, they are encouraged to specialize 
even more by gathering additional knowledge and skills in their own field of expertise while 
leaving information outside of their specialization area to be processed by other team mem-
bers. The reasoning behind this is that information can be most efficiently processed and 
stored by the team member who is most knowledgeable regarding that specific type of in-
formation. Therefore, responsibility for information elements is implicitly or explicitly allo-
cated to the member who is perceived to have most expertise with regard to that specific 
information (Hollingshead, 2001; Wittenbaum, Stasser, & Merry, 1996). In this way, over 
time the initial transactive memory structure deepens as team members increasingly differ-
entiate their knowledge and each member specializes in his or her area of expertise (Holl-
ingshead, 2001; Wegner, 1995). In a longitudinal study of knowledge-worker teams, Lewis 
(2004) examined how TMSs emerge and develop over time. She found that initially distrib-
uted expertise, member familiarity, and frequent face-to-face communication supported the 
development of TMSs. In another study, Lewis, Lane, and Gillis (2005) investigated if 
groups may also develop TMSs that facilitates group learning beyond the basic transfer of 
concrete knowledge from one task to a similar other task (i.e. single loop learning). She 
found that after experience with several tasks, groups TMSs include abstract principles that 
facilitate the generalization of team knowledge from one task domain to another across 
distinct but related tasks (i.e. double loop learning). 
Parallel to the development of knowledge directories specifying where knowledge is 
located within the group, the TMS is further extended by the formation of effective transac-
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tive processes (Lewis et al., 2007, Lewis et al., 2005). In enacting a TMS, group members 
develop standardized interaction routines in an attempt to facilitate the efficient allocation 
and accessing of knowledge from each other during on-going task performance (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990; Kanki, Folk, & Irwin, 1991). Research on the retrieval processes of TMSs 
suggests that apart from verbal communications, nonverbal and paralinguistic communica-
tions—referring to the manner in which something is communicated rather than the actual 
meaning of the words—also play an important role in the effectiveness of transactive re-
trieval processes (Hollingshead, 1998b). 
Antecedents of TMSs 
Variables that can affect TMS development include communication, group size, social net-
work, time, group members’ tenure, group training, and turnover within the group (More-
land, 1999). Antecedents of TMSs were tested in a number of studies, all using Lewis’ field 
scale. Akgün, Byrne, Keskin, Lynn and Imamoglu (2005) found that team stability, team 
member familiarity, and interpersonal trust were positively related to the development of 
TMSs in product development teams. Lewis (2004) also found that initially distributed 
expertise was positively related to the emergence of a TMS and that this effect was even 
stronger if members were familiar with each other. In a study of daycare workgroups, Pelto-
korpi and Manka (2008) found that interpersonal communication, group potency, suppor-
tive supervision, and self-reported group performance were positively related to the group’s 
TMS, and that variability in TMS development mediated the relationships between those 
antecedent factors and group performance. 
The personality composition of teams may also affect TMS development, especially re-
garding the extent to which team members actively share expertise-specific information, 
critically evaluate other members’ expertise, and share and request information varies as a 
function of the personality composition of the team (Pearsall & Ellis, 2006; Rulke & Rau, 
2000). For example, Pearsall and Ellis (2006) found that team members’ dispositional asser-
tiveness was positively related to the formation of TMSs. Using a team level operationaliza-
tion of personality constructs, De Vries, Van den Hooff, and De Ridder (2006) found that 
agreeableness in teams’ communication styles was positively related to team members’ 
willingness to share information, and teams’ extraversion in communication style was posi-
tively related to individuals’ eagerness and willingness to share information. As can be seen 
from the studies reported earlier, researchers have operationalized these predictor variables 
at different levels, leaving open the question of how individual level traits translate to team 
level factors that impact team level TMS outcomes. 
Another antecedent to the development of a TMS is the extent to which team members 
depend on each other for reaching their goals (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004). Zhang and 
colleagues (2007) found that task interdependence, cooperative goal interdependence, and 
support for innovation were positively related to the quality of teams’ TMSs in terms of 
differentiation, coordination, and credibility. In a study of dyads, Hollingshead (2001) em-
ployed an experimental design that enabled the comparison of four incentive systems that 
represented a continuum of outcome interdependence, ranging from a condition in which 
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the members only received points if both members recalled the information correctly (inte-
gration condition) to a condition in which the members received points only if one member 
recalled the information correctly (differentiation condition). Under the integration condi-
tion, participants were more likely to specialize in remembering different information than 
their partners, whereas under the integration condition participants were more likely to 
remember the same information. 
Some scholars have applied computational modeling to logically validate propositions 
regarding the antecedents of TMSs. For instance, Choi and Robertson (2008) found that 
communication quantity and the existence of a social network in the form of a referral net-
work were positively related to TMS consensus, while group size was negatively related to 
this particular outcome. Palazzolo and colleagues (2006) tested a model in which commu-
nication density mediated the relationship between initial and final transactive memory 
states. These researchers found that the starting knowledge level of individual members was 
negatively related to TMS development because of decreased communication density, 
whereas accuracy of expertise recognition was positively related to TMS development be-
cause of its facilitating effect on future communicative interactions. Overall team size was 
negatively related to TMS development. Palazzolo and colleagues (2006) argued that this 
may be due to people’s cognitive limitations—that is, it may be more difficult to become 
familiar and cognitively acquainted with all members of a large group versus a smaller 
group. Relatedly, Ren, Carley, and Argote (2006) found that larger groups and groups func-
tioning in more dynamic task and knowledge environments benefited more from ‘knowing 
what others know’ than smaller groups and groups functioning in more stable environ-
ments. 
Apart from the benefits of training team members collectively rather than apart, which 
are evident in many TMS studies (Lewis et al., 2005; Liang et al., 1995; Moreland et al., 
1996; Moreland & Myaskovsky, 2000), specific team skills training may also facilitate the 
formation of a TMS. An experimental study by Prichard and Ashleigh (2007) indicated that 
teams receiving team training aimed at the development of a range of skills including prob-
lem-solving, interpersonal relationships, goal setting, and role allocation developed higher 
quality TMSs than teams that did not receive the skills training. 
Finally, given that TMSs develop idiosyncratically in groups and TMS development is 
contingent on the expertise of group members, changes in group composition are generally 
found to be devastating to group performance (Lewis, 2003; Moreland et al., 1996, 1998). 
Moreover, when the composition of a team is changed, the old TMS structure may interfere 
with the development of a new TMS structure. Lewis and colleagues (2007, Study 1) found 
that groups that experienced partial membership changes retained the TMS communication 
structure observed at the outset, which resulted in ineffective TMS processes. In a follow up 
study they found that these detrimental effects could be overcome by actively encouraging 
the retained group members to reflect on their knowledge structures (Lewis et al., 2007, 
Study 2). 
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Contingency Variables 
Finally, some researchers have started to analyze the factors that influence under what 
circumstances a TMS is more or less important for team performance. Akgün and colleagues 
(2005) found that task complexity moderated the relationship between TMS and product 
success, such that when tasks were more complex, the positive effect of a TMS on product 
success was higher than when tasks were less complex. Rau (2005) found that the level of 
relationship conflict in teams moderated the effect of awareness of the location of expertise 
within a team on team performance. Awareness of expertise location had a positive effect on 
performance under low levels of relationship conflict, but had an insignificant effect under 
high levels of relationship conflict. 
In an experimental study, Ellis (2006) found that acute stress negatively affected the 
functioning of teams’ TMSs. However, a subsequent experimental study by Pearsall, Ellis, 
and Stein (2009) indicated that not all types of stress are detrimental to team performance. 
Hindrance stressors—demands or circumstances that interfere with work achievement and 
are associated by team members with negative outcomes — negatively affect a team’s TMS, 
whereas challenge stressors—demands or circumstances that are associated by team mem-
bers with potential gains—exert a positive effect on the team’s TMS. 
Future Directions 
As becomes clear from the above review, several authors have indicated that a TMS consists 
of transactive memory knowledge structures as well as transactive processes (Hollingshead, 
2001; Lewis, 2003; Wegner et al., 1985). How ever, much remains unclear regarding the 
relationship between these two components. In empirical studies, researchers generally 
have not made a distinction between process and knowledge components, but instead have 
included both together under the rubric of TMS. However, although interrelated, they 
clearly constitute separate factors; as Lewis and co-authors indicated, “TMS structure and 
processes operate synergistically within a group’s TMS, but in distinctly different ways, with 
TMS structure providing the initial guidance for transactive processing” (p. 162). Future 
studies could usefully further assess the relative importance of these components and their 
interactive effects in the effective functioning of TMSs. Furthermore, apart from the devel-
opmental aspects, most scholars have considered the TMS notion as a relatively stable con-
struct. Contextual variables that may vary over time are generally not explicitly taken into 
account, although studies by Ellis (2006) and Pearsall and colleagues (2009) indicate that 
TMSs may be affected in the short term by contextual factors such as team stress. This im-
plies a need for further work to explore the interplay between the enduring properties of 
TMSs and situational variables that might moderate their effects on team processes and 
outcomes. 
Finally, several scholars have alluded to the distinctions and overlap between the 
shared mental models concept and the TMS concept. In their review of research and theory 
on teams in organizations, Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, and Jundt (2005) observed that 
these two constructs, which dominate the recent literature on team cognition, ironically 
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point to opposing conclusions regarding integration and differentiation of knowledge wit-
hin the team. Whereas work on shared mental models emphasizes the benefits that can be 
gained from having overlapping knowledge among team members, the literature on TMSs 
emphasizes the advantages of diversification of the team’s knowledge base. Other scholars, 
however, have pointed to the similarities between the two concepts. Mohammed and Dum-
ville (2001) argued that the notion of shared mental model is the broader concept that en-
compasses aspects of the transactive memory construct. Moreover, several scholars have 
noted the similarity between what Cannon-Bowers and colleagues (2003) referred to as 
team member mental models and the ‘knowing who knows what’ component of a TMS 
(Austin, 2003; Kerr & Tindale, 2004). We agree that shared mental models and TMSs are 
partly overlapping; however, the relationship between the two constructs may be more 
complex in the sense that they could also have interactive effects on performance and that 
they could be causally related concepts (Brandon & Hollingshead, 2004; Ellis, 2006; Lewis, 
2003). A TMS and shared mental models could reinforce each other such that a TMS will be 
more effective when team members also hold similar mental models. On the other hand, 
under some circumstances they could be supplementary in that it may suffice for a team to 
have either a TMS or shared mental models to facilitate team information processing. Fi-
nally, longitudinal studies may clarify if the existence of shared mental models may facili-
tate the development of a TMS in a team and vice versa. Empirical studies on the relation-
ship between these two central team cognition constructs could further the formation of a 
more complete understanding of the cognitive structures and processes that are important 
for effective team functioning. 
While teams researchers have focused intently on understanding more about the 
shared cognitive constructs of mental models and transactive memory, a third, less-
prevalent team-level construct has been defined and described in extant literature: TSA. We 
next turn to a review of the work on TSA for three central reasons. First, existing work sug-
gests that the concept of TSA is similar to and yet distinctive from shared mental models and 
transactive memory systems, particularly concerning its role in team adaptability in dy-
namic environments. Second, most theorizing about TSA has been published in extant 
literatures not routinely accessed by many teams researchers; by including a review of the 
concept here, we hope to increase the accessibility of this literature to those researchers. 
Finally, and of related concern, knowledge about situation awareness has been pioneered by 
researchers focusing outside the team context; our understanding of TSA could be greatly 
broadened with more team-level empirical research and specification. We hope here to 
foster more interest in the concept among researchers of groups and teams. 
Team situation awareness 
Even though various scholars have alluded to the crucial role of TSA in adaptive team per-
formance (Burke et al., 2006; Cooke et al., 2000; Orasanu, 1990), unlike shared mental 
models and TMSs, there is only a scant empirical record of this concept. 
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Whereas mental models are cognitive representations of the general functioning of a 
system, SA refers to the knowledge and understanding of a dynamic system at a specific 
point in time (Durso & Gronlund, 1999; Endsley, 1995). As such, it refers to a more ephem-
eral and transitive type of knowledge that is developed while engaging in task perform-
ance—and one that is constantly being updated and recreated subject to changes in the task 
situation and performance requirements (Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995; Fracker & Vidulich, 
1991). Correspondingly, scholars have referred to TSA as a team’s awareness and under-
standing of a complex and dynamic situation at any point in time (e.g. Endsley, 1995; Salas, 
Prince, Baker, & Shresta, 1995). The concept of TSA is closely related to the notion of team 
situation models, which are defined by Rico and colleagues as “dynamic, context-driven 
mental models concerning key areas of the team’s work” (2008: 164), and that have been 
characterized by Cooke and colleagues (2000, p.157) as team knowledge that is ”in a con-
stant state of flux.” 
Because a team’s ability to form an appropriate understanding of the task environment 
plays an important role in its adjustment to unanticipated events, the concept of TSA is 
crucial for understanding the sustained performance and viability of teams (Ancona, 1990; 
Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Burke et al., 2006) and the organizations in which they function 
(Bourgeois, 1985; Daft & Weick, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989). Particularly for teams functioning 
in high-reliability organizations, the timely recognition of cues signaling non-routine situa-
tions, and the incorporation of those cues in the collective team-level representations, is 
pivotal to safe and efficient operations (Waller, 1999; Weick, Suttcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). 
Accordingly, scholars have emphasized the importance of achieving and maintaining an 
adequate understanding of the situation in a variety of fields including medicine (Gaba, 
Howard, & Small, 1995; Helmreich & Schaefer, 1994), aviation (Endsley, 1995; Mosier & 
Chidester, 1991; Orasanu, 1990), nuclear power plant operations (Hogg et al., 1995; Sebok, 
2000; Waller et al., 2004), military command-and-control (Kaempf, Klein, & Thordsen, 
Wolf, 1996), and railroad operations (Roth et al., 2006). In order to clarify the concept of 
TSA, we will first briefly introduce the general concept of situation awareness (SA) as it has 
been developed at the individual level. Then we will explain the different ways scholars 
have conceptualized TSA at the team level. We will describe its relation to shared mental 
models and briefly describe measurement methods scholars have applied to this more 
ephemeral form of team cognition. Finally, we will provide a short overview of the few 
empirical studies that have been conducted on TSA. 
Conceptualization 
The concept of SA developed in the field of aviation, where it was used to explain the supe-
rior performance of some fighter pilots during World War I (Endsley, 1995). Because several 
studies indicate that a breakdown in SA constituted an important factor in many aviation 
accidents (Endsley, 1988; Jentsch, Barnett, Bower, & Salas, 1999; Salas et al., 1995), it is not 
surprising that SA has continued to receive much attention among aviation psychologists 
and in the related field of Human Factors. 
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The most widely cited definition of SA is given by Endsley as “the perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley, 1988, p. 97). End-
sley thus considered SA to be composed of three hierarchical levels. The first level pertains 
to the perception of the individual elements in the environment, the second level to the 
integration of the elements into a comprehension of the current situation, and the third level 
to the projection and anticipation of future states. She posed SA as a central aspect of indi-
vidual information processing, linking attention and perception of incoming information to 
decision making and action execution (Endsley, 1995). 
Scholars have made a distinction between situation assessment, referring to the proc-
esses involved in acquiring and maintaining an understanding of the situation (i.e., percep-
tion, comprehension, and projection), and the SA that encompasses the resulting knowledge 
or awareness of the situation (Sarter & Woods, 1991). Situation assessment is considered a 
goal-directed process (e.g. Durso & Gronlund, 1999; Endsley, 1995; Sarter & Woods, 1991). 
It involves more than merely being conscious of, and attending to, the environment; instead, 
it implies an active assessment of the environment with respect to specific goals (Smith & 
Hancock, 1995). Accordingly, SA, which constitutes the outcome of the situation assessment 
processes, has been referred to as a meta-goal—an overriding goal that must be achieved 
before task goal completion is possible (Selcon & Taylor, 1991). 
Situation assessment as a process bears close resemblance to the activities of scanning, 
interpretation, understanding, and action involved in sensemaking (Weick 1995). Moreover, 
the result of situation assessment—SA—comes close to what Weick described as the sub-
stance of sensemaking, or the linkages between cues, frames, and connections. However, 
the situation assessment approach stands in contrast with Weick’s sensemaking perspective, 
in that Weick emphasizes the idiosyncratic and subjective nature of the processes of giving 
meaning to and constructing an understanding of the situation, while scholars studying SA 
have often implicitly assumed the existence of an optimal or ‘true’ referent to which a per-
son’s or team’s situational understanding can be compared (see, e.g., Endsley, 1995; Mosier 
& Chidester, 1991). 
Emergent Aspects of TSA 
Although TSA is generally considered as an emergent phenomenon originating from the SA 
of the individual members, different specifications exist concerning how this higher level 
phenomena is shaped and constrained by its lower level constituents (Chan, 1998; 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Wellens (1993) and Endsley (1995) conceptualized TSA as the 
distribution and overlap of the SA of the individual team members. They argued that opti-
mal TSA could be obtained by the separation of the responsibilities for SA of the team mem-
bers in such a way that it maximizes the coverage of the relevant environment while at the 
same time leverages sufficient overlap to ensure efficient group coordination. Hence, ac-
cording to this view, optimal TSA strikes a balance between the differentiation and integra-
tion of team members’ personal awareness of the situation. 
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Others, however, have argued that TSA can not be fully captured by the aggregation or 
overlap of the individual team members’ knowledge, but instead must also involve team 
interaction processes such as communication, coordination, task allocation, and planning (; 
Salas et al., 1995; Schwartz, 1990). Cooke and co-authors (2000, 2001) proposed the con-
cept of holistic TSA, which arises when team processes transform the knowledge of the 
individual team members into effective collective knowledge. They asserted that this holistic 
team level understanding does not reside with the individual team members; nor can it be 
conceptualized as a collection of individual knowledge; rather, they maintained, it consti-
tutes the knowledge upon which the team’s actions are based. 
Some authors have adopted a more top down, systems approach that considers how 
collectives form and maintain overall SA of dynamic systems (Artman & Garbis, 2004; Art-
man & Waern, 1999; Heath & Luff, 1992). These scholars build on Hutchins’ (1991; 1995) 
notion of distributed cognition which takes the joint cognitive system as the focal point of 
analysis. In line with the socio technical system approach (Trist & Bamforth, 1951), cognition 
is considered to be an embedded property of the cognitive system—the collection of indi-
viduals plus the available technology—and not merely a compilation of the cognition of 
individual team members. Therefore, studies from a distributed cognition perspective often 
consist of case studies that describe how TSA is maintained in specific naturalistic settings, 
such as cockpits, control rooms, or medical dispatch centres (Artman & Waern, 1999; Bland-
ford & Wong, 2004; Heath & Luff, 1992; Hutchins, 1995). Particular emphasis is placed on 
the role of structural aspects, supportive technology, and artifacts in understanding how SA 
is represented and propagated through the system (Artman & Garbis, 1998). For example, 
Roth and co-authors (2006) described how in railroad operations, employees developed a 
variety of informal cooperative strategies that enhanced overall system safety by improving 
shared SA. The strategies used included alerting others of unusual or unexpected conditions 
and overhearing or overseeing activities of others. The use of open communication channels 
that could be sampled by all members of the system played an important role in enabling 
informational redundancy. 
Distributed TSA 
Other scholars have emphasized the distributed aspects of TSA, acknowledging that by 
distributing SA responsibilities among their members, teams can reach broader coverage of 
the task environment and potentially locate and process more task relevant information 
(Endsley, 1995; Stanton et al., 2006; Wellens, 1993). In order to maximize the extent to 
which they are able to gain awareness coverage of their relevant task environment, teams 
may distribute their situation assessment function among the different members by spatially 
or functionally splitting up their task environment and assigning responsibility for each 
subsection to a different member (Artman, 1999; 2000). For example, teams may spatially 
split up their task environment, as is the case in air traffic control (i.e., individuals monitor 
different geographic sectors), or team members may be assigned responsibility for different 
functional aspects, as may be the case in fire fighting teams (i.e., some members may attend 
to the fire while others keep track of victims involved in the incident). On the other hand, by 
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maintaining overlapping areas of responsibility, teams can attain redundancy, which may 
increase the probability that important information will become noticed by at least one 
member (Hollenbeck et al., 1995). Particularly in environment s  r e q u i r i n g  h i g h  l e v e l s  o f  
vigilance, the cost of missing pieces of information may be higher than the costs of func-
tional redundancy. 
Apart from a horizontal, geographical or functional distribution, teams may also decide 
to adopt a vertical distribution of TSA tasks. Stanton and colleagues (2006) theorized that 
distributed SA may entail different individuals being involved in different levels of SA; some 
individuals may be engaged in task perception, some in comprehension and others in pro-
jection. For example in military organizations, although a large number of people may span 
the boundary with the external environment, only a small group of people at the top of the 
organizational hierarchy may be involved in the actual interpretation of the organizational 
environment (see Kaempf et al., 1996 for an example). This, however, summons the classi-
cal dilemma between central command and distributed responsibility; is it better for teams 
to hold one central person responsible or to make all team members responsible for main-
taining overall awareness of the situation? On the one hand, in complex situations, individ-
ual members may quickly become overloaded with information, making it difficult to main-
tain SA. On the other hand, assigning overall SA tasks to some members, may free up cogni-
tive resources from other members thereby allowing them to fully concentrate on executing 
other tasks. 
Particularly in high workload situations, it may be beneficial for teams if one individual 
with a cognitively-central position within the group is responsible for compiling and keeping 
active the higher-order situational knowledge. Studies on the role of working memory in the 
formation of SA suggest that the availability of sufficient attentional resources is crucial for 
forming and maintaining SA (Carretta, Perry, & Ree, 1996; Endsley, 1995; Gugerty & Tirre, 
2000). For instance, in a study investigating 311 civilian aircraft accidents, Jentsch and co-
authors (1999), found that captains were significantly more likely to lose SA when flying 
themselves then when the first officer was flying. This indicates that the additional work-
load involved in flying the aircraft negatively affected the ability to maintain SA. So, cap-
tains may play a pivotal role in forming TSA as they must receive and integrate information 
communicated by the other team members (Schwartz, 1990). Similarly, Bigley and Roberts 
(2001) observed that for members of temporary response organizations, “the cognitive or 
perceptual requirements of particular tasks can be so demanding that individuals perform-
ing them are not able to maintain an awareness of the surrounding system” (p. 1291). These 
authors found that in such cases, responsibilities for SA were shifted to someone in a better 
position and with sufficient cognitive resources to build and maintain an overall under-
standing. 
Awareness of Other Members 
TSA does not exclusively relate to the external task environment; it may also include aware-
ness of the team’s internal situation, or, in other words, understanding of the current status 
and needs of the other team members (Endsley, 1995; Marks & Panzer, 2004). Scholars have 
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addressed this internal aspect of TSA using labels such as shared workspace awareness 
(Gutwin & Greenberg, 2004), mutual awareness (Artman & Waern, 1999), and mutual 
organizational awareness (Macmillan, Entin, & Serfaty, 2004). However, because a prolif-
eration of different terms for similar constructs may lead to confusion, we propose the basic 
distinction between external TSA—the awareness and understanding of the task environ-
ment and internal TSA—the awareness of the current status and needs of the team and the 
team members itself. Note that this division runs parallel to distinction between teamwork 
mental models—knowledge about the team’s structure and about characteristics of the other 
team members—and taskwork mental models—knowledge about task processes, strategies, 
and likely scenarios of the task system the team faces. 
Whereas, most studies and theories have focused on external TSA, some processes 
have been related to internal TSA. For example, Heath and colleagues noted the importance 
of rendering activities visible in order to facilitate the development of internal TSA (Heath & 
Luff,  1 9 92 ;  H ea t h ,  S v en sso n,  H ind m ar sh ,  Luff,  &  v om L eh n,  2 0 0 2 ) . By  r end er ing  v i sib l e  
selective aspects of their activities, team members encourage others to pay attention to 
features of their task that become potentially relevant to others. Although this ascribes a 
relatively passive role to the observer, others have pointed to the more active process of 
team monitoring , or “observing the activities and performance of other team members” 
(Dickinson & McIntyre, 1997, p.25) in maintaining internal TSA. In a study with teams per-
forming in a simulated flight simulation Marks and Panzer (2004) found that team monitor-
ing was positively correlated with both coordination and feedback processes, which in turn 
improved team performance. There is thus some indirect evidence for the relationship be-
tween internal TSA and team performance; however, apart from a few scant studies, a co-
herent framework of the activities, processes, and technological devices team members may 
apply to maintain and understand the internal status of the team is still lacking. 
The relationship between shared mental models and team situation awareness 
Although, no study has yet been undertaken to directly address the relationship be-
tween shared mental models and TSA, research at the individual level indicates that team 
members’ mental models play an important role in the development of TSA for two main 
reasons (Stout, Cannon Bowers, & Salas, 1994). First, mental models influence the content 
of TSA. Because mental models focus attention onto specific aspects of the situation and 
determine how this information becomes interpreted (Endsley, 1995; Mogford, 1997; Sarter 
& Woods, 1991), team members’ mental models will determine to a considerable extent how 
team members will understand task situation at any point in time. Second, mental models 
facilitate the development of TSA. Because the maintenance, integration, and projection of 
information take place in working memory, the ability to concurrently store and operate 
using different pieces of information is considered to be the main bottleneck for acquiring 
and maintaining SA (Fracker & Vidulich, 1991; Wickens, 1984). Therefore, scholars have 
argued that mental models facilitate the attainment of SA by diminishing the load on work-
ing memory capacity (for a review see Durso & Gronlund 1999). For example, Sohn and 
Doane (2004) conducted an experiment investigating the relative effects of working mem-
ory and memory retrieval structures—essentially a basic type of mental model—on flight 
SA. They demonstrated that individuals who had acquired retrieval structures through 
experience in a particular domain could use these structures to take the load necessary for 
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acquiring SA off working memory capacity. The quality of the retrieval structures of experi-
enced pilots emerged as a better predictor for SA than their working memory capacity. 
The relationship between mental models and SA however is not unidirectional: rather, 
as argued by Waller and Uitdewilligen (2009) team members’ momentary understandings 
of the situation can evoke and shape particular cognitive structures. For example, when a 
situation is perceived as a crisis, team members access different mental models from those 
accessed when they perceive a situation as serious but routine. Adams and colleagues (1995) 
nicely depicted this iterative process using Neisser’s (1976) model of the perceptual cycle. 
This model shows how cognitive structures—mental models—influence what aspects of the 
environment people explore, which determines the type of information that becomes avail-
able from the environment—SA—which in turn, modifies the original cognitive structures, 
and so on. 
The aforementioned close relationship between individual level mental models and SA 
leads us to speculate how shared mental models and TSA relate to each other at the team 
level. First, it is likely that if team members share an understanding regarding how aspects 
of the environment, task, and team function in general, they are also more likely to construe 
a common understanding of the task and team situation at a specific point in time. Second, 
as argued above, to the extent that mental models direct team members’ focus of attention 
and interpretation processes, similarity in mental models may lead members to focus on 
similar information sources and draw similar interpretations from them. This in turn may 
aid rapidity of response, but also increase the danger of collective myopia. Conversely, 
highly divergent mental models may lead to a wider sampling of environmental information 
and a wide variety of interpretations, which may lead to more complete and more elaborate 
TSA. On the other hand this may pose a greater burden of information processing on the 
team as a whole, leading to conflicting and ambiguous understanding. However, as research 
integrating these team cognitive structure concepts is still lacking, statements about how 
they relate to each other remain speculative. For example, does similarity in mental models 
always lead to similarity in TSA? And, can similar TSA also trigger different mental models 
in different team members? More research is needed on how characteristics of a teams’ 
shared mental model—accuracy, similarity, complexity—relate to characteristics of their 
TSA. 
Measures of (T)SA 
One reason for the scarcity of studies on TSA is probably the difficulty involved in develop-
ing assessment methods that take into account the dynamic nature of the concept (Cooke et 
al., 2000). Another explanation can be found in the challenge of deriving meaningful team 
level variables from individual level SA indicators. At the individual level, a variety of meth-
ods has been developed for assessing SA, including questionnaires, query measures, implicit 
performance measures, and behavioral checklists (Cooke et al., 2001; Durso & Gronlund, 
1999; Endsley, 1995b). Dynamic aspects of SA can be assessed by repeatedly administering 
measures over time. Team level SA measures may be constructed from these individual 
measures by creating collective indexes—for instance, on the basis of aggregated accuracy, 
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similarity, or distribution. Alternatively, some authors have argued that TSA should be 
directly assessed as a holistic team level situation understanding; by targeting measures to 
the team as a whole instead of to each member separately (Cooke et al., 2000; Hogg et al., 
1995). However, when team tasks have conjunctive or disjunctive properties (Steiner, 1972), 
it may very well be the SA of the best or worst performing team member that drives team 
performance (Endsley, 1995b; Sebok, 2000). 
Questionnaires measures often consist of Likert-scale questions with which participants 
or observers are directly questioned about situation assessment quality (e.g. Taylor, 1990). 
They can be administered during and/or after task performance. A disadvantage of adminis-
tering SA questionnaires after a task has been completed is that respondents may confuse 
SA with task performance outcomes. Moreover, SA questionnaires have often been devel-
oped for specific domains—mainly pilot performance and air traffic control—and hence 
may not directly be generalizable to other settings. 
Query measures assess the extent to which participants are aware of task relevant in-
formation at a specific point in time. Questions about the present or anticipated future state 
of the situation are administered, while the simulation is frozen at random moments. For 
instance, in the case of the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) 
technique developed by Endsley (1995) a simulator task is stopped at random points and 
information about the task is collected from operators while they answer the SA questions. 
SA accuracy is subsequently measured by comparing the answers of the operators with 
objective data registered by the simulator (computer), and SA similarity can be assessed by 
comparing the answers of the different team members (Bolstad, Cuevas, Gonsalez, & 
Schneider, 2005; Cooke et al., 2001). An advantage of this method is that by repeatedly 
administering queries, researchers can develop a dynamic picture of TSA as it develops over 
time. The main disadvantage; however, is the intrusiveness of the method. Because the task 
has to be stopped every time queries are administered, the measurement often interferes 
with the natural execution of the task. This makes administration of the method problematic 
particularly in field settings as it rarely possible to interrupt a task in order to administer a 
measurement. Moreover, after the first round of queries participants may anticipate the 
queries that follow, and the questions may focus participants on aspects of the task to which 
they would otherwise not attend. Finally, assessment of the accuracy of team members’ SA, 
is only possible if objectively correct answers to the queries can be determined. For lower 
levels of SA that refer to simple facts about the situation this will not be problematic; how-
ever, for higher levels of SA that refer to interpretations about the situation. it may not 
always be possible to determine the “true situation.” 
Implicit measures assess SA indirectly by scoring behavior or performance on tasks or 
subtasks which are selected or constructed specifically to require SA in order to be success-
fully accomplished (Cooke & Gorman, 2006; Dwyer, Fowlkes, Oser, Salas, & Lane, 1997; 
Patrick, James, Ahmed, & Halliday, 2006). However, although this method allows research-
ers to induce the quality of TSA, it does not provide any information about the content of 
team member’s SA nor does it provide a dynamic picture of TSA over time. 
Another method that may be particularly suited to assess TSA is content analysis ap-
plied to the content of team communications obtained by video, audio, and/or written text 
recordings (Langan-Fox, Anglim, & Wilson, 2004; Waller et al., 2004; Waller & Uitdewilli-
65 Chapter 2 
 
gen, 2009). This approach provides the type of data amenable to continuous measurement, 
and can capture the dynamic and continuous nature of the TSA construct. Although com-
munication is only an indirect measure of team members’ knowledge and is therefore not 
likely to cover the complete content of awareness of the individual team members, it does 
nevertheless, include those aspects deemed appropriate to share in an open forum. Hence, 
coding and analyzing the content of team communications should enable researchers to 
gain insights into the process of collective sensemaking. 
Empirical Studies 
As we mentioned before, the number of studies directly assessing TSA is low. Studies that do 
assess TSA generally are exploratory in nature and have small sample sizes. Here, we simply 
give a summation of the results that have been found in these studies. In a study investigat-
ing two person pilot crews, Prince, Ellis, Brannick, and Salas (2007) found that an observer 
based measure of TSA accuracy administered during a high-fidelity simulation, as well as a 
TSA measure collected in a preceding low-fidelity scenario, were significantly correlated 
with performance scores of the teams on the high-fidelity simulation. In a study using a 
synthetic team training task in which three person teams learned to operate an uninhabited 
air vehicle, Cooke and co-authors (2001) found that TSA accuracy and similarity, measured 
by queries regarding mission progress that were randomly administered during the mission, 
were positively correlated with team performance. In a simulation study using a query 
measure of TSA, Bolstad Cuevas, Gonzalez and Schneider (2005) found that frequency of 
communication among team members and a social network measure of physical distance 
predicted TSA similarity. Hogg and colleagues (1995) developed a query measure of TSA 
specifically for nuclear power plant control rooms, which they administered holistically—to 
the team as a whole instead of separately to each member. They found that scores on this 
TSA measure accurately reflected the difficulty of different types of disturbances that were 
introduced into the simulation scenario; the more difficult the disturbances, the stronger the 
teams experienced a decrease in the accuracy of their TSA. In an experimental study, using 
this same measure, Sebok (2000) compared TSA—operationalized as the average accuracy 
of the SA of the team members—in normal and small teams before and during system dis-
turbances, under two interface conditions. The first condition was a “conventional nuclear 
power plant interface condition”, characterized by non-computerized displays where opera-
tors’ stations were located several meters apart. The second condition was an “advanced 
interface condition”, characterized by computerized displays, large-screen overview display, 
and co-located seating arrangement. Although she did not find main effects for plant inter-
face and team size, Sebok found an interaction effect indicating that normal sized teams had 
better TSA in the conventional plant interface condition while smaller teams had better TSA 
in the advanced interface condition. 
Other studies have not directly assessed TSA but have focused on the processes in 
which teams engaged while forming an understanding of the situation. For instance, in a 
study of air traffic controllers Hauland (2008) assessed team situation assessment behav-
iours using eye-movement data, and found that during the handling of non-routine events 
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team performance improved when the two operators simultaneously accessed information 
regarding future traffic. In a study of nuclear power plant control teams, Waller and col-
leagues (2004) found that the time team members spent engaging in team situation assess-
ment behaviors was positively related to their ability to adapt to non-routine events. 
Future Directions 
Although it is neither as mature nor as coherent as the literatures concerning shared mental 
models or TMSs, the existing work on team situational awareness may be more applicable to 
the dynamic, transitive nature of the turbulent environments facing many action teams. 
More work in the area needs to be done, both theoretically and empirically, to further un-
derstanding of how individuals’ situational awareness translates to the team-level version of 
the construct. Through the integration of the various conceptualizations of TSA and the 
critique of extant methods of assessment for operationalizing this potentially important 
concept, we hope our review will help motivate such work. 
Adaptation and shared cognition 
In our review of the recent literature on shared mental models, TMSs, and TSA, we have 
emphasized issues of adaptability in action teams facing dynamic environments. In this, the 
final section of our chapter, we suggest why these shared cognitive structures may not al-
ways facilitate adaptability in such teams, and we suggest two important moderators of the 
relationship between shared cognition and team adaptability. Specifically, we seek to ad-
dress the question as to whether the shared cognitive structures so efficient under relatively 
stable or even moderately dynamic circumstances actually hinder teams’ abilities to adapt to 
radically changing environments. 
Shared mental models and team adaptation 
In their cyclical model of team adaptation, Burke and co-authors (2006) emphasized the 
importance of shared mental models for the formulation and execution of new plans and 
strategies in novel environments. They stated that “[in] the absence of shared mental mod-
els adaptive team performance is not possible, because members do not have compatible 
views of equipment, tasks, and team member roles and responsibilities, which allow mem-
bers to adapt proactively” (p. 1194). Similarly, Marks and colleagues (2001) posed that 
under high environmental dynamism, the positive relationship between mental model 
similarity and accuracy and team performance will be even more pronounced than under 
low degrees of environmental dynamism. In particular, they argued that when faced with 
novel non-routine situations, similar and accurate mental models enable teams to engage in 
real-time interpretations of information and effective coordination. The results of their 
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study support the reasoning that mental model similarity becomes more important for per-
formance when teams operate in novel environments. Moreover, they found that a priori 
accuracy of team members’ mental models was not very important in novel environments, 
leading them to suggest that teams with similar mental models would eventually form accu-
rate ones as well. 
However, scholars from other fields have pointed out that cognitive structures may 
function as barriers to radical change and lead to rigidity (Hodgkinson, 1997;2005; Porac & 
Thomas, 1990; Reger & Palmer, 1996; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986; Tushman & 
Romanelli, 1985). Studies of mental model accuracy indicate that it is important for team 
functioning that the team’s mental models appropriately represent the underlying structure 
of the environment (Cooke et al., 2001; Edwards et al., 2006; Lim & Klein, 2006). This im-
plies that in a changing environment, alterations in the underlying structure of the envi-
ronment should be matched with corresponding modifications in team members’ mental 
models. Under low or moderate environmental dynamism, teams may adapt by making 
incremental changes to their mental models. Under extreme environmental dynamism, 
however, teams may need to completely redevelop their knowledge structures (Gersick, 
1991). Because structures that may have been effective under previous circumstances may 
become dysfunctional in the new situation, failure to update team knowledge structures in a 
timely matter may lead to severe performance decrements (e.g. Weick, 1990; Weick, 1993). 
As March noted, “mutual learning has a dramatic long-run degenerate property under con-
ditions of exogenous turbulence” (1991, p. 80). 
More specifically, and as Cannon-Bowers and colleagues (1993) noted, if a threshold of 
similarity in mental models is surpassed, team’s cognitive functioning may become overtly 
rigid; similarly, Klimoski and Mohammed noted that although often seen as functional, 
shared mental models may have a “dark side” as well (1994, p. 419). Mental models tend to 
be obstinate and enduring, and changes in mental models often lag behind changes in the 
environment (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hodgkinson, 1997;2005; Reger & Palmer, 1996). Particu-
larly when teams have successfully functioned in environments that have been stable for a 
relatively long period of time, their knowledge structures may become engrained and taken 
for granted, making them less amenable to change in the short term (Audia, Locke, & Smith, 
2000; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; March, 1991). 
The first phase of team adaptation is the recognition and interpretation of cues signal-
ling a need for change, while the second phase is the formulation of plans and strategies to 
deal with the challenges of the changing environment (Burke et al., 2006; Waller, 1999). 
The effect of shared mental models on both phases of the adaptation processes is dubious. 
Concerning the first phase, because mental models guide perception and interpretation 
processes (Neisser, 1976; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), similarity in mental models may cause 
team members to attend to similar situational cues and diagnose these cues in similar ways. 
As Walsh (1995: 281) noted in his review of work on strategic decision making, “[while] 
these knowledge structures may transform complex information environments into tracta-
ble ones, they may also blind strategy makers, for example, to important changes in their 
business environments, compromising their ability to make sound strategic decisions” (see 
also Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Therefore, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggested that in 
order to evaluate and utilize outside knowledge under conditions of rapid and uncertain 
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change, it is best to expose a fairly broad range of prospective “receptors” to the environ-
ment. Hence, teams with very similar mental models may fail to—or lack the absorptive 
capacity to—timely perceive and diagnose cues that fall out of the scope of their knowledge 
structures, and thereby miss early indications of upcoming environmental upheaval. 
Concerning the second phase of team adaptation, the formulation of new and ground-
breaking plans and strategy requires the kind of improvisation and creativity processes that 
are often associated more with cognitive diversity than with cognitive similarity (Bantel, 
1994; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hoffman & Maier, 1961; Jehn et al., 1999). Diversity in under-
lying knowledge structures has been associated, if adequately managed, with the ability to 
generate a wide range of perspectives and alternative solutions and the tendency to engage 
in deep information processing to integrate these various viewpoints (Milliken & Martins, 
1996; van Knippenberg et al., 2004). A thorough elaboration of perspectives and informa-
tion is related to successful problem solving, the emergence of new insights (Jehn et al., 
1999; Levine & Resnick, 1993), and a team’s ability to reconsider assumptions and produce 
more creative and high quality solutions (de Dreu & West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986). So, al-
though similarity in mental models may lead to highly efficient team coordination proc-
esses, it may not be the optimal configuration for the adaptive planning processes teams 
require under extreme environmental change. 
Transactive memory systems and team adaptation 
Lewis states that “knowing whether the effects of a TMS persist in dynamic task environ-
ments is critical to understanding the real impact of TMSs in organizations” (2005, p. 581). 
Ren and colleagues (2006) found in a study using computational modeling that knowing 
“who knows what” is particularly important for groups functioning in volatile task and 
knowledge environments. However, the functionality of a TMS seems to depend on the 
stability of the membership and expertise specialization within the team (Lewis et al., 2005). 
Particularly under circumstances requiring team adaptation, team composition may be 
far from stable. For example, research on top management teams indicates increases in 
turnover under turbulent circumstances (Keck & Tushman, 1993; Wiersema & Bantel 1994) 
and teams in fast-response organizations may often have to engage in plug-and-play team-
ing, composing teams with those members who happen to be available at the time (Bigley & 
Roberts, 2001; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). Moreover, modest levels of turnover can be an optimal 
strategy for increasing exploration in the face of environmental turbulence (March, 1991). 
Finally, teams may bring in outsiders to challenge the status quo and increase the variety of 
perspectives the team can draw on when facing novel situations (Bogner & Barr, 2000; Choi 
& Levine, 2004). 
Various studies of TMS show the detrimental effects of breaking up and rearranging 
group membership (Lewis, 2003; Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996; 1998; Wegner et al., 
1991). More specifically, Lewis and co-authors (2007) found that when teams had partial 
membership loss, remaining members rigidly adhered to their previous TMS structures, 
which resulted in decreased performance. 
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Team situation awareness and team adaptation 
Numerous scholars have pointed to the pivotal role of an integrated representation and 
awareness of the important elements of the task environments for adaptive team perform-
ance (Bourgeois, 1985; Hogg, Knut, Strand-Volden, & Torralba, 1995; Waller et al., 2004). 
Scholars have represented situation representations as knowledge structures that are sub-
ject to continuous transformations (Cooke et al., 2000; Rico et al., 2008; Salas et al., 1995), 
as they are considered to “change with changes in the situation” (Cooke et al., 2000: 154). 
However, studies about if and when teams actually update their situation representations 
given changes in the external environment are scarce (for an exception, see Waller & Uit-
dewilligen, 2009). Because of the important role the accuracy of team situation representa-
tions play in team functioning, it is of pivotal importance for teams to readjust their situa-
tion representations after significant changes in the environment (Burke, et al. 2006; Rico et 
al., 2008). Studies on cognitive fixation suggest that people tend to stick to their original 
interpretations of situations even when faced with evidence disconfirming these interpreta-
tions (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When a situation is defined in 
a particular way, people have a natural tendency to favour confirmatory information and 
discount or ignore discordant evidence (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978). 
Studies on attentional narrowing and cognitive tunnelling indicate that team members 
may become so preoccupied with a single aspect of the environment that they may fail to 
attend to other aspects and fail to update their SA (Huey & Wickens, 1993). For instance, in 
an incident described by Wiener and colleagues (1993), during a routine flight on the night 
of December 29, 1972, the pilot, first, and second officer of a Lockheed 1011 noted that the 
nose landing gear light did not indicate “down and locked.” In the ensuing moments, while 
the crew became so involved discussing the underlying causes and attempting to solve this 
problem, their attention was distracted away from their instruments and they failed to 
notice a warning signal indicating a sudden drop in altitude. It was this failure to notice an 
unexpected change in a timely manner that eventually led to the crash of the aircraft. This is 
a telling example of how a team that formed an initially correct understanding of the situa-
tion became so preoccupied with their original understanding that they failed to notice 
significant changes that had taken place, necessitating an update of their SA. The example 
illustrates again the importance of taking into account the temporal aspects of team cogni-
tion; it is not correct TSA at a single point in time but the frequent updating of TSA that is 
the key to adaptive team performance. 
Flexibility 
From our previous analysis, it appears that shared cognitive structures may facilitate as well 
as impede team adjustment to novel environments. However, work is lacking that would 
enable us to predict the help or hindrance of shared cognition in teams facing dynamic 
environments. What would enable teams with shared cognitive structures to be flexible in radi-
cally changing environments—that is, able to quickly and accurately update not only their 
shared mental models, transactive memory, and TSA, but update the assumptions upon which 
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these structures were created? We propose that two sources of flexibility may help teams in 
these situations: flexibility embedded in the cognitive structures themselves, and flexibility 
in the team processes. 
Burke and colleagues (2006) suggested that in the face of radical change, team mem-
bers may require flexible mental models; however, not much is known about what may 
make knowledge structures particularly flexible or rigid. Some scholars have suggested that 
flexibility may depend on the structural aspects of the cognitive structures. For example, 
Weick’s observation (1979) that loose coupling in structural configurations allows for adap-
tation and adaptability may hold not only for organizational- but also for cognitive struc-
tures. Lyles and Schwenk (1992) proposed that loose coupling between core and peripheral 
features in cognitive structures facilitates organizational adaptation. Work by Yayavaram 
and Ahuja (2008) indicates that the structure by which different knowledge elements are 
coupled together or the way they are subdivided into different clusters may affect the ability 
to recombine knowledge elements for innovation. 
Additionally, the level of abstraction of knowledge structures may be related to their 
adaptability to different task situations. At the highest level of abstraction, team members 
may develop a form of metacognitive knowledge, referring to an understanding of their 
cognitive structures and conditional knowledge that facilitates deciding on when and why 
to apply various cognitive actions (Doyle & Ford, 1998; Hinsz, 2004; Lorch, Lorch, & 
Klusewitz, 1993). For example, Lewis and co-authors (2005) showed that when teams were 
trained in more than one task in the same domain, they developed a more abstract under-
standing of the task domain, enabling them to recognize common elements between tasks, 
which in turn facilitated the application of prior knowledge and expertise distribution struc-
tures to novel contexts. 
Other scholars have looked at team processes that foster flexibility required for adap-
tive behavior. Whereas most studies on guided team self-corrections and reflexivity indicate 
that these processes are related to quality and similarity in team knowledge structures un-
der relatively stable circumstances (Blickensderfer et al., 1997; Smith-Jentsch et al., 2008), 
the extent to which a team explicates and overtly reflects upon its objectives, processes, and 
strategies is also likely to positively influence the team’s ability to adapt to more extreme 
environmental jolts (Gurtner et al., 2007). For example, Lewis and colleagues (2007) found 
that, when teams faced changes in membership, invoking reflexivity in team members 
helped prevent the rigid adherence to obsolete TMSs by the team members who were left 
behind. Finally, a study by Kray and Galinsky (2003) suggested that the activation of a coun-
terfactual mind-set—that is, focusing team members on what might have been and fostering 
the formation of alternative representations—may minimize cognitive rigidity resulting 
from the failure of groups to seek disconfirming information in respect of their initial hy-
pothesis when engaged in problem solving tasks. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have reviewed recent empirical and theoretical work on three types of 
shared cognition in teams: shared mental models, TMSs, and TSA. We have focused this 
review in particular on aspects of shared cognition that affect the adaptability of teams 
facing dynamic, unpredictable task environments. Additionally, we have suggested that 
both the inherent structural characteristics of shared cognition and the reflexivity of teams 
moderate the influence these types of shared cognition have on team performance in such 
environments. 
Our suggestions for future research are included in the body of the review at the end of 
each section, and we do not reiterate them here. However, our overall reading of the litera-
ture reviewed above reminded us of two important aspects concerning research collabora-
tion in the groups and teams literature. First, and following an elegant call for such collabo-
ration (Poole et al., 2005), over the past several years researchers across several disparate 
academic fields have added much to our knowledge regarding shared cognition in teams, 
and many signs of cross-field collaboration have begun to appear. For example, the forma-
tion of INGRoup—the Interdisciplinary Network for Group Research—in 2006 has provided 
an annual means for groups’ researchers across disciplines such as industrial/organizational 
psychology, social psychology, organizational behavior, and communication, to meet and 
explore new agendas and methods for studying team shared cognition and other issues in 
small group research. A quick perusal of the reference list included here will illustrate the 
need for such cross-disciplinary dialogue to continue in the area of shared cognition in 
teams. Such dialogue is particularly important regarding the consistent use of terminology 
concerning shared cognition in teams, which in turn will increase the ability of researchers 
to perform cross-study analyses and better summarize our knowledge in this area (Hodgkin-
son & Healey, 2008). 
Additionally, as organizational environments become more complex and fast-paced, 
and as organizations turn to teams to successfully anticipate and react to these environ-
ments, researchers will be challenged to find increasingly accurate means to measure shared 
cognition and related behaviors in dynamic environments—either simulated or real. Devel-
oping better and more accurate measures will likely necessitate “an earnest dialogue with 
computer scientists and mathematicians who may have the tools necessary to aid us in 
automating the coding of behavioral data and detecting patterns of behavior in groups” 
(Ballard, Tschan, & Waller, 2008, p. 345). Ultimately, more precise measures may also lead 
to better cross-study comparison as well as information for the training of teams working in 
these environments. What an exciting time to be studying team cognition when new devel-
opments in techniques and methods opens up new opportunities to deepen our understand-
ing of, in particular temporal and dynamic, aspects of team cognition that hitherto have 
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Based on team cognition literature (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & 
Mohammed, 1994) and the model of team adaptation proposed by Burke, Stagl, Salas, 
Pierce, and Kendall (2006), we examined the effect of team cognitive structures on team 
adaptation to novel circumstances. We tested the relations between mental model updating, 
team post-change interaction patterns, and tea m  a d a p t i v e  p e r f o r m a n c e .  I n  a d d i t i o n  w e  
tested whether team situation awareness, team members’ initial mental model similarity 
and accuracy, and team communication directly after a task situation change were antece-
dents of mental model updating. Results from 46 teams working on a fire fighting simula-
tion indicate positive relationships between team mental model updating, post-change team 
interaction patterns, and team adaptive performance. In addition, post-change team inter-
action patterns mediated the relationship between mental model updating and adaptive 
performance. 
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Introduction 
Organizations often deploy teams to cope with the ever increasing dynamism, complexity, 
and uncertainty of their environments (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006). As a 
result, it is crucial for these teams to maintain high levels of performance not only under 
routine circumstances but also in case of complex and unpredictable non-routine situations 
(Ilgen, 1999). In non-routine situation teams face unfamiliar and often unexpected prob-
lems that could have severe consequences for the team and the organizations in which they 
function (Waller, 1999). Although many teams spend the majority of their time functioning 
under normal operational conditions, under infrequent non-routine conditions, consequen-
tial differences in effectiveness among teams often become most evident (LePine, 2003; 
2005). Team functioning under these circumstances is often crucial for diverting failures 
and disasters (Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009); therefore, much leverage can be gained 
by identifying elements that contribute to teams’ ability to ‘think on their feet’ and rapidly 
adapt to novel non-routine circumstances. 
As team members accumulate experience in performing a team task, they develop effi-
cient routines and interaction patterns that constitute a major source of the reliability and 
speed of team performance (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick & Hackman, 1990). How-
ever, the applicability of such routines and interaction patterns are strongly dependent on 
the context in which they have been developed. When the team is faced with a changing 
task situation, persevering with previously established routines and interaction patterns can 
become detrimental for team performance (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick, 1988; Gersick 
& Hackman, 1990; Stachowski et al., 2009). In particular, if changes occur in the underlying 
task structure —i.e in the relationships among task variables and in the relative effective-
ness of specific actions—, teams must reevaluate the applicability of their existing practices 
and develop new practices for confronting their novel task situation (LePine, 2003; Marks, 
Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000). In order to effectively deal with such non-routine situations, 
teams must adapt to changes in the task situation and respond with appropriate actions 
(LePine, 2003). Thus, team adaptation is defined by Burke and colleagues (2006) as “a 
change in team performance, in response to a salient cue or cue stream, that leads to a func-
tional outcome for the entire team” (p.1190). 
Team researchers have depicted adaptation as a number of processes a team has to per-
form in order to adapt to a new task situation. Marks and colleagues (2000) suggest that 
teams adapt by surveying their task environments, interpreting the meaning with regard to 
the team goal, deciding on a strategy for action, and executing these actions. Similarly, 
Burke and colleagues (2006) suggest that team adaptation occurs as a recursive multiphasic 
process consisting of a situation assessment phase, a plan formulation phase, a plan execu-
tion phase, and a team learning phase. In the present research we build upon these theories 
of team adaptation by exploring the role of team members’ cognitive knowledge structures 
in team adaptation to novel non-routine circumstances. 
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In the above mentioned team adaptation models, the authors have emphasized the im-
portance of the structured knowledge team members have regarding their task or team in 
the team adaptation process. In particular, team mental models—team members’ mental 
representations of knowledge, relationships, or systems—are considered pivotal for success-
ful team adaptation (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). However, previous works, 
while explicating the role of mental models in team adaptation, often take a static perspec-
tive on team cognition, focusing on characteristics such as similarity, accuracy, or quality 
(Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Resick, 
Murase, Bedwell, Sanz, Jiménez, & DeChurch, 2010). Yet, research from the field of mana-
gerial and organizational cognition suggest that under dynamic task circumstances, it may 
not be the momentary stable characteristics of mental models that impacts performance, but 
the ability to update mental models in light of changing task situations (e.g. Barr, Stimpert, 
& Huff, 1992; Bartunek, 1984; Weick, 1979). 
Whereas, some scholars have hinted at the effect of dynamic aspects of mental models 
on team adaptive performance (e.g. Marks et al., 2000), empirical research on these dy-
namic effects are lacking. Therefore in the present paper, we test whether team member 
mental model updating—changing mental models in line with changes in the task situa-
tion—is positively related to team performance in a non-routine situation. In addition, we 
test whether initial mental model similarity and accuracy, team communication in the mo-
ments following the change, and pre-change team situation awareness (TSA)—team mem-
bers’ awareness of the relevant elements of the task situation—are antecedents of mental 
model updating. Finally we investigate whether team post-change interaction patterns 
mediate the relationship between mental model updating and team adaptive performance. 
We test our hypotheses in a study of 46 three-person teams performing tasks during a fire 
fighting simulation requiring an unexpected adaptation in task strategies. 
Theoretical background and hypotheses 
Boundary condition: Degree of environmental turbulence 
Whereas, we argue that team members should update their mental models in response to 
changes in their task situation, the extent to which they will have to adjust will depend on 
the degree of environmental turbulence (e.g. Moorman & Miner, 1997). Scholars have dis-
tinguished between two qualitatively different types of change: evolutionary and radical 
change (e.g. Gersick, 1991; Miller & Friesen, 1984). Whereas in evolutionary change the 
main elements from the previous period may still hold, radical change refers to a complete 
restructuring of the forces making out the relevant environment, or as Gersick cogently 
illustrated “the difference between changing the game of basketball by moving the hoops 
higher and changing it by taking the hoops away” (1991: p. 19). In the present study we 
focus on non-routine changes that are large enough to require teams to abandon some 
previously acquired routines and practices, but not so large that all previous knowledge 
becomes irrelevant. 
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Team mental model updating and team adaptive performance 
The most widely researched aspect of team cognition is probably the notion of shared men-
tal models. Mental models are organized knowledge structures consisting of the content as 
well as the structure of the concepts in the mind of individuals that represent a specific task 
or knowledge domain (Kieras, & Bovair, 1984; Orasanu & Salas, 1993). The concept of 
shared mental models refers to the distribution and overlap of the mental models of the 
members of a team (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). In both field and simulated settings, re-
search on shared mental models indicates that similarity of team members’ mental models 
facilitates team processes and team performance (e.g. Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2000; Marks et al., 2000; Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, & Kraiger, 2005; Web-
ber, Chen, Payne, Marsh, & Zaccaro, 2000). Moreover, a number of scholars have argued 
that apart from mental model similarity, the extent to which team members’ mental models 
depict the actual or optimal structure of the team or task is also important for team per-
formance (Cooke, et al., 2000; Rentsch & Hall, 1994). Empirical findings indicate direct 
effects for mental model accuracy (Cooke et al., 2001; Cooke et al., 2003; Edwards, Day, 
Arthur, & Bell, 2006; Lim & Klein, 2006; Marks et al., 2000), as well as interaction effects 
between mental model similarity and accuracy (Marks et al., 2000) in predicting team per-
formance. 
Several authors have argued that shared mental models are particularly important for 
team functioning in non-routine adaptation requiring situations (Cannon-Bowers et al., 
1993; Marks et al., 2000). Burke and co-authors (2006) reasoned that similarity in mental 
models is positively related to team adaptation as this facilitates the team processes that are 
required for the effective execution of new plans and strategies. In particular, they argued 
that a shared understanding of the task and other team members’ roles helps them monitor 
each other’s performance and provide backup behaviors if necessary. Marks and colleagues 
(2000) reasoned that whereas under normal circumstances team members have the oppor-
tunity to explicitly communicate about and deliberate their actions and strategies, unusual 
non-routine circumstances generate such time pressure that teams are precluded from such 
explicit coordination practices and hence rely more strongly on their shared mental models 
for rapid coordination and interpretation of novel information. Consistent with this reason-
ing, they found that shared mental models are particularly conducive for team performance 
in novel environments. Overall, the existing body of research indicates a positive link be-
tween shared mental models and team adaptive performance. 
Despite the acknowledgement that mental models sometimes can and should change 
over time (Burke et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2000), empirical studies on team mental models 
have often provided a rather static picture of team mental models and have not explicitly 
examined how team mental models may change over time in reaction to changes in the task 
structure. In those studies in which mental models were assessed at several points in time, 
researchers were mainly interested in the development and stability of team mental model 
similarity and accuracy over time; consequently, changes in the underlying structure of 
those mental models were not examined (Cooke et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2006; Mathieu 
et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005; Xinwen, Erping, Ying, Dafei, & Jing, 2006). In a stable task 
environment, development of team members’ mental models may follow a linear develop-
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ment towards increasing convergence with one (or more) optimal model(s). In an unstable 
environment, however, the trajectory of mental model development is by definition not 
linear, as a mental model that is effective at one point in time may quickly become subopti-
mal at a later point in time. For example, many companies in the airline and trucking indus-
tries suffered as their managers held on to operational models that had previously been 
optimal but quickly became outdated after the deregulation of these industries (Audia, 
Locke, & Smith, 2000). Therefore, a study that aims to assess the quality of team mental 
models over time in an unstable environment should incorporate this nonlinearity and 
assess if changes in the task structure are incorporated in the mental models that reflects the 
task situation. In a simulation study, Marks and colleagues (2000) did assess team mental 
models under different conditions, and found that high performing teams appeared to flexi-
bly adapt their mental models from routine to novel contexts. However, they did not for-
mally test this proposition and they did not include mental model flexibility or updating as 
variables in their research model. 
While the above-referenced literature emphasizes the positive effects of shared mental 
models on team adaptive performance, scholars from the field of managerial and organiza-
tional cognition have pointed out that cognitive structures such as mental models can also 
function as barriers to radical change and actually inhibit adaptation to novel circumstances 
(Reger & Palmer, 1996; Tushman et al., 1986). For instance, Walsh (1995), through applying 
the distinction between bottom-up versus top-down information processing (Abelson & 
Black, 1986), articulates the notion that knowledge structures may limit understanding. In 
contrast to bottom up information processing, during which people’s cognitions are driven 
by the current information context, top-down information processing involves the applica-
tion of individuals’ knowledge structures such as mental models. People acquire these 
knowledge structures through past experiences in similar situations and use them to make 
sense of their present environments and to select appropriate actions. Although top-down 
information processing is often effective and efficient, it is based upon knowledge structures 
that essentially are simplifications of reality—selective abstractions of situations that focus 
individuals on specific aspects of their environment while ignoring others. Therefore, if 
knowledge structures are inadvertently applied to situations for which they are not appro-
priate—for example if the present situation differs on fundamental aspects from previous 
situation—this may lead to decrements in performance. More specifically, scholars have 
argued that in situations requiring structural change, cognitive structures may inhibit adap-
tation to novel circumstances; when individuals and teams apply cognitive structures that 
are developed in previous situations to new situations that are fundamentally different, they 
are at risk of ignoring relevant information and taking inappropriate actions (Reger & 
Palmer, 1996; Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986). 
Studies of mental model accuracy clearly indicate that it is vital for team performance 
that team members’ mental models appropriately represent the underlying structure of the 
task situation (Cooke et al., 2001; Lim & Klein, 2006; Edwards et al., 2006). This implies that 
when a team’s task situation changes, alterations in the underlying structure of that situa-
tion should be matched with corresponding modifications in team members’ mental models, 
or teams will run the risk of acting on an impoverished or outdated view of reality (Weick, 
1979). It is not similarity or accuracy of mental models per se, but rather team members’ 
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ability to update their mental models in the light of changes in the task situation that is 
pivotal to team adaptation. Louis and Sutton (1991) propose that team adaptive perform-
ance does not merely depend on how good individuals or collectives of individuals function 
under routine or non-routine circumstances, but is more l ikely to be a function of their  
capacity to sense when a switch is appropriate. Therefore we predict that, when faced with 
an unexpected change in their task structure, team members’ ability to revise and update 
their mental models to more closely align them with the new task situation will be positively 
related to the team’s ability to perform well and avoid performance level decrements under 
non-routine circumstances. Note that this implies that not all change in mental models is 
necessarily beneficial to performance. We expect that specifically updating of the mental 
models—change that is in line with the changes in the task structure—is of importance for 
adaptive team performance. Therefore we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Team members’ mental model updating after a non-routine change will be posi-
tively related to team adaptive performance. 
Initial team mental model similarity and team mental model updating 
In addition to the importance of team members’ mental model updating, a consistent body 
of research indicates that similarity in team members’ mental models facilitates efficient 
teamwork and consequently leads to high performance (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; 
Mathieu et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005). However, the role of pre-change mental model 
similarity in team adaptation to novel circumstances is murky. 
Burke and co-authors (2006) emphasized the importance of shared mental models for 
the formulation and execution of new plans and strategies in novel environments. They 
stated that “[in] the absence of shared mental models adaptive team performance is not 
possible, because members do not have compatible views of equipment, tasks, and team 
member roles and responsibilities, which allow members to adapt proactively” (p. 1194). 
Similarly, Marks and colleagues (2001) pose that under high environmental dynamism, the 
positive relationship between mental model similarity and accuracy and team performance 
will be even more pronounced than under low degrees of environmental dynamism. In a 
low-fidelity three person team simulation, they found positive main effects, as well as an 
interaction effect of mental model similarity and accuracy on team adaptive performance. 
The interaction indicated that team mental model similarity was particularly important for 
teams with less accurate mental models. Based on this result, they suggest that if team 
members have similar mental models, these do not necessarily have to be accurate initially 
because having similar mental models may help them to construct accurate mental models 
as well. 
Although the existing research seems to imply a positive relationship between mental 
model similarity and team adaption, several scholars have voiced their concern that too 
much similarity may under specific conditions hinder effective adaptation (e.g. Cannon-
Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). Cannon-Bowers and colleagues (1993) 
wondered if a threshold of similarity in mental models may be surpassed, such that indi-
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viduals’ contributions may become lost and a team’s cognitive functioning may become 
overly rigid. This reasoning seems to imply two mechanisms that may cause a possible nega-
tive effect of mental model similarity on team performance: a social psychological and a 
cognitive mechanism. First, a social psychological mechanism implies a relation between 
mental model similarity, interpersonal cohesiveness, and a pressure for consensus. Second, 
a cognitive mechanism implies that mental model similarity is the opposite of cognitive 
diversity, which is often considered an important requirement for performance in novel 
environments. In order to derive our hypotheses about the effect of initial mental model 
similarity on mental model updating we will explore the evidence for these two mecha-
nisms. 
Cannon-Bowers and colleagues speculated that teams with overly similar mental mod-
els may display characteristics of groupthink (Janis, 1972); team members may become 
unwilling to abandon incorrect models when they are socially reinforced by the other group 
members. A reasoning based on the groupthink phenomenon assumes linkages between 
mental model similarity, group cohesiveness, and a pressure for consensus (Aldag & Fuller, 
1993); however, there is little proof for these relationships in the existing literature. Al-
though, Klimoski and Mohammed (1994) argued that perceptions of mental model similar-
ity may lead to high team cohesion by increasing trust and liking among the team members, 
research linking mental model similarity to social psychological outcome variables, such as 
cohesiveness is lacking in the extant literature. More importantly, the relationship between 
cohesiveness and pressures for consensus is highly contested (e.g. Callaway & Esser, 1984; 
van Woerkom & Sanders, 2010). A study by Kellermanns, Floyd, Pearson, and Spencer, 
(2008) suggests that, it may be more plausible that mental model similarity and pressure for 
consensus are separate constructs that may independently and interactively drive team 
processes and performance. They conducted a study in which they investigated the interac-
tion between mental model similarity and norms for constructive confrontation in work 
teams. They found that mental model similarity was positively related to work team deci-
sion quality when norms for constructive confrontation were low but mental model similar-
ity was negatively related to work team decision quality when norms for constructive con-
frontation were high. Given that norms for constructive confrontation can be considered 
antithetical to pressures for consensus, this implies that mental model similarity and pres-
sures for consensus are more likely to be independent interacting factors. 
A second more compelling argument indicating a possible negative effect of mental 
model similarity on adaptive performance proposes a cognitive mechanism. A number of 
recent studies have reported negative effects of mental model similarity on team perform-
ance. First, the study of Kellermanns and colleagues (2008), reported above, indicates that 
when teams have strong norms for constructive confrontation, mental model similarity may 
be negatively related to performance. They argue that in contrast to teams with similar 
mental models, teams with dissimilar mental models have greater diversity of cognitive 
inputs, which can be put to the team’s benefit in case they have constructive norms for team 
interaction. In addition, scholars have argued that mental model dissimilarity may be in-
dicative of an efficient distribution of roles and responsibilities (Banks & Millward, 2000). 
For example, Banks and Millwards (2007) make a distinction between similarity in proce-
dural knowledge and similarity in declarative knowledge. They found that whereas similar-
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ity in declarative knowledge about the task was positively related to team performance, 
similarity in procedural task knowledge was negatively related to team performance. Fi-
nally, Hamilton and Mohammed (2010) found that in heterogeneous teams, whereas simi-
larity in teamwork mental models was positively related to team performance, similarity in 
taskwork mental models negatively predicted team performance. 
Although the above mentioned studies do not relate specifically to team performance 
in adaptation requiring situations, an investigation of the role of shared mental models in 
the cognitive processes of team adaptation provides additional information on the possible 
negative effects of mental model similarity on team adaptation. First, given that mental 
models guide perception and interpretation processes (Neisser, 1976; Starbuck & Milliken, 
1988), similarity in mental models may be negatively related to the variety of cues that is 
considered within a team. Similarity may thereby reduce the chance that the team will 
notice the often relatively atypical cues that may signal a need for change. Second, the 
development of novel plans and strategies has often been associated more strongly with 
cognitive diversity than with cognitive similarity (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999). The 
information processing perspective on diversity (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007) sug-
gests that because teams with diverse knowledge structures have at their disposal a wider 
variety of opinions and perspectives, they are more likely to engage in deep information 
processing to integrate these various viewpoints. Deep information processing in turn is 
related to team’s ability to reconsider assumptions and produce more creative and high 
quality solutions (de Dreu & West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986). 
In sum, because these different research streams point to opposing conclusions regard-
ing the relationship between mental model similarity and mental model updating, we for-
mulate two opposing hypotheses: 
H2a: Team members’ initial mental model similarity will be positively related to men-
tal model updating after a non-routine change. 
H2b: Team members’ initial mental model similarity will be negatively related to men-
tal model updating after a non-routine change. 
Initial team mental model accuracy and team mental model updating 
An analysis of the extant literature also provides us with two opposing perspectives regard-
ing the relationship between initial mental model accuracy and mental model updating. 
First, given that previous research has consistently linked mental model accuracy to success-
ful performance (e.g. Edwards et al., 2006), initial mental model accuracy may lead to a 
‘paradox of success’. Research on the ‘paradox of success’ implies that initial success may 
hinder adaptation to changing circumstances (Audia et al., 2000; Miller, 1993). A number of 
studies, mainly on the organizational level, suggest that past success may lead to dysfunc-
tional strategic persistence after a radical environmental change (Audia et al., 2000; Lant, 
Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Miller & Chen, 1993). For instance, Audia and colleagues (2000) 
81 Chapter 3 
 
found in a simulation study that individuals who initially experienced high levels of success 
were more satisfied, sought less information, set higher goals, and became more confident 
in the effectiveness of their current strategies, which subsequently led to more strategic 
persistence. Thus, high levels of past success may decrease the motivation to engage in 
additional cognitive processing and lead to persistence and a lack of change in mental mod-
els despite of changes in the environment (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
Hence, it seems reasonable to deduce that individuals and teams with mental models that in 
the past have consistently led to good performance will be less likely to change these mental 
models than will individuals and teams with mental models that have not previously been 
associated with good performance. 
On the other hand, initially accurate mental models may provide individuals and teams 
with a more advantageous starting point to develop new accurate mental models than indi-
viduals and teams that did not initially have accurate mental models. Three arguments can 
be given for this positive relationship between mental model accuracy and mental model 
adaptation. First, even though some linkages among concepts may no longer hold in the 
new situation and some others will have to be developed, it is unlikely that all relationships 
among all concepts will have to be completely restructured. Hence, the net amount of rela-
tionships among concepts that has to be changed from an initially accurate mental model to 
a new accurate mental model is likely to be smaller than from an initially inaccurate mental 
model to a new accurate mental model. Second, the accuracy of the initial mental model 
may reflect an underlying ability to construct accurate mental models. For example, Ed-
wards and colleagues (2006) found a positive relationship between team ability and mental 
model accuracy. This ability may also be beneficial in the adaptation of the initial mental 
model to the new task situation (LePine, 2005). Third, the positive effect of initial accuracy 
on performance may generate additional effects that positively affect mental model adapta-
tion. For example, initially accurate mental models may make task performance more effi-
cient and thereby free up cognitive resources that may be used for consecutive processes of 
task performance and adaptation (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Rouse & Morris, 1986). Efficient 
teams will have more cognitive resources left for scanning their environments for cues sig-
nalling a need for change and for developing appropriate strategies to deal with such 
change (Thorngate, 1976). 
Whether previously accurate mental models will be conducive or detrimental to mental 
model adaptation is likely to depend on the degree of change in the task situation the team 
is facing. As we described under the boundary condition of the present study, although the 
type of change we focus on in this study is quite drastic, it is not as extreme as the radical 
environmental changes reported, for example, in the studies of Audia and colleagues 
(2000). Therefore, we expect the arguments for a positive relationship between team mem-
bers’ initial mental model accuracy and mental model updating to be more in line with the 
present study. Hence we hypothesize that: 
H3: Team members’ initial mental model accuracy will be positively related to mental 
model updating after a non-routine change. 
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Pre-change team situation awareness and team mental model updating 
In addition to mental model accuracy, the ability of teams to realize that a change is neces-
sary plays an important role in team adaptation. According to Burke and colleagues (2006), 
the first phase of team adaptation consists of the individual level cognitive process in which 
at least one of the team members scans the environment for cues that may indicate a re-
quirement for a change in strategies and procedure. Other scholars have also considered the 
process whereby a team assesses the situation and have treated the resultant awareness of 
situational elements as an important antecedent of adaptive team performance (e.g. Cooke 
et al., 2000; Orasanu, 1990; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha 1995). Specifically, Mosier, and 
Chidester (1991) found that in flight crews working in a flight simulator and facing non-
routine events, awareness of the information pertinent to the situation explained from 17 to 
31 percent of the variance in crews’ performance. Endsley referred to situation assessment as 
“the process of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining situation awareness;” she defined situa-
tion awareness as “the perceptions of the elements in the environment within a volume of 
time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in 
the near future” (1995, p: 36). The concept of situation awareness should be distinguished 
from mental models as it refers to the more ephemeral and dynamic knowledge of the actual 
momentary situation, whereas mental models reflect the underlying abstractions that make 
up the task-relevant structure and that can be generalized to other comparable situations 
(e.g. Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 1995; Fracker, 1991). 
TSA refers to a team’s awareness and understanding of the dynamic situation at any 
point in time (e.g. Salas et al., 1995). Scholars have given different accounts of how team 
level situation awareness is constructed from the situation awareness content of the indi-
vidual team members. Early scholars such as Endsley, (1995) and Wellens (1993) conceptu-
alized TSA in terms of the distribution and overlap of the situation awareness of the individ-
ual team members. Other scholars have argued that apart from the characteristics of indi-
vidual situation awareness, accounts of TSA should also include the team processes that 
integrate the knowledge of the individual members to a collective team level understanding 
(Cooke et al., 2000; 2001; Salas et al., 1995; Schwartz, 1990). 
Whereas most conceptual work views mental models as antecedents of situation 
awareness, we follow Burke and colleagues in proposing initial TSA as an antecedent of 
mental model updating. People tend to update their existing knowledge structures if they 
face unusual situations or when their expectations about reality are disconfirmed (Kruglan-
ski, 1990; Louis & Sutton, 1991). Teams with accurate and complete awareness of the impor-
tant elements of their task situation in the pre-change period are likely to timely recognize 
cues signaling important changes and hence to incorporate these changes into their mental 
models. Therefore, we propose that initial TSA will be positively related to mental model 
updating. 
H4: Initial TSA will be positively related to mental model updating after a non-routine 
change.  
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Team adaptation communication, team adaptive performance, and team 
mental model updating 
Once the change in the task situation has been perceived by the team, members must en-
gage in planning processes in order to adapt their interaction patterns to the new reality of 
the task (Burke et al., 2006). LePine (2003) found that role-structure adaptation—team 
communication in which members addressed and adjusted their interaction patterns and 
smoothly communicated necessary information—was positively related to team adaptive 
performance. In a simulation with airline crew members, Waller (1999) found that it was 
not so much the frequency but the timing of adaptation behaviors that was associated with 
crew performance. In particular, she found that the speed with which teams engaged in task 
prioritization and task distribution was significantly related to team adaptive performance. 
Moreover, in a study with nuclear power plant crews, Waller, Gupta, and Giambatista 
(2004) found that during non-routine situations, high performing crews engaged in more 
information collection behaviors than lower performing crews. Thus, empirical evidence 
indicates that during non-routine situations, timely engagement in communication regard-
ing priorities, tasks, and roles positively relates to a team’s adaptive performance. In line 
with these previous studies, we define team adaptation communication as communication 
taking place in the moments immediately after a change in the task situation that is directed 
at exchanging information about and making sense of the novel circumstances. 
Pearsall, Ellis, and Bell (2010) found that role identification behaviors, which they 
scored as the sharing of information by team members about their role or asking questions 
about the responsibilities of others, was positively related to the accuracy of team members’ 
mental models and to the team’s transactive memory system. This implies that team mem-
ber mental model updating may mediate the relationship between adaptation communica-
tion and team performance. By discussing priorities, task, and roles, immediately after a 
change in the task situation, team members may quickly adjust and realign their mental 
model, which is expected to lead to high performance. Therefore, we propose that: 
H5a: Team adaptation communication will be positively related to team adaptive per-
formance. 
H5b: The relationship between team adaptation communication and team adaptive 
performance will be mediated by team mental model updating. 
Post-change team interaction patterns as a mediator in the relationship 
between team mental model updating and team adaptive performance 
Whereas, team mental model updating may be crucial to team adaptation, team members’ 
actual task related behaviors or interaction patterns are a more proximal antecedent of 
adaptive team performance (LePine, 2005). Team interaction patterns are the recurring 
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interlocking patterns of activity, both verbal and non-verbal, that team members perform 
during a task performance episode. (LePine, 2003; Zellmer-Bruhn, Waller, & Ancona, 2004). 
Several scholars have placed interaction patterns at the basis of organized behavior (Cohen 
& Bacdayan, 1994; Katz & Khan, 1978; Weick, 1979). For example, Weick (1979) asserts that 
organizational processes consist of double interacts, which are sequences of behavior in 
which one actor acts, a second actor responds, and the first actor acts again in response to 
the second actor’s action. Team interaction patterns consist of the repeated sequences of 
behaviors often executed by different team members. When team members’ actions co-
occur at a higher-than-chance frequency, this indicates a stable underlying pattern of behav-
ior (Stachowski et al., 2009). Interaction patterns closely resemble the notion of habitual 
routines, which are formally defined by Gersick and Hackman (1990) as “when a group 
repeatedly exhibits a functionally similar pattern of behavior in a given stimulus situation 
without explicitly selecting it over alternative ways of behaving.” However, whereas team 
habitual routines are considered to be largely automatic (i.e., they are triggered and exe-
cuted without conscious deliberation), interaction patterns are defined less stringently and 
hence may be consciously selected and executed as well as automatic. 
Previous research offers competing views regarding the relationship between team in-
teraction patterns and team adaptive performance. On the one hand, team interaction pat-
terns are considered to facilitate team adaptive performance because the stability inherent 
in repetitive patterns increases predictability and thereby facilitates interpersonal coordina-
tion of behavior (Kanki, Folk, & Irwin, 1991). Moreover, automaticity of behavior reduces 
the load on working memory and thereby frees up mental resources, which may be used for 
other activities, such as scanning the environment and developing alternative action plans 
(Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Thorngate, 1976). However, researchers have also pointed at the 
fact that habituated interaction patterns may be related to rigidity and an inability of teams 
to discard interaction patterns that have become dysfunctional and to flexibly develop new 
ones (Cohen & Bacdayan, 1994; Gersick & Hackman, 1990). Particularly, when situations 
are perceived as threatening, people tend to become rigid and fall back on well learned 
responses (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Whereas well learned responses may be 
functional under relatively stable circumstances, they can become detrimental when the 
task becomes non-routine and requires divergent interaction patterns than the ones origi-
nally developed. For example, Stachowski and colleagues (2009) found that during a crisis 
situation, higher performing nuclear power plant crews exhibited fewer, shorter, and less 
complex interaction patterns than less effective crews. 
Another view points out that stability and flexibility may not necessarily be opposite 
concepts, but may be two sides of the same coin (Farjoun, 2010; Feldman & Pentland, 
2003). Farjoun (2010) argues that stability and change are not only separate and conflicting 
but also fundamentally interdependent as well as mutually enabling. More specifically, 
stable mechanisms such as routines “while still supporting stable outcomes, also promote 
adaptability, innovation, and exploration” (2010, p.205). This view is consistent with studies 
on improvisation, which show that extensive knowledge of standardized practices and 
routines are a crucial prerequisite for improvisation and innovation (Moorman & Miner, 
1998; Vera & Crossan, 2005). Also, Feldman and Pentland (2003) propose this two-sided 
view of routines as containing a source of inertia as well as flexibility. They conceptualize 
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routines as consisting of an ostensive aspect, embodying the abstract and structural aspects 
that support stability, and a performative aspect referring to the actual execution of the 
routine which allows for individual agency and variation. In other words, by their repeated 
enactment of routines, individuals and teams not only retain and reinforce existing routines 
but also modify them and create new variations. Hence, it is the existence of available rou-
tines that allows for the variations that are required to adapt to novel circumstances. Finally, 
this view is supported by the finding of LePine (2003) that the amount of newly developed 
routines after a change was positively related to team adaptive performance. Therefore, we 
propose that the amount, variety, and complexity of team interaction patterns after the 
structural change will mediate the relationship between mental model updating and team 
adaptive performance. 
H6: The amount, variety, and complexity of team interaction patterns after the struc-
tural change mediates the relationship between mental model updating and team 
adaptive performance 
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Figure 1. Research model 
Methods 
Sample 
We recruited 138 bachelor students from two samples. The first sample contained 102 stu-
dents from a large North American business school (NA) and the second sample contained 
36 students from a large Western European business school (WE). Students were arrayed 
randomly into 46 three-person teams. Of the students in the sample, 61 (NA = 45,1 %, WE = 
41,7 % ) were female. As country of origin 50 (NA = 47.1 %, WE = 5.6 %) indicated a North 
American country, 35 (NA = 32.4 %, WE = 8.3 %) indicated an Asian country, and 45 (NA = 




















Note that H5b and H6 are mediation hypotheses
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= 21.4, SD = 0.9). Although there were differences between the samples in terms of country 
of origin and there was a small but significant difference in mean age between the samples, 
independent sample t-tests indicate that students from the two samples did not differ sig-
nificantly on the main variables tested in this study. All students participated in team simu-
lation sessions that lasted approximately 100 minutes for which they received a small 
amount of course credit. In addition, in order to motivate goal-directed team functioning, 
all members of the three highest performing teams received prize certificates worth ap-
proximately 10, 25, and 50 USD per team member. 
Task 
We used a computer-based real-time command-and-control fire fighting simulation called 
Networked Fire Chief as our research platform. NFC is developed as a psychological re-
search tool to investigate command and control decision making in complex dynamic situa-
tions (Omodei, Taranto, & Wearing, 2003). For each team, the simulation runs on three 
networked computers simultaneously. The teams’ task is to minimize the overall damage 
caused by fire outbreaks occurring at pre-established time points on locations on a map of a 
village environment. Team members work together from their individual computers and 
have at their disposal fire trucks and helicopters for extinguishing fires, and bulldozers for 
clearing grounds (which prevents fires from spreading). Whereas two of the team members 
are only able to scroll through the map at a detailed level, one of the team members is able 
to zoom out to an overview map of the complete area. All members have information dis-
played about the actual and the predicted wind strength and direction (as wind influences 
the spread of the fire). Team members were seated apart so they could not see each other 
and could communicate with each other only via a computerized chat function. 
Task situation change. Consistent with previous studies on team adaptation, we 
adopted the task-change paradigm to assess team adaptive performance (Chen, Thomas, & 
Wallace, 2005; LePine 2003, 2005; Marks et al., 2000). In this paradigm, teams are trained 
in one context until they possess a basic proficiency in executing the team task. Then some 
aspect of the task situation changes so that the team must adapt its behaviors to appropri-
ately address the new task context (Lang & Bliese, 2008). We programmed the NFC simula-
tion so that halfway the time period of the team task, important changes would occur in the 
strength and direction of the wind and in the size and intensity of fires. These changes in the 
task situation were not immediately apparent to the team members as fires occurred at 
irregular intervals and team members needed to deduce the effects of the wind on the 
spreading of the fires. Due to these changes, tactics and interaction patterns that are optimal 
in the first half of the simulation become suboptimal in the second half of the simulation. 
We conducted a pilot test with 12 teams to assess if our a priori derived optimal strate-
gies actually lead to the highest performance. From this pilot test we derived that in the first 
half of the simulation, the optimal strategy is to have the team member with the overview 
function scan the environment for newly developed fires and communicate this information 
while other members use helicopters and fire trucks to extinguish these fires as rapidly as 
possible. Because extinguishing fires is much faster than bulldozing land, preventing fire 
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from spreading is not an effective strategy in the first half of the simulation. In the second 
half of the simulation, fire intensity increases significantly and fires become much more 
difficult to extinguish. Moreover, the wind becomes substantially stronger and blows into 
the direction of the villages. These circumstances render it more optimal to prevent the fires 
from spreading instead of immediately trying to extinguish all fires. Teams performed best if 
they focused their effort on bulldozing land ahead of the wind and extinguishing fires at the 
frontline, a strategy also used by firefighters in bushfire situations in the field (AIIMS, 2005). 
Procedure 
Sessions lasted about 100 minutes in total and contained an introduction phase, a prac-
tice trial phase, and a simulation phase. In the introduction phase, students filled in a gen-
eral background questionnaire and were instructed on the use of the simulation by means of 
a standardized presentation. After the presentation followed a 15 minutes practice trial 
during which the team members could familiarize themselves with the controls and coordi-
nation requirements of the simulation. Following the practice trial, students were given five 
minutes to communicate via a computerized chat function to develop a strategy; immedi-
ately after this communication, subjects’ mental models were assessed with a written in-
strument (explained in more detail below). 
After completing this instrument, students were notified that the actual simulation 
would start. The simulation trial duration was 30 minutes; the non-routine change in task 
structure began after 15 minutes. During the simulation, at three time points (at 5, 10, and 15 
minutes), the simulation was frozen, the screen was blanked, and a situation awareness 
questionnaire was administered to all three team members. After 20 minutes, team mem-
bers filled in the second mental model instrument. After the simulation, students filled in a 
final questionnaire, and then they were debriefed and thanked. 
Measures 
Team situation awareness. We employed a query measure of situation awareness to 
assess the extent to which team members were aware of task relevant knowledge at specific 
points in time (Cooke et al., 2001; Endsley, 1995). We applied a freeze task in which at three 
time points the simulation was momentarily paused, the screen set to blank, and the team 
members were asked to answer a number of questions about the situation. Questions related 
to their awareness of critical elements of the situation: present locations of fire, wind direc-
tion, and wind speed. A map of the task environment was used in which the team members 
could indicate the present wind direction and speed and the presence of fires. Situation 
awareness accuracy was subsequently measured by comparing the situation descriptions of 
the team members with objective data registered by the simulator. Because teams differed 
in the speed at which they extinguished fires, in the TSA measure we included only fires that 
started immediately before the freeze measurement. 
Because different specifications exist concerning how team level situation awareness is 
shaped and constrained by its individual-level constituents (Chan, 1998; Kozlowski and 
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Klein, 2000; Uitdewilligen, Waller, & Zijlstra, 2010), we transferred situation awareness 
accuracy to the team level in two ways: as total accuracy and as coverage. Total accuracy is 
an additive measure (Chan, 1998) that refers to the total number of correct answers of all 
the team members. Coverage on the other hand is a compilational measure (Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000) that takes into account the fact that TSA may not simply be an aggregate of the 
situation awareness of the individual members, as team members may distribute their re-
sponsibility for aspects of the environment (Ensdley, 1995; Wellens 1993). Therefore, TSA 
coverage refers to the total of unique accurate answers the team members give. The differ-
ence between the two measures is that for calculating total accuracy, all correct answers are 
added up into the final score, whereas for calculating coverage, correct answers that are 
given by more than one team member are counted only once. 
Team members’ mental models. We used association matrices (Edwards, 2006; 
Mathieu et al., 2000: 2005) to assess two types of team mental models: system mental mod-
els and task mental models. System mental models refer to team members’ understanding of 
the development and spreading of fires and task mental models represent team members’ 
associations among the task goals and activities. By means of a detailed task analysis of the 
simulation and the technical documentation, and with the help of a focus group consisting 
of people who were experts on the simulation (Mathieu et al., 2000), we derived seven 
concepts that are most critical for understanding the development of the fires: (a) fire inten-
sity, (b) spreading of fire, (c) landscape flammability, (d) direction of wind, (e) speed of 
wind, (f) burnt area, and (g) difficulty of extinguishing fires, and seven concepts that were 
considered most critical for minimizing the impact of the fire: (a) extinguishing fires, (b) 
bulldozing land, (c) checking world map, (d) team communication, (e) team leadership, (f) 
locating vehicles, (g) locating fires. 
Team members were asked to fill in matrices in which they indicated how strong they 
considered each of these concepts to be related to all other concepts. Statistics about the 
distribution off the mental model measures are reported in table 1. Mental model similarity 
is assessed by the quadratic assignment proportion correlation between the mental models 
of the different team members. The quadratic assignment proportion is a measure of asso-
ciation among the matrices based on a Pearson’s correlation coefficient on the correspond-
ing cells of the data matrices (Mathieu et al., 2005). While the values can in principal range 
from -1 (completely reversed) to + 1 (completely similar), values in our sample ranged from 
.01 to .72 for the system mental model and from -.10 to .59 for the task mental model, which 
indicates that all teams at least had a basic level of similarity. In order to assess initial team 
mental model accuracy we calculated the average quadratic assignment proportion correla-
tion of each team member’s mental model with a referent mental model. In order to derive a 
referent mental model, we asked six subject matter experts to independently complete the 
mental model measures. As subject matter experts we used six additional bachelor students 
whom we extensively trained to perform the team task under normal task circumstances. 
The use of trained subject matter experts for deriving expert mental models is common in 
the literature and has been proven to provide reliable referents for assessing mental model 
accuracy (Acton, Johnson, & Goldsmith, 1994; Edwards et al., 2006). We averaged the 
mental models of the referent groups to yield referents for the system mental model and the 
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task mental model. Values in our sample ranged from .13 to .64 for the system mental model 
and from -.05 to .61 for the task mental model. 
System mental model change was measured in two ways: as absolute change and as 
updating. Absolute change was measured as the average of the reverse of the quadratic 
assignment proportion correlation between team members’ mental models before and after 
the change. In other words, our measure of absolute mental model change reflects the mean 
dissimilarity between mental models at time 1 and time 2, with values ranging between -1 
(completely similar) to + 1(completely dissimilar). Values in our sample ranged from -.92 to 
.32 for the system mental model and from -.65 to -.03 for the task mental model, indicating 
that, although team members’ did change their mental models over time, very drastic 
changes were not common. Although, absolute change only reflects whether team members 
did change their mental models from the period before the change to the period after the 
change, it does not reflect the direction of this change. Therefore, we also derived measures 
of mental model updating that reflect whether team members updated their mental models 
in alignment with the changes in the task situation. Whereas in the first half of the simula-
tion wind speed and direction were relatively unimportant factors, in the second half they 
became crucial input factors for teams’ strategies. Team members needed to take into ac-
count the wind in order to efficiently prioritize which fires to extinguish first and to decide 
where they would apply bulldozers to prevent fires from spreading. For example, it would 
be strategically more efficient to give high priority to a fire that, due to the wind direction, 
would spread towards a village, rather than to give high priority to a fire that would spread 
in the direction of a lake. 
In order to derive our measure of mental model updating, we first used UCINET (Bor-
gatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1992) to calculate for each team member the relative centrality of 
each of the concepts of their mental model. We calculated per team member the average 
centrality of the wind by averaging their centrality for the concepts of wind speed and direc-
tion. Finally, we averaged the centrality scores over the three team members. The resulting 
measure can be understood as the percentage of the centrality score of the wind relative to 
the centrality score of the other concepts in the mental models. Values in our sample ranged 
from 9.31 percent to 15.20 percent for wind centrality before the change and from 10.87 
percent to 15.18 percent after the change. Values for bulldozer centrality ranged from 7.07 
percent to 12.94 percent before the change and from 5.41 percent to 11.97 percent after the 
change. In order to assess system mental model updating we will enter into the regression 
equations the centrality of the wind score after the change while we control for the initial 
centrality of the wind. By entering the initial centralities before entering the post-change 
centralities, the post-change values represent the residual or change in centralities from the 
pre-change to the post-change period (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
We conducted the same steps for the task mental model updating measure, which we 
assessed as the average change in the centrality of bulldozing in team members’ mental 
models. Whereas, in the first half of the simulation bulldozing land constituted a suboptimal 
strategy, after the non-routine change, bulldozing land ahead of the fires to prevent it from 
spreading became an optimal strategy. Because the wind drove the fires rapidly into the 
direction of the villages, the fastest way to stop it was by creating a barricade with the bull-
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dozers below the wind so it could not spread any further. Therefore we assess an adaptive 
change in the task MM by the increase in the average centrality of bulldozing.  
Table 1. Ranges, means and standard deviations of mental model measures. 
   Min. Max Mean SD 
System MM similarity t1  .01  .72  .29  .17 
Task MM similarity t1  -.10  .59  .21  .16 
System MM accuracy t1   .13  .64  .41  .12 
Task MM accuracy t1   -.05  .61  .39  .14 
System MM abs. change  -.92  .32  -.49  .28 
Task MM abs. change  -.65  -.03  -.34  .16 
Wind centrality t1  9.31%  15.20%  12.45%  1.30% 
Wind centrality t2  10.87% 15.18% 12.91%  1.06% 
Bulldozer centrality t1  7.07%  12.94%  10.03%  1.35% 




Adaptation communication. To measure adaptation communication, we em-
ployed direct measures of the team communication data in the five minutes immediately 
following the change in the task situation (LePine, 2003; Waller et al. 2004). We used an 
additive index (Pearsall et al., 2010) of two behaviors—task distribution and information 
sharing—that were found to be related to team adaptive performance in previous studies 
(LePine, 2003; Waller, 1999). Task distribution was coded in accordance with the method 
used by Waller (1999) as including all statements in which team members gave commands 
or assigned tasks to other team members, when they requested help, or when they indicated 
that they would execute a task themselves. Example statements for this category are “Is 
someone controlling the east?” and “Pat, if you [bull]doze in front of the houses at 60,30 I 
will take the fire at 12,48.” Information sharing was coded in accordance with Waller (1999) 
as all statements in which team members reactively or proactively shared task information 
with other team members. Task information contained information about the location or 
characteristics of fires or vehicles as well as about general characteristics of the task situa-
tion. Example statements for this category are “Big fire at 60,30,” and “Watch the wind 
guys.” 
Team interaction patterns. In line with (LePine, 2003) we used a measure of role 
structure adaptation based on recurring patterns of task-related activity. We used indicators 
of interaction patterns (Stachowski et al., 2009) to capture the structure of the post-change 
interaction. As an input for pattern recognition we ordered the behavioral data recorded by 
the NFC simulation in a temporally ordered string of events containing the action that was 
executed (move, stop, fight, or treat), the vehicle on which the action was executed (heli-
copter, fire truck, or bulldozer), the person who executed the action (member 1, member 2, 
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or member 3), and the time at which the action was executed. Due to technical problems 
behavioral data of 7 teams was lost and hence all analyses involving interaction patterns 
only involve the remaining 39 teams. We used THEME, a pattern recognition software algo-
rithm (Magnusson, 2000; Ballard, Tschan, & Waller, 2008) to identify patterns in the inter-
action sequences of the team members. THEME software searches for patterns in temporally 
ordered event data by first searching for simple co-occurrences of events, and then combin-
ing these into more complex hierarchically ordered patterns. To be conservative, we set the 
confidence interval to derive patterns at 0.005, indicating that patterns were only retained if 
they occurred at a less than 0.5 percent probability level. In order to control for the effect of 
the total number of actions on the number of patterns that could be identified, we set the 
minimum number of times a pattern should occur, to the median frequency of all event 
types (Noldus manual, 2004). We derived indicators for the total number of interaction 
patterns, the number of unique interaction patterns, the average number of switches be-
tween team members, the average number of team members in a pattern, the average 
length of the patterns, and the average hierarchy level of the patterns. 
Team adaptive performance. Team performance is measured as the percentage of 
the total area that could have been burnt but that was saved by the team. Consistent with 
other research, team adaptive performance was measured as the team’s performance score 
of the period after the change had taken place (LePine, 2003). 
Game experience. We included a control variable for team members’ com-
puter/video game experience because researchers have suggested that team member game 
experience may impact team performance on computer based simulation tasks (Wilson et 
al., 2009). We measured game experience with the single questionnaire item “Please indi-




A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed that the observed team adaptive performance distribu-
tion differed significantly from a normal distribution (p < 0.01). An inspection of the distri-
bution of team adaptive performance scores indicates that although the majority of teams 
had scores between minus 1.778 and minus 4.264 (N = 24, M = -2.813, SD = 0.829), the 
additional teams manifested highly deviating scores varying from minus 6.050 to minus 
47.942 (N = 22, M = -19.903, SD = 12.912). This indicates the existence of bifurcation effect 
which suggests that under non-routine situations teams bifurcate into high- and low-
performing clusters as some teams are able to deal with the change whereas others get 
c a u g h t  i n  a  n e g a t i v e  d o w n w a r d  s p i r a l  ( W a l l e r, 1999; Waller et al., 2004; Waller, Roe, 
Gevers, & Raes, 2005). Therefore, in order for the scores to more closely approximate a 
normal distribution, we applied a reciprocal transformation (1/ (XHighest -Xi)), as this reduces 
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the impact of extreme scores. Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations among all 
the variables included in the hypotheses are included in Table 2. 
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the pattern indicators derived 
with the THEME pattern recognition software. We assessed the dimensionality of the six 
measures of interaction patterns using principal component analyses on the pattern indica-
tors both before and after the change. From the factor analysis we derived a one factor 
solution with an eigenvalue of 4.685, explaining 78.1 percent of the total variance. Because 
all variables have high factor loadings ( > .789) on the single factor, we aggregated the six 
measures of interaction patterns into a single underlying dimension of pattern complexity 
by averaging the z scores of the individual measures. Pattern occurrences in the post-change 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of interaction pattern analysis  
      Mean  SD 
Nr. of events  598.67  104.42 
Nr. of unique interaction patterns  10.59  9.07 
Total nr. of interaction patterns  284.64  249.18 
Average pattern length  2.12  0.58 
Average pattern hierarchy  1.14  0.43 
Average nr. of switches between members  0.30  0.41 
Average nr. of team members in pattern  1.22  0.46   
Test of Hypotheses 
Mental model updating and team adaptive performance 
Hypothesis 1 poses that mental model updating after the non-routine change is positively 
related to team adaptive performance. To test this hypothesis we conducted hierarchical 
linear regression with absolute change as well as with updating of both mental model meas-
ures on teams’ adaptive performance scores. In order to assess the effect of updating we first 
entered the centrality of the wind and the centrality of bulldozing in the pre-change period 
as control variables. Then, in a second step we entered centrality of the wind and centrality 
of bulldozing to assess the effect of the changes in these variables on team adaptive per-
formance (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). As can be seen from table 4 (step 1), none 
of the absolute mental model change measures was significantly related to team adaptive 
performance. Moreover, neither the initial centrality of bulldozing in the task mental model 
nor the initial centrality of the wind in the system mental model were positively related to 
team adaptive performance. However, as can be seen from table 4 (step 2), updating of the 
system mental model was significantly and positively related to team performance—the 
more teams increased the centrality of wind characteristics in their understanding of the 
situation, the better they performed in the post-change period. Updating of the task mental 
model, however, was not significantly related to team adaptive performance. So, these 
results provide mixed support for hypothesis 1. 
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Table 4. Regression results for the effect of change in mental models and interaction patterns on adap-
tive performance 
   Step 1  Step 2  Step 3  Step 4 
Average game experience  0.25  0.23  0.37*  0.29* 
Wind centrality before change  -0.01  -0.25  -0.03  -0.16 
Bulldozer centrality before change  0.22  0.16      
System MM absolute change  -0.11  -0.20      
System MM absolute change  -0.06  -0.14      
Wind centrality after change    0.54**  0.62**  0.50 
Bulldozer centrality after change    0.01      
Total number of actions       0.11  -0.01 
Patterns before change       -0.02  -0.05 
Patterns after change         0.34* 
          
Total R
2 0.13  0.33 0.33 0.41 
 R
2    0.20**     0.09* 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
       
Antecedents of mental model updating 
Hypothesis 2a proposes that initial mental model similarity will be positively related to 
mental model updating; whereas hypothesis 2b poses that initial mental model similarity 
will be negatively related to mental model updating. Hypothesis 3 proposes that initial 
mental model accuracy will be positively related to mental model updating. To test these 
hypotheses we conducted hierarchical linear regressions with post-change wind centrality 
as the dependent variable, controlling for pre-change wind centrality. As can be seen from 
table 5 neither initial mental model accuracy (step 2) nor similarity (step 3) had a significant 
effect on mental model updating. Thus this provides no support for Hypothesis 2a, Hypothe-
sis 2b, and Hypothesis 3. 
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Table 5. Antecedents of mental model updating 
   Step 1  Step 2  Step 3  Step 4  Step 5 
Average game experience  0.06  0.06  0.05  0.02  -0.03 
System MM Wind centrality t1  0.64***  0.49***  0.45**  0.48**  0.52*** 
System MM accuracy t1    0.04  0.10  0.10  0.11 
System MM similarity t1      -0.10  -0.10  -0.09 
TSA sum         0.23  0.22 
TSA coverage        -0.08  -0.09 
Task discussion          0.17 
Information exchange          0.02 
          
Total R
2 0.25 0.25 0.25  0.29  0.32 
R
2    0.00  0.01  0.04  0.03 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
         
Hypothesis 4 poses that pre-change team situation awareness positively predicts team 
mental model updating. To test this hypothesis we added TSA sum and TSA coverage to the 
equation predicting post change wind centrality. As Table 5 (step 4) shows, neither measure 
of TSA predicts updating, providing no support for Hypothesis 4. 
Team adaptation communication, mental model updating, and adaptive 
performance 
Hypothesis 5a predicts that team adaptation communication is positively related to team 
adaptive performance. As Table 6 indicates, the beta coefficient for task discussion is not 
significant and the beta coefficient for information exchange in predicting team adaptive 
performance is marginally significant, lending limited support for Hypothesis 5a. 
Hypothesis 5b predicts that the relationship between team adaptation communication 
and team adaptive performance is mediated by mental model updating. In order for this 
hypothesis to hold, the following conditions should hold: (1) Adaptation communication 
should predict team adaptive performance, (2) Adaptation communication should predict 
mental model updating, (3) Mental model updating should predict team adaptive perform-
ance, and (4) the relationship between team adaptation communication and team adaptive 
performance should decrease if mental model updating is added to the equation (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). The first condition receives limited support as information exchange is a 
marginally significant predictor for team performance. However, as Table 5 (step 5) indi-
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cates, neither task discussion nor team information exchange has a significant effect on 
mental model updating. Hence, the second condition for mediation does not hold and Hy-
pothesis 5b is not supported. 
Table 6. Regression results for the relationship between adaptive communication and adaptive per-
formance 
   Step 1  Step 2 
Average game experience  0.27
† 0.26 
Task discussion    -0.13 
Information exchange    0.34
†
    
Total R
2 0.07 0.16 
 R
2    0.08 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
    
Post-change interaction patterns, team mental model updating, and 
adaptive performance 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that teams’ post change interaction patterns will mediate the relation-
ship between mental model updating and team adaptive performance. In order for this 
hypothesis to hold, the following conditions should hold: (1) mental model updating should 
predict team interaction patterns, (2) Interaction patterns should predict team adaptive 
performance, (3) mental model updating should predict team adaptive performance, and 
(4) the relationship between mental model updating and team adaptive performance should 
decrease if the variable for post-change interaction patterns is added to the equation (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986). 
In order to test the relationship between mental model updating and post-change pat-
terns we regressed pattern interactions after the change on wind centrality after the change, 
controlling for the total number of actions, interaction patterns before the change, and wind 
centrality before the change. Table 7 shows that system mental model updating marginally 
predicts pattern complexity, providing partial support for the first condition. In order to test 
the effects of post-change interaction patterns on team adaptive performance, we first ex-
cluded the non-significant variables from our equation predicting team adaptive perform-
ance and we added the total number of actions, and pre-change interaction patterns as 
control variables. As can be seen from Table 4 (step 4), post-change interaction patterns 
significantly predict team adaptive performance, thus providing support for the second 
condition. As we have seen before, mental model updating significantly predicts team adap-
tive performance, providing evidence for the third condition. Finally, as Table 4 (step 4) 
99 Chapter 3 
 
shows, the beta-coefficient of mental model updating predicting team adaptive performance 
decreases after interaction pattern complexity is added to the equation. In addition, a Sobel 
test indicates a marginally significant mediation effect (t = 1,96, SD = 0.37, p = 0.05). 
Together these equations provide support for the partial mediation effect of Hypothesis 6. 
Table 7. Regression results for the effects of system mental model updating on interaction pattern 
complexity after the change. 
   Step 1  Step 2 
Average Game experience  0.23  0.23 
Total number of actions  0.27  0.33
†
Patterns before change  0.01  0.10 
Wind centrality before change  -0.17  -0.31
†
Wind centrality after change    0.34
†
    
Total R
2 0.16 0.23 
 R
2    0.08
†
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.       
Discussion 
As organizations increasingly employ teams as mechanisms for dealing with environmental 
change and turbulence, it becomes more crucial to unravel factors that underlie and con-
tribute to team adaptation. Our study focused on developing understanding of the cognitive 
aspects of team adaptation. More specifically, we investigated the role of team mental 
model updating, TSA, team adaptation communication, and team interaction patterns in a 
simulation study involving 46 three-person teams. Our results provide important findings in 
several areas. 
First, whereas the body of literature on team mental models has accumulated over the 
last 20 years, empirical investigations of many temporal aspects of team mental models, 
such as flexibility and change, have been lacking. Although some scholars have hinted at the 
importance of mental model flexibility for team adaptive performance (Marks et al., 2000; 
Burke et al., 2006), our study is the first to empirically demonstrate that mental model 
updating is positively related to team adaptive performance. More specifically, our results 
indicate that it is not a change in mental models per se, but specific change in alignment 
with the change in the task situation that predicts post-change team functioning. 
In our study only updating of the system mental models and not of the team task men-
tal models significantly predicted team adaptive performance. An explanation for this dif-
ference could be that whereas teams’ system mental models directly reflect the team’s task 
situation, the team’s task mental model reflects aspects such as task processes and strategies 
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that are one step further removed from the task situation (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). 
Therefore it could be that, whereas the system mental model has to be changed in line with 
the changes in the task situation, there may be equifinality in the way in which team mem-
bers can change their task mental models—it may be that there is not one but several strate-
gies teams can choose to deal with a novel task situation (Mathieu et al., 2005). 
Based on the results of the pilot tests we expected that the best strategy for teams after 
the change would be to rapidly use bulldozers to prevent the fire from spreading, and that 
the recognition of this optimal strategy would be reflected in the increased centrality of 
bulldozing in team members’ mental models. However, teams may adapt in several ways to 
unexpected changes, and it is difficult to specify a priori if one form of adaptation is the only 
or even the optimal way to adapt (see also LePine, 2003). For instance, some high perform-
ing teams appeared to be able to maintain high performance even though they did not make 
much use of the bulldozers in the post-change period. Instead they let the fire burn over a 
small strip and then extinguished the fire in front of a burnt area. In this way, the burnt area 
itself served as a barrier that prevented the fire to spread further. An additional analysis of 
the actual behavior of team members indicates that the number of times team members 
applied the bulldozers was actually negatively related to team adaptive performance. It 
appears that the less adaptive teams did use the bulldozers but did not include information 
about the wind direction and speed in deciding where to apply their bulldozers. Hence, they 
did make use of their bulldozer more often but they did not select the optimal locations for 
bulldozing. 
Contrary to our expectations, we failed to find evidence for an effect of initial mental 
model accuracy on mental model updating. Based on existing literature (Burke et al., 2006; 
Edwards et al., 2006), we argued that initial mental model accuracy would provide teams 
with a fertile starting ground that would help them to recognize the need for change and 
adapt their knowledge structures accordingly. Following the ‘paradox of success’ logic it 
could be argued that high initial accuracy could actually decrease adaptation because it may 
lead to initial success and consequently to strategic persistence and cognitive rigidity (Audia 
et al., 2000; Miller, 1993). If this reasoning would hold in our study, we should expect to see 
strong negative correlations between initial mental model accuracy and absolute mental 
model updating. However, whereas we do find a negative correlation between initial mental 
model accuracy and absolute mental model change for the task mental model, for the sys-
tem mental model there is no significant correlation between initial mental model accuracy 
and absolute mental model change. So, teams with initially more accurate mental models 
do not necessarily cling more rigidly to these mental models. It seems that more in general, 
under dynamic conditions, initial accuracy in mental models may be less relevant than 
under more stable conditions (Marks et al., 2000). 
In addition, although existing literature suggest a relationship between initial similar-
ity in mental models and team’s ability to update their mental models in line with changes in 
their relevant task situation (Burke et al., 2006; Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Marks et al., 
2000), we did not find evidence for this relationship. Neither, did we find evidence for the 
opposing view that similarity in knowledge structures may negatively impact adaptation by 
reducing the amount of information that teams perceive and process. A possible explanation 
for these non-significant effects may be that the positive and negative effects of initial men-
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tal model similarity may counteract each other. Teams with initially similar mental models 
may derive the benefits of high quality coordination as well as the drawbacks of conformity 
and rigidity (Cannon-Bowers, et al., 1993). Together these findings suggest that in dynamic 
situations, it is not the specific state of team members’ mental models before the change but 
the ability of the team members to update their mental model in response to changes in the 
task situation that drives adaptive team performance. 
Furthermore, we failed to find evidence for an effect of TSA on mental model updating. 
Neither TSA sum nor TSA coverage were positively related to mental model updating. Our 
hypothesis regarding the positive effect of TSA on mental model updating was based on the 
reasoning that the first step in team adaptation relies on a team’s ability to sense cues that 
signal the need for change (Burke et al., 2006; Louis & Sutton, 1991). Only if teams recog-
nize that crucial aspects of their task situation have changed, are they able to incorporate 
these changes in to their mental models. A possible explanation for the non-significant effect 
of TSA may be that it is not sufficient for team members to be aware of basic task informa-
tion, instead team members also need to communicate this information to each other in 
order to combine distinct information elements and make sense of the information in light 
of their task goals. In order to test this explanation we conducted an additional regression 
analyses in which we investigated the moderation effect of information sharing on the effect 
of TSA coverage on mental model updating. The beta coefficient for the interaction between 
TSA coverage and team information exchange is positive and marginally significant (β = 
0.27, p = 0.065). This suggests that TSA may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for team members to update their mental models of the task situation. The awareness of 
simple cues is important, but additional team processes are required to translate these cues 
into the actual realization that a change is necessary. 
Finally, we found a strong and significant relation between post-change team interac-
tion patterns and team adaptive performance. The more, longer, and more complex patterns 
teams applied in the post-change period, the higher their adaptive performance. Moreover, 
Team adaptation patterns mediated the relationship between mental model updating and 
team adaptive performance, indicating that teams that incorporated the change in their task 
situation into their system mental model, reacted to this change by developing and applying 
interaction patterns that fitted the novel task situation. 
At first sight, this finding seems to be in contradiction with previous research on the 
benefit of interaction patterns under non-routine circumstances. Stachowski and colleagues 
(2009) found that during a crisis situation, higher performing nuclear power plant crews 
exhibited fewer, shorter, and less complex interaction patterns than less effective crews. 
However, Stachowski and colleagues’ (2009) study focused on interaction patterns derived 
from communication; in the present study, interaction patterns were measured from the 
micro-behavioral data recorded in the simulation. Hence, this difference in findings may be 
explained by the level at which routines were assessed in the two studies. Complexity in 
communication patterns may indicate a lack of automatic processing of information on a 
more tactical or strategic level—e.g. if communication is extremely standardized, it is likely 
that team members are sticking closely to well-trained protocols. Complexity in behavioral 
interaction patterns, on the other hand, occurs at a much lower level—the duration of a 
single interaction pattern is maximally a few seconds and represents only a fraction of the 
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team performance episode. In many adaptive situations, it is likely that whereas higher level 
routines have to be adapted to fit the novel situation, many lower level routines will remain 
functional under the new circumstances. Moreover, teams’ ability to rapidly develop novel 
routines for new task situations may be an important component of team adaptability (Le-
Pine, 2005). It is up to future research to further detangle these effects and more precisely 
pinpoint what types of routines are beneficial and what types are detrimental to team per-
formance under non-routine circumstances. 
Limitations 
Because we measured mental models only at two time-points, this did not allow us to 
trace and pinpoint exactly when cognitive restructuring of team members’ mental models 
took place. We chose to implement our post-change mental model measure at five minutes 
after the change, following previous work that indicates that the speed of team adaptation is 
crucial for team adaptive performance (Waller, 1999) and our analysis of the simulation 
that indicated in order to maintain high performance levels, teams should update their 
understanding of the situation within five minutes after the change. However, given that we 
only had one post-change measurement of mental models, we could not measure the actual 
speed of adaptation. 
Another limitation of the study is that by using averages for team mental models, our 
treatment of cognitive change is relatively simplistic. Our methods do not address whether 
the recognition of cues signaling the need for change and subsequent updating of mental 
models is initiated by single team member or whether members conjointly engage in these 
processes. Future research could extend these findings by tracing more accurately which 
team members signal a need for change and how cognitive changes are communicated and 
dispersed within teams. 
In addition, our measure for mental model updating assumes that when faced with a 
change in the task structure, team members adapt their knowledge structures to more 
closely resemble the underlying task situation. Research from the field of learning, however, 
indicates that when confronted with novel situations, instead of abandoning previously 
established associations between variables, individuals are more likely to add information in 
terms of qualifiers to their existing associations (i.e. Bouton, 2002). If we translate this 
mechanism to the context of mental models, qualifiers would indicate under what circum-
stances a particular mental model would be appropriate for a situation. Because the mental 
model measures we used in this study are situation specific—team members were asked to 
indicate how they understood their present situation—we could not draw any conclusions 
about whether team members simply adapted the parameters in their mental models or if 
they included situation qualifiers that indicated under what specific situations those pa-
rameters would hold. The goal for our research, however, was not to realistically depict the 
cognitive structure of team members’ mental models, but to investigate whether adaptive 
change in team members’ mental models plays a role in team adaptation. Research with 
more elaborate mental model measures is required to more accurately depict how such 
adaptive changes are incorporated in team members’ knowledge structures. 
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Endsley (1995), in her definition of the theory of situation awareness, poses that situa-
tion awareness is a hierarchical construct consisting of three levels. The first level refers to 
an understanding of the basic elements of the environment, the second level to an integra-
tion of these elements into an understanding of the situation, and the third level refers to an 
anticipation of the near future. In the present study, we measured TSA as team members’ 
knowledge about important information from the task situation and hence we only focused 
on the first level of situation awareness without measuring the higher level interpretations 
of this information. However, as Weick (1995) indicated, sensemaking is a connection of 
cues and existing knowledge structures. Hence, additional research would be needed to 
unravel the effects of higher level situation awareness on team adaptation. 
Finally, a limitation is that the task and setting may limit the generalizibility of the re-
sults and conclusion that can be drawn from this study. We used a simulated laboratory 
environment because we aimed to test basic cognitive and behavioral mechanisms underly-
ing team adaptation. However, two specific aspects of this design warrant caution for over-
generalizing the results to field situations. First, because of the relatively short time span of 
the simulation, teams had only limited time to adapt and had to do so while executing the 
task. As Zaheer, Albert, and Zaheer indicated “theory that is valid for one time interval may 
not be valid for another.” (1999, p. 725). Because, in field situations with a longer time span 
team adaptation may occur over a longer time period and teams may have more possibilities 
to set aside time for adaptation process, the cognitive mechanisms underlying team adapta-
tion may diverge from the short-term adaptation that was the focus of the present study. 
Second, the participants had no previous experience with the simulation used in the study. 
Therefore, team members’ mental models and interaction patterns were developed during 
the simulation and there was likely little impact of pre-established mental models and inter-
action patterns. A benefit of using a novel task is that variety in task skills is limited; how-
ever, team adaptation in novel tasks may diverge from team adaptation in situations were 
team members have strongly established mental models and interaction patterns. Finally, 
given that the variables in the study were not experimentally manipulated, we are precluded 
from making definite causal statements about the effects tested in the study. Even though 
we have provided our reasoning on the direction of effects based on sound theoretical bases, 
the possibilities of reversed causality and possibly untested confounders can not be com-
pletely excluded. 
Conclusion 
Faced with changing task conditions, team members will need to act quickly and rapidly 
update their understanding of the situation in order to develop novel tactics and strategies 
that fit the novel situation (Burke et al., 2006; LePine, 2003). In the present study we inves-
tigated the role of a number of cognitive aspects of team adaptation that have hitherto been 
underexposed in empirical research. In contrast to common approaches in the existing 
literature we adapted a dynamic approach to the measurement and conceptualization of 
team mental models and our results suggest that mental model updating is an important 
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precursor to team adaptive performance. Moreover, we found that the complexity of post-
change team interaction patterns was positively related to team adaptive performance and 
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trajectories in a complex environment: 
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Theories on the role of team cognitive structures in team performance seem to lead to dif-
ferent inferences. On the one hand, shared mental model theory focuses on similarity in 
cognitive knowledge structures among team members, while on the other hand transactive 
memory theory emphasizes the benefits that can be gained from cognitive diversification. 
We propose a model of team cognition that integrates these divergent viewpoints by apply-
ing the notions of internal and external cognitive alignment. In order to deal with complex 
adaptive environments, teams require cognitive variety in order to be able to process the 
complexities of their external environment and they require cognitive integration mecha-
nisms, such as similarity, in order to deal with internal alignment. We present and test a 
model of the effects of team internal and external cognitive alignment on task performance 
over time. Our findings indicate that both internal and external cognitive alignment are 
crucial for team performance trajectories. In addition we investigated the role of team in-
formation search trajectories—that is, the extent to which team members actively sought 
out task information at different moments in time—in the relationship between team cogni-
tive structures and performance trajectories. Although team internal and external alignment 
predict team information search trajectories and team information search predicts team 
performance trajectories, no conclusive evidence was found for a mediation effect of team 
information search. Finally, we found evidence for a moderation effect of team external 
alignment on the effect of team information search on team performance trajectories. 
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Introduction 
In organizations, no single individual is able to form an adequate understanding of or man-
age the workload associated with technically complex systems in dynamic environments. 
Not surprisingly, teams are considered to be the appropriate working arrangements for task 
performance in such environments (Sundstrom, DeMeuse, & Futrell, 1990). Medical teams 
require surgeons and anesthetists as well as surgical nurses. Flight crews consist of pilots 
and co-pilots both having their own responsibilities during the flight. Operations crew 
members are each responsible for specific subsystems of a chemical plant. Team knowledge 
embedded in the diverse knowledge structures of the individual members is considered to 
constitute a key resource for teams working in these complex environments (Grant, 1996; 
Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002). The division of expertise necessitates the coordination of 
team members’ individual efforts to ensure that the team performs as an integrated entity 
(e.g. Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). Because contemporary team tasks are 
increasingly cognitive in nature, gaining insight into team cognitive structures and cognitive 
process is crucial for understanding team task execution and predicting and explaining team 
performance (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). 
However, in their review of research and theory on teams in organizations, Ilgen, Hol-
lenbeck, Johnson, and Jundt (2005) observed that the two constructs dominating the recent 
team cognition literature seems to implicate opposing conclusions regarding cognitive 
integration and differentiation. Whereas shared mental model theory (Cannon-Bowers, 
Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) calls attention to the benefits of 
similarity in cognitive knowledge structures among team members, transactive memory 
theory (e.g. Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Wegner, Guiliano, & Hertel, 1985) emphasizes 
the differentiation of cognition among the team members. The question remains: How can 
cognitive diversity and cognitive integration conjunctively drive team performance? In 
order to answer this question and thereby provide an integrated account of the role of dif-
ferent types of team cognition structures on team performance we develop a model of team 
internal and external cognitive alignment. 
Proponents of cognitive diversity have often drawn on Ashby’s (1956) notion of requi-
site variety and the related concept of cognitive complexity to indicate the need for team 
cognitive variety (Harrison & Klein, 2007; Walsh, 1995). Thereby they emphasize the align-
ment of the team’s knowledge structure with the external environment—complex environ-
ments should be matched with complex knowledge structures in order to ensure that all 
relevant aspects of the environment are taken into account in team decisions. Shared mental 
model theorists on the other hand, have drawn on theories of coordination and the notion of 
shared expectations, thereby emphasizing the internal alignment of team members’ actions 
and cognitions within the team (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Klimoski & Mo-
hammed, 1994). In this paper, we argue that internal and external alignment are not neces-
sarily opposing concepts and that adaptive teams require both in order to thrive in complex 
and dynamic environments. 
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In response to recent calls to investigate how teams develop and change over time (e. 
Arrow, Poole, Henry, Wheelan, & Moreland, 2004; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 1999), 
in this paper we take a dynamic approach to team functioning by looking at the temporal 
trajectories of team information search processes and team performance. With trajectories 
we refer to the dynamic development of these variables over the lifetime of the team. Analy-
sis of trajectories provides a nuanced picture of how teams develop on these variables over 
time and also enables us to establish not only whether team cognitive structural variables 
impact team processes and performance but also when this impact is most salient. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we introduce the notion trajectories in team in-
formation search and team performance trajectory and provide some reasons why the study 
of trajectories should be preferred over the study of final outcomes. Then, we introduce the 
notions of team cognitive similarity and diversity, which we consider as emergent team 
properties of the team, and show how they materialize in the multi-level constructs of 
shared mental models and transactive memory systems. We introduce our model of internal 
and external alignment to clarify the complementary roles of similarity and diversity, and 
present some hypotheses. We test our research hypotheses in a study with 64 student teams 
performing in a complex management simulation. 
Theoretical background 
Team information search trajectories and team performance 
trajectories 
We conceptualize team functioning not merely as an end product or retrospective summary 
of the result of team actions but as the dynamic trajectory of team information search behav-
ior and team performance indicators over time. A dynamic conceptualization of these con-
structs recognizes that information search levels and performance outcomes at different 
time moments are interdependent and manifest particular trajectories over time (Kozlowski 
et al., 1999; Landis, 2001; Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). These trajectories are influenced and 
shaped by internal team factors as well as external contextual factors. 
In the theoretical and empirical literature on team performance, a number of theoreti-
cal notions provide propositions regarding the development of performance trajectories 
over time. Bifurcation theory proposes that whereas during relatively stable periods, be-
tween team variance in performance will be low, during non-routine periods variance in 
performance between teams will rapidly increase (Waller, Roe, Gevers, & Raes, 2005). Skill 
acquisition literature indicates that task performance develops in a negatively accelerated 
fashion, in which after initial rapid growth, increase in performance levels off (Argote, 1993; 
Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989). Midpoint equilibrium theory poses that teams engage in a major 
transformation—represented by qualitative change in their activities—roughly around the 
t e m p o r a l  m i d p o i n t  o f  t h e i r  l i f e t i m e  ( G e r s i c k ,  1 9 8 8 ) .  F i n a l l y ,  s o m e  s c h o l a r s  h a v e  d r a w n  
attention to the effect of early team activities on later team performance (Ericksen & Dyer, 
2004; Chidambaram & Bostrom, 1996: Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). Mathieu and Rapp (2009), 
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for instance, found that the formulation of high quality team charters and performance 
strategies, early on, affected the development of team performance over time. However, 
despite the formulation of the abovementioned theories, literature relating team cognition 
variables to specific parameters of team performance trajectories seems to be lacking. 
Similar to team performance, team information search is likely to occur in varying lev-
els at different moments in time. For instance, lifecycle theories pose that groups engage in 
different types of processes during specific phases of their lifecycle (e.g. Tuckman & Jensen, 
1977). Whereas lifecycle theories have been contested in the teams’ literature (e.g. Seeger, 
1983; Seers & Woodruff, 1997), alternative temporal models of team development also 
suggest dynamic patterns of information search behavior over time. For example, Gersick 
(1988), found that team members engaged in elaborate information collection about outside 
requirements just after half of the time they had been allotted to complete their task had 
passed. However, similar to the research on team performance trajectories, there is a dearth 
of empirical studies that assess the development of information search patterns over time, 
their antecedents and consequences. 
In the present paper we model team performance and team information search as tem-
poral phenomena. A temporal phenomenon is defined by Roe as “an observable event, or 
series of events, happening to a particular object” (2008, p. 41). A phenomenon is character-
ized by a demarcated time interval with clear and theoretical meaningful beginning and end 
points that manifest a pattern of dynamic changes in the attributes comprised by the phe-
nomenon over time (Roe, 2008). This approach allows us not only to investigate whether 
team cognition structures influence team information search and performance, but also to 
more precisely pinpoint at what moments in the team performance episode these variables 
have the strongest effects and how team cognitive structures affect the trajectories of devel-
opment of the temporal phenomena. So, in the present study we investigate how the dy-
namic phenomena of team performance and team information search, bounded within the 
time period of a two week team task, unfold over time, and how they are influenced by team 
cognitive structures. Given the paucity of theoretical and empirical research on the relation-
ship between team cognition and team performance trajectories, we formulate our hypothe-
ses regarding these trajectories in global terms—e.g. in terms of positive trajectories refer-
ring to a general increase in the level of the construct over time. We provide a more thor-
ough explorative discussion of the trajectories in the discussion section of the paper. 
Emergence of team cognitive properties: cognitive convergence and 
divergence 
By focusing on cognition as a team level construct, properties emerge that cannot be repre-
sented by the mere aggregation of the cognition of the individual members of the team. 
Team cognition refers to the “knowledge architecture” of a team (DeChurch & Mesmer-
Magnus, 2010)—the structural properties that emerge from the relationship among the 
knowledge of the individual team members. Kozlowski and Klein define a phenomenon as 
emergent if “it originates in the cognition, affect, behaviors, or other characteristics of indi-
viduals, is amplified by their interactions, and manifests as a higher-level, collective phe-
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nomenon” (2000: 55). Emergent team level constructs such as overlap and division of 
knowledge (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994), and a transactive memory system (TMS) 
(Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 1985) are essentially team level properties which are epistemo-
logically different from individual level knowledge (Cook & Brown, 1999). Numerous stud-
ies have demonstrated that emergent team level cognitive properties are crucial antecedents 
of team performance (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, 
& Cannon-Bowers, 2000). However, only few studies have investigated how different emer-
gent team cognition properties interact and conjointly impact team performance. Therefore, 
in the present study we assess different team emergent cognitive properties and analyze 
their unique and combined impact on team performance. 
Kozlowski and Klein (2000) distinguish between two basic types of emergence: compo-
sition emergence is characterized by convergence of the lower level constituents and compi-
lation emergence is characterized by divergence of the lower level constituents. Whereas, 
composition results in shared unit properties that are essentially similar in content and 
meaning—that is, isomorphic—between the lower and the higher level constructs, compila-
tion emergence results in differentiation in lower level elements and therefore, the higher 
level construct refers to the pattern or configuration of the individual characteristics. Within 
the team cognition literature these two polar forms of emergence have been represented by 
the concepts of shared mental models and TMSs. For example, in their extensive meta-
analysis of the cognitive underpinnings of team performance, DeChurch and Mesmer-
Magnus (2010) pose that a TMS is consistent with compilation emergence as a team’s TMS is 
composed of the diverse set of knowledge and skills of the individual team members and 
their awareness of who knows what. They argue further that the shared mental model lit-
erature concerns a composition form of emergence as it refers to the extent to which team 
members’ mental models are similar to each other or to an external referent model. 
Theorists have provided arguments for the beneficial effects of both team cognitive 
composition and team compilation constructs. Researchers have associated diversity in 
underlying knowledge structures with the ability to generate a wide range of perspectives 
and alternative solutions (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Simons et al., 1999). The integration of 
these various viewpoints is considered to lead to deep information processing, the emer-
gence of new insights (Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999; Levine, Resnick, & Teasley, 1993), 
and the team’s ability to reconsider assumptions, thereby coming to more creative and high 
quality solutions (De Dreu & West, 2001; Nemeth, 1986; van Knippenberg, De Dreu, & 
Homan, 2004). Moreover, researchers studying TMSs have considered diversity to be an 
indication of role diversification and cognitive specialization – that is, a team’s possession of 
a wide range of knowledge, skills, and abilities (e.g. Austin, 2003; Moreland, 1999). Cogni-
tive specialization may occur if members have distinct team roles and consequently develop 
knowledge structures considering their own specific subtasks, thereby ensuring cognitive 
efficiency and an optimal use of team resources (Banks & Millward, 2000; Hollenbeck et al., 
1995; Mohammed & Dumville, 2001). 
Conversely, theories of shared mental models (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993: Klimoski & 
Mohammed, 1994), and the similar concept of shared schemas (Rentsch & Hall, 1994), 
emphasize the need for convergence of cognition within teams in order to optimize team 
functioning. Mental model researchers argue that similarity in team members’ knowledge 
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structures helps team members to develop shared expectations, which facilitate the execu-
tion of interdependent actions (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). Not surprisingly, the ambigu-
ity of the effects of integration and diversification of knowledge has let to a call for clarifica-
tion of the way in which these seemingly opposing properties affect performance outcomes 
(Guzzo & Salas, 1995; Moorman & Miner, 1997). In order to shed some light on this issue, 
we first provide a short overview of the multi-level emergent concepts of team mental mod-
els and TMSs from which we conclude that the concepts should not be seen as diametrically 
opposed as sometimes is indicated. Next, we introduce our model of internal and external 
alignment and we place these concepts within this model and reason how they relate to 
each other and conjunctively drive team performance. In addition, we discuss the notion of 
team information search as an important mediator in the relationship between team cogni-
tive structures and team performance. 
Team Mental Models 
Mental models (MMs) are defined by Rouse and Morris (1986) as knowledge structures that 
enable humans to describe, explain, and predict a system with which they interact. For 
example, a machine operator may posses a MM that depicts the cause and effect relations of 
the internal functioning of a machine. To the extent that this MM properly mirrors the ac-
tual functioning of the machine, the operator will be able to deduce what the parameters on 
the machine display signify about the system’s state and he or she will be able to infer the 
consequences of alternative actions. As such, MM based reasoning is a form of top-down 
information processing, meaning that cumulated knowledge from past experiences is used 
to make sense of information environments and to guide action (Walsh, 1995). 
Previous research has consistently indicated a link between the similarity of team 
members’ MMs and team task performance in a number of different domains, including 
both field studies (Lim & Klein, 2006; Rentsch and Klimoski, 2001; Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu, 
& Kraiger, 2005; Webber, Chen, Payne, Marsh, & Zaccaro, 2000) and simulations (Cooke, 
Kiekel, & Helm, 2001; Ellis, 2006; Marks, Zaccaro, & Mathieu, 2000; Mathieu, Heffner, 
Goodwin, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 2005; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 2000). Shared MMs impact team performance through their effect on team interac-
tion processes (Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994), specifically coordination, communication, 
and collaboration (Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000). Coordina-
tion processes refer to those behaviors that are aimed at attuning the resources and activi-
ties of individual team members towards the concerted goal directed behavior of the team 
as a unity (Cannon-Bowers, Tannenbaum, Salas, & Volpe, 1995). Shared MMs are consid-
ered to facilitate implicit coordination by providing mutual expectations from which accu-
rate, timely predictions can be drawn about the behavior and information requirements of 
other group members (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Rico, Sánchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gib-
son, 2008; Wittenbaum, Vaughan, & Stasser, 1998). Moreover, team members with similar 
MMs may communicate information that is required by others at the time it is required, and 
in a way that is understood by the recipient (Fussel & Krauss, 1987; Krauss & Fussell, 1991). 
Finally, the presence of shared MMs within a team may decrease the amount of time re-
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quired for clarifying and agreeing upon strategies and decrease the occurrence of friction 
due to cognitive divergence and misunderstanding (Bettenhausen & Murningham, 1985; 
Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007). 
Although the majority of empirical studies on shared MMs focus on similarity among 
team members’ knowledge structures, scholars have recognized the benefits of having di-
vergent but compatible MMs (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). 
Cannon-Bowers and colleagues (1993) suggest that it is not the overlap in MMs but the 
common expectations that team members derive from these models that drives team per-
formance and Cannon-Bowers and Salas conclude that “in any given team, some knowledge 
will have to be shared, other knowledge similar, and yet other knowledge distributed or 
complementary” (2001, p. 1999). 
Empirical evidence suggests that sometimes dissimilarity in MMs relate positively to 
team performance. Levesque, Wilson, and Wholey (2001) found, contrary to their predic-
tions, that in software development teams, MMs became less instead of more similar over 
time. Their results indicated that as team members became increasingly specialized, the 
amount of interaction decreased which subsequently led to less similar MMs. They did not, 
however, relate diversity in MMs to team outcomes. In a study on university work teams, 
Kellermans, Floyd, Pearson, and Spencer, (2000) found that norms for constructive conflicts 
moderated the relationship between MM similarity and decision quality; whereas teams 
with weak norms for constructive conflict benefitted from similar MMs, teams with strong 
norms for constructive conflict actually benefitted more from dissimilar MMs. Banks and 
Millwards, (2007) found that whereas similarity in team members’ declarative knowledge 
was positively related to team performance, similarity in procedural knowledge negatively 
predicted team performance. Cooke and colleagues (2003) found that high performing 
teams showed high accuracy of knowledge structures regarding their own roles and lower 
similarity in taskwork knowledge. The above examples indicate that specialization of team 
members’ task knowledge with their individual role may be reflected in dissimilar task MMs. 
Diversification due to specialization in team members’ MMs is an important element of 
the distributed cognition perspective of team MMs (Banks & Millward, 2000; Hutchins, 
1995). The theory of distributed cognition indicates that it is not so much overlap in knowl-
edge that is required, but the team as a whole must be able to jointly understand and oper-
ate on the complexity of the whole system (Hutchins, 1995). For example, Banks and Mill-
ward (2000) propose and test a model of distributed MMs in which team members holds 
specific aspects of the overall system model and team decisions arise from ‘running’ this 
shared MM. So, although similarity in MMs is important for team functioning, particularly 
in complex environments, it may at least be as important that the team members’ MMs 
jointly cover the relevant task environment. Because transactive memory theory focuses on 
this distributed aspect of team cognition we now turn to a discussion of TMSs. 
Transactive Memory Systems 
Transactive memory theory was originally developed by Wegner and colleagues to explain 
how people in intimate relationships develop efficient implicit systems for remembering and 
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retrieving information (Wegner, 1985, 1987). The general idea behind transactive memory 
theory is that groups can optimize their knowledge base when each member develops exper-
tise in a specific area and in addition they develop an awareness of who holds what knowl-
edge. Building on Wegner’s early work, researchers have expanded the scope of transactive 
memory theory to the group level (Liang, Moreland, & Argote, 1995) and have broadened its 
content to also include the division and knowledge of team members’ skills or expertise 
(Moreland & Myaskovski, 2000), and external relationships (Austin, 2003). A TMS is con-
sidered a compilation form of emergence as it propels towards divergence in the knowledge 
and skills of the individual group members (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). When a 
team develops an efficient division for storing and retrieving task information, each member 
develops expertise in a specific area and consequently team members’ knowledge becomes 
more and more diversified (Hollingshead, 2001). 
However, researchers have distinguished different components of a TMS and apart 
from compilational components they have also identified compositional forms of emergence 
that are indispensable for the functioning of a TMS (e.g. Austin, 2003; Brandon & Holl-
ingshead, 2004; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Wegner, 1991; Lewis, 2003). For example, Austin 
defines transactive memory consensus as “the extent to which group members agree about 
who has what knowledge” (2003, p. 867) and Brandon and Hollingshead (2004) identify 
transactive memory sharedness—the degree to which members have a shared understand-
ing of the division of expertise within the group— as one of the three core dimensions of a 
TMS. So, transactive memory consensus or sharedness, are closely related to the notion of 
team MM similarity—a shared understanding of teammates, knowledge, skills, abilities, 
preferences, and tendencies (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993). 
In addition, compositional forms of emergence may play an important role in the inter-
action processes related to a TMS. Scholars have emphasized the importance of the process 
components of a TMS system, consisting of the dynamic interaction processes involved in 
encoding, storing and retrieving information among the group members (Hollingshead, 
2001; Lewis, 2003). More specifically, several scholars have considered coordination as a 
manifestation of a high quality TMS (Lewis, 2003; Liang et al, 1995; Moreland & My-
askovsky, 2000). Therefore, given that research on shared MMs indicates that the effective-
ness of team interaction processes is facilitated by the convergence of structural knowledge, 
about the team and the task (Mathieu et al., 2005; Mathieu et al., 2000) it is not surprising 
that Ellis (2006) found that similarity and accuracy of team interaction models were posi-
tively related to the functioning of a team’s TMS. 
So, a TMS is a complex multi-dimensional construct containing both compilational as-
pects and compositional aspects. Researchers seem to agree that although TMS theory em-
phasizes the benefits of cognitive diversification, the compositional components have a 
pivotal role in tying together these diversified components into collective team level func-
tioning (Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2003). 
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Differences in Focus between Shared MM and TMS Research 
A look at the divergent settings in which empirical research on shared MMs and TMSs has 
been conducted may shed some light on the gap between both perspectives. Research on 
TMSs in groups has mainly focused on knowledge intensive production tasks and knowl-
edge worker teams (e.g. Austin, 2003; Lewis, 2003; Liang et al., 1995), while research on 
shared MMs has primarily been conducted on teams executing action tasks (e.g. Cooke, et 
al., 2001; Marks et al., 2000; Mathieu et al., 2000). Whereas in the former the use and inte-
gration of knowledge may be more central to task performance, in the latter the coordina-
tion among team members’ actions may play a crucial role. This focus on different task types 
may explain why MM similarity and TMSs have occasionally been regarded as opposing 
constructs (Ilgen et al., 2005). However, although at first sight, theories on cognitive simi-
larity and theories on cognitive variety seem to lead to incompatible propositions, the 
abovementioned reviews show that this is not the cvase. SMM theory does not focus exclu-
sively on similarity, nor does TMS theory focus exclusively on diversity. Also, researchers 
from both fields seem to acknowledge that often both similarity and diversity are required to 
function effectively in complex task environments. In order to bring together these view-
points into one overlapping framework, in the next section, we introduce the notions of 
external and internal alignment and we derive hypotheses of how aspects of shared MMs 
and TMSs conjointly impact team performance. 
HYPOTHESES 
In this section we construct our research model of external and internal alignment. The 
complete research model is depicted in figure 1 and the corresponding hypotheses are de-
rived below.  




Figure 1. Research model of the effects of external and internal alignment on team performance trajectories 
in complex environments 
 
External alignment 
We define external alignment as the extent to which team members’ knowledge structures 
represent all relevant aspects of the task environment. So, external alignment refers to the 
notion that for teams functioning in complex and dynamic environments it is important that 
their knowledge structures are sufficiently aligned with the complexities and challenges of 
that external environment. This notion is closely related to the concept of requisite variety, 
which states that in order for an entity to be able to control a complex system, the entity as a 
whole must contain a commensurable amount of complexity as the system itself (Conant & 
Ashby, 1970). Accordingly, scholars mainly in the field of strategic decision making have 
emphasized the importance of complexity in cognitive knowledge structures for making 
decisions in multifaceted and ambiguous environments (e.g. Bartunek, Gordon, & Weath-
ersby, 1983; Calori, Johnson & Sarnin, 1994; Ginsberg, 1990; Prahalad, & Bettis, 1986; 
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knowledge structures, specifically under conditions of extreme and unexpected environ-
mental change (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Miller, 1993; Turner, 1976). 
The complexity of a system is determined by both the number of elements in the sys-
tem and the extent to which these elements interact with each other (Ashby, 1956; Simon, 
1996). In parallel, scholars have portrayed cognitive complexity4 as a function of the number 
of concepts an individual or group uses to describe a system and the number and nature of 
relationships that are distinguished among these concepts (Bartunek et al., 1983; Ginsberg, 
1990; Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967). Because MMs are essentially interpretations and 
simplifications of an external system (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), they may compromise the 
ability to make decisions in complex environments (Walsh, 1995; Weick, 1979). Starbuck 
and Milliken (1988) posited that knowledge structures function as a lens, which filters the 
information that is received from the environment and determine how this information is 
interpreted. Thus, the complexity of an individual’s or team’s knowledge structures is posi-
tively related to the ability to notice anomalous information and form alternative interpreta-
tions. 
Consistent with the notion of cognitive complexity, many authors have considered 
teams to be the optimal arrangement for complex tasks, as the variety of knowledge present 
within a team may most closely approach the complexity required for many contemporary 
organizational tasks (Cooke et al., 2003). So, the complexity of a system or problem is 
matched with the cognitive complexity of the team arrangement. For instance, the regula-
tion of deviations of the human body—a system of tremendous complexity—requires the 
joint effort of a number of medical specialists (e.g., anesthesiologists, surgeons) in order to 
compile the variety of expertise needed for diagnose and operation. Moreover, various 
studies have shown a positive relationship between people’s expertise in a field and the 
complexity of their cognitive maps (Lurigio & Carroll, 1985; Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 
1996). Hence, diversification of cognition, achieved by means of a division of expertise, 
constitutes an effective mode for attaining the required level of complexity. Therefore we 
hypothesize the following: 
H1: In a complex environment, teams’ external alignment is positively related to their 
performance trajectories, such that teams with more complex MMs will improve their 
performance faster than teams with less complex MMs. 




4 Other researchers (e.g. Kelly, 1955) have considered complexity as a personality trait; 
however we here restrict the use of the complexity concept to refer to the complexity of 
individual’s or team’s cognitive structures of specific systems, without explicitly positing a 
relationship between the complexity of these structures and personality characteristics.  
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Team information search 
A team’s external cognitive alignment is particularly important for the processing of infor-
mation from its environment. In complex and dynamic environments, the extent to which 
teams take into account all aspects of their environments is crucial for task performance 
(Burke et al., 2006; Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Sego, Hedlund, Major, & Philips, 1995; Waller, 1999). 
Teams must collect information in order to recognize the need for change in their task 
strategies and to make informed decisions on team actions. For instance, the literature on 
team situation assessment indicates that particularly in highly dynamic task situations, 
continuous scanning of the relevant task environment is crucial for team performance and 
viability (Artman, 2000; Mosier & Chidester, 1991). 
Previous literature suggests that there is a crucial linkage between team cognitive 
structures and team information search processes. The information processing view of 
teams implies that the compilation of team members’ knowledge structures significantly 
influences the information that is attended to by the team and how this information is proc-
essed (Hinsz et al., 1997). More specifically, because knowledge structures focus attention 
onto specific aspects of the situation and determine how this information becomes inter-
preted, more complex and elaborate team level knowledge structures are likely to result in a 
wider coverage of the relevant environment, which in turn will lead to higher performance 
(Mogford, 1997; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). Therefore, we propose that: 
H2: In a complex environment, the relationship between teams’ external alignment 
and team performance trajectories is mediated by the teams’ information search be-
havior. 
Internal alignment 
Whereas, external alignment relates to a teams’ requisite variety with its external environ-
ment, we define internal cognitive alignment as the extent to which team members’ knowl-
edge structures are aligned with each other in such a way that they enable efficient knowl-
edge sharing and integration. Several authors have emphasized the role of team processes 
in the integration of the knowledge of the individual members (Cooke, Salas, Cannon-
Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Grant, 1996; Okhuysen & Eisendhart, 2002; 
Simons et al., 1999). However, whereas team members without much experience working 
together may depend mainly on processes for integrating knowledge, over time, as team 
members gain experience in cooperatively working together, these knowledge integration 
processes may crystallize into cognitive integration mechanisms. Both research on SMMs 
and research on TMSs indicate that, through repeated interaction, teams develop cognitive 
integration structures and mechanisms linking together the variety of knowledge and skills 
held by the various members of the team, thereby facilitating team level information proc-
essing (Gurtner et al., 2007; Hollingshead, 2001; Lewis, 2004; Lewis et al., 2005; Rulke & 
Rau, 2000). We propose in order for teams to thrive in complex environment, they require 
both internal and external alignment. 
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Although some evidence indeed indicates that complex environments are associated 
with the formation of complex knowledge structures (Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin, 1994; 
Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Stabell, 1978), the functional link between team cognitive 
complexity and performance has not been unanimously supported. In a management simu-
lation study Walsh and colleagues (1988) found that low coverage – and hence low com-
plexity – of the information environment was positively related to team performance. 
Kilduff (2000) found a positive relationship between cognitive diversity early in the team’s 
lifecycle and final team performance; however if cognitive diversity sustained during the 
lifecycle of the team, this had a negative effect on performance. McNamara, Luce, and 
Thompson (2002) found that top management teams did not require a maximal level of 
complexity; instead a manageable amount of complexity was positively associated with 
firms’ financial performance. A review of research on the relationships between the envi-
ronment, complexity, and performance led Walsh to conclude that “(t)he most surprising 
aspect of the findings to date in this broad area of inquiry is the lack of support for many of 
the research hypothesis derived from Ashby’s (1956) logic” (1995: 302). In addition, the 
research stream on diversity in teams indicates that the relationship between team cognitive 
diversity and team performance is not at all straightforward (Milliken & Martins, 1996; van 
Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). Thus, an important issue in team cognition research is to 
find out the conditions under which team cognitive complexity can be beneficial for team 
performance. Therefore, we propose that the existence of internal cognitive alignment may 
constitute an important prerequisite for a team to benefit from its external cognitive align-
ment. 
Although cognitive diversification may constitute a necessary condition for the attain-
ment of the cognitive complexity required to function in a diverse and dynamic environ-
ment, it is not a sufficient condition. The more cognitive diversity there is present within the 
team, the more coordination is required for combining together the pieces of distributed 
cognition and guaranteeing effective interactions (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995; Weick, 1979). Although the aggregate of the knowledge structures of the individual 
members may give insight into the team’s potential coverage of the information domain, it 
does not suffice to assess its realized coverage – the extent to which this potential in knowl-
edge structures is actually used in the decision making process (Walsh et al., 1988). 
According to proponents of the view of distributed cognition, the team and not the in-
dividual should be taken as the unit of analysis when investigating team cognition (Banks & 
Millward, 2000; Hutchins, 1995). Taking the team as the level of analysis draws attention to 
how the information processing of the constituent parts—the team members—link together 
to constitute team level information processing (Hinsz et al., 1997). Similarly, Schroder and 
colleagues (1967) argued that the integrative complexity of a system is not only composed of 
the diversity in the parts of the system but is also made up of their interconnectedness. 
Hence, the extent to which the cognitive architecture of the team as an entity can be consid-
ered complex not only depends on the complexity of and the variety in individual member’s 
knowledge structures but also on the extent to which the knowledge structures of the mem-
bers are interconnected. 
A plenitude of research has indicated that there is a substantial gap between the avail-
ability of diverse knowledge within a group and the group making functional use of that 
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knowledge (Simons et al., 1999; Stasser & Titus, 1992). A wide variety of studies indicates 
that information sharing, although pivotal to team performance, only takes place under 
stringent conditions (Brodbeck et al., 2007; Mesmer-Magnus & Dechurch, 2009; Stasser, 
1988). An explanation for this is that diverse knowledge structures may lead to ‘representa-
tional gaps’ (Cronin & Weingart, 2007) or ‘interpretive barriers’ (Dougherty, 1992) which 
impede team level knowledge integration. Moreover, the lack of mutual understanding may 
lead to frustration and disruptive conflict (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; van Knippenberg & 
Schippers, 2007). Therefore, teams require cognitive structures that facilitate internal 
alignment in order to solve inherent issues of teams’ cognitive diversity. Therefore, we pro-
pose that apart from direct effects of these team internal alignment constructs, they also 
interact with team cognitive complexity in predicting team performance trajectories. 
H3: In a complex environment, teams’ internal alignment will be positively related to 
teams’ performance trajectories. 
H4: In a complex environment, the relationship between external alignment and per-
formance trajectories will be moderated by internal alignment structures, such that 
teams with complex MMs will improve their performance faster in case they also have 
similar MMs and a well functioning TMS. 
Interaction effects of team information search and team MM complexity 
Apart from a direct effect of team cognitive complexity on team information search, we also 
expect team cognitive complexity to affect the extent to which team information search 
actually translates into improved performance. Given that knowledge structures function as 
a lens that filter what information is accessed and how this information becomes processed 
(Starbuck & Milliken, 1988), one would expect that if team members have more complex 
knowledge structures, they are likely to take into account and accurately process more task 
relevant information than teams with less complex structures. For example, Burke and 
colleagues (2006) noted that whereas the recognition of cues signaling a need for change is 
the first step towards successful team adaptation, once a cue pattern is perceived, a series of 
cognitive processes based on existing MMs takes place that turn these cues into an under-
standing of the situation. Also, the theory of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) 
indicates that teams must have an adequate amount of related prior knowledge in order to 
be able to process and capitalize upon new information. Therefore, we propose that: 
H5: In a complex environment, the relationship between team information search and 
performance trajectories will be moderated by team MM complexity, such that high 
levels of team information search will have positive effects on performance trajectories 
for teams that have more complex MMs. 
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Methods 
Temporal research design 
Our research hypotheses require a temporal design in which we look at the development 
trajectories of team information search and team performance over time. In order to test 
these hypotheses we collected team performance and team information search measures at 
multiple points in time. In order to fully capture the longitudinal nature of this data we 
applied random coefficient modeling (RCM) (Bliese and Ployhart, 2002). RCM is a data 
analysis technique consisting of two stages. In the first stage—the level-1 analysis—we 
assessed the form of the change trajectories of these variables over time. In the second 
stage—the level-2 analysis—we tested whether our team cognition variables accounted for 
significant differences among teams in the form of these trajectories. In order to illustrate 
our findings we display figures with fitted curves we derived by computing the information 
search and performance trajectories for high and low values on the cognitive alignment 
variables. 
Sample 
Participants included 371 students enrolled in the bachelor of international business at a 
Dutch university. Students were randomly assigned into 64 teams ranging from five to seven 
members. Of the students 207 (55.8%) were German, 77 (20.8%) were Dutch, and 87 
(23,5%) had other nationalities. Their mean age was 20.35 years (SD = 1.35) and 174 
(46.9%) of the students were female. Team size ranged from five to seven members with 25 
(39.1%) teams consisting of five members, 28 (43.8%) teams consisting of 6 members, and 
11 (17.2%) teams consisting of 7 members. The simulation, which will be explained below, 
constitutes an obligatory part of the first year curriculum and students received extra credits 
for filling in the measures and questionnaires used in this study. Data were collected in two 
consecutive years and due to the nature of the team level MM measures we included in the 
analyses only teams of which all members handed in the MM measures, leaving us with 64 
out of the total of 126 teams. Complete teams did not differ significantly from incomplete 
teams in terms of the dependent variable team performance (t = -.808, p = .422). 
The simulation 
The Global Business Game (GBG; Wolfe) is a web-based simulation in which team members 
have to work together as the management team of a globally competitive company in the 
video equipment industry. The simulation is an obligatory requirement for the students and 
is part of a two week course at the end of the first year international business bachelor. 
Thirty five percent of their individual grades for the course is determined by their team’s 
performance ranking in the simulation. 
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The interactive simulation captures the essential elements a globally competitive firm 
faces, and the main strategies and operating methods available to such a firm. All teams 
start with the same household video and equipment company with limited assets and spe-
cialized competencies. They have to set out a strategy for their company regarding produc-
tion, marketing, logistics, and internationalization by making decisions on a large number 
of variables concerning the operation of their factories (e.g. wage rates, number of plants, 
number of line supervisors, quality control, production planning), logistics (e.g. shipping 
methods, factory locations), marketing and sales (e.g. number of sales officers, prices, ad-
vertising budget), and finances (e.g. dividend, stock issues, capital sales). Decisions—
regarding the quarterly strategy of the company—have to be taken on a daily basis and the 
outcomes of teams’ decision are published the next day. 
Procedure 
Before the start of the course, team members were randomly assigned to their team. During 
the two week period, there were six class-based meetings in which team members did get 
feedback on their strategies and got the opportunity to ask questions about the simulation to 
experienced tutors. First, students were instructed to read the GBG manual to develop an 
understanding of the simulation. After this they received an on-line multiple-choice test 
with twelve questions testing their understanding of the simulation. This test was a prereq-
uisite for the simulation, so students that failed this assessment had to study and redo the 
test until they obtained satisfactorily performance. Then, team members could practice the 
operation of the simulation during a two day practice period. The simulation lasted for nine 
days and included seven decision periods. At the third plenary session of the first week, 
team members were required to individually complete the MM exercise and TMS question-
naire. 
Measures 
Mental model complexity. During the plenary session, one of the researchers gave a 
short presentation, explaining how to complete the MM exercise, then team members were 
provided with a list of 72 concepts, categorized into the three main areas of marketing and 
sales, manufacturing, and finances, and one sheet only containing a rectangle with the word 
‘profit’ printed in the middle. Participants were requested to construct a mental map on this 
sheet, representing their understanding of the simulation. They did this by selecting from 
the concept sheet those concepts they used in their understanding of the simulation, and 
drawing lines between concepts they considered to be related to other concepts in their 
maps. They were told that their concept maps would be rated, and if they would be graded 
as sufficient and they would have filled in the additional questionnaire, they would receive 
half a point extra on their final grade. 
This method resembles a causal mapping or concept mapping technique as used in a 
number of previous studies (Eden, Jones, & Sims, 1983; Thordsen, 1991). Mohammed and 
Klimoski (2000) make a distinction between elicitation, referring to the technique used to 
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determine the content component of the MMs, and representation, referring to the tech-
nique for determining the structure of the MMs. MM assessment techniques differ in the 
extent to which elicitation and representation can be freely determined by the participant—
versus being pre-specified by the researcher. With the present method, the structure is not 
pre-specified in that, apart from the location of profit in the middle, students were free to 
locate concepts at any place they considered most suitable for their own understanding. 
However, the concepts were partly fixed, in that participants could only choose from 72 pre-
specified concepts from the concept sheet. Students were instructed that they were free to 
pick and use as many of these concepts as they deemed necessary for depicting their under-
standing of the simulation. Unlike the often used measurement method of similarity ratings 
(Mathieu et al., 2000; DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010), the number of concepts and 
links participants can use in their model is not completely fixed in the present measurement 
approach. This allows us to assess MM complexity and similarity as separate constructs. At 
the beginning of the academic year students received a mind mapping exercise in which 
they were trained to schematically depict their learning material in a visual mind map rep-
resentation, so all students were familiar with the basic idea behind mind mapping and had 
some previous experience with this. 
We derived the concepts on the concept sheet from a thorough scanning of the student 
manual of the GBG. We selected all concepts on which relevant decisions could be taken in 
the simulation (e.g. advertising budget, vacation days, dividends, ten year bonds), and all 
concepts that represent important inputs for those decisions (e.g. product quality, worker 
absenteeism, lost sales, overdraft, bond rate, market share). The list derived in this way was 
revised and assessed for completeness and consistency by a subject matter expert—the 
course coordinator, with six years of experience in teaching the simulation. 
For the analyses of the MMs we entered each individual concept map into a matrix in 
which each link between two concepts is represented by a 1 on the intersection of the two 
concepts in the matrix. Based on the work of Nadkarni and Narayanan (2005) we derived 
three indicators of MM complexity. The first indicator, comprehensiveness, refers to the 
total number of concepts in the map. Since, based upon our review of the simulation man-
ual, we limited the maximum number of concepts that could be used to 72, this aspect cap-
tures the extensiveness of the MM, or the extent to which the participant made use of the 
offered concepts. The second indicator, density-1, is defined by the number of links between 
concepts divided by the number of concepts used in the map. This aspect captures the ratio 
of the number of linkages used to the number of concepts in the map and reflects the density 
or connectedness of the concepts within the map. The third concept proposed by Nadkarni 
and Nayaranan (2005), density-2, is defined by the number of links in the map relative to all 
possible links. However, since for the present study, the number of all possible links was 
equal for all participants, this measure reflects the total number of links in the map. 
Because the study by Nadkarni and Narayanan (2005) indicated that the three meas-
ures of complexity are likely to load strongly on one underlying factor we conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation. The results indicated that a common 
factor consisting of the three aspects of complexity explains 78.46 % of the total variance 
with factor loadings of .88 for comprehensiveness, .79 for density-1, and .98 for density-2. 
Therefore, we averaged the three aspects of MM complexity into one combined score. 
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Mental model similarity. We calculated MM similarity as the total amount of over-
lapping linkages used within the team, controlled for team size. We constructed a team level 
matrix in which each square specified the number of team members that had indicated that 
particular link on their concept sheet. We calculated MM similarity as the sum of all linkages 
held by all team members minus the sum of linkages held by only one team member multi-
plied by one divided by the number of team members (MM similarity = (SumTotal – SumU-
nique)*1/N, where N = Number of team members, SumUnique = Sum of linkages that are 
by held only one team member, SumTotal = Sum of all linkages held by all team members). 
Information Search. Information search was assessed with two measures that were 
directly derived from the logged data of the GBG simulation. For each time period, the 
simulation stores information on how often each of the 38 different information pages of the 
simulation have been visited by the members of a team. The information pages cover a wide 
variety of information that can be important for team decision making; for example, the 
firms’ balance sheet, production schedule, sales promotions, and subcontracting agree-
ments. For each team, we assessed the total number of pages visited (search depth) and the 
number of unique pages (search breadth) visited per time period. An exploratory factor 
analysis on the averages of these two constructs over the seven time periods indicates that a 
common factor explains 80.63 % of the total variance with factor loadings of .90 for both 
search depth and search breadth. Therefore, we averaged the two measures into one com-
bined score for information search. 
Transactive memory system. The teams’ TMS was measured with the TMS scale 
developed by Lewis (2003). The scale consists of 15 items that assess three dimensions of a 
TMS, with five items for each dimension: knowledge specialization (i.e. the tendency of 
group members to focus on different aspects of the task), task coordination (i.e. the ability 
of the team members to work together efficiently), and credibility (i.e. members’ beliefs 
about the reliability of other members’ knowledge). Each item was scored on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha 
for the scale was .66. A mean Rwg(j) of .93, based on a slightly (positively) skewed distribu-
tion, provided evidence of intermember agreement (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984), and an 
ICC(1) of .22 and ICC(2) of .62 provided support for acceptable intermember reliability 
(Bliese, 2000). Therefore, we aggregated the individual responses to a single team score 
(e.g., Lewis, 2003, Pearsall, Ellis, & Bell, 2010). 
Team performance. In accordance with reasoning of Mathieu and Rapp (2009) on 
the use of performance indexes in management simulations, we operationalized team per-
formance as a weighted index of five team performance indexes: after-tax profits in the 
home country currency (40%), rate of return on assets (20%), earnings per share (20%), 
rate of return on owner’s equity (20%), and stock price (20%). Scores on the team perform-
ance indexes were reported after each decision period and provided the input for team 
members’ final course grade. 
Team size. Because team size may influence team performance as well as the func-
tioning of a team’s TMS and team MMs (Wheelan, 2009) we included team size as control 
variable in our analyses. 
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Results 
Correlations. Table 1 displays correlations and descriptive variables among all study 
variables. Notably, MM complexity and MM similarity show a high correlation (.80). This is 
not completely surprising given that MM similarity was measured as the amount of overlap 
in linkages among team members. Because teams with more complex MMs use more link-
ages on average they can also be expected to have more overlapping linkages. However, 
given the theoretical distinction between MM similarity and MM complexity we decided to 
proceed with both variables included in our analyses. 
An inspection of the development of correlations over time indicates that MM complex-
ity and MM similarity show increasing correlations with performance and information 
search over time. The correlation between TMS and performance first seems to decrease 
from time 1 till time 3 before it increases from time point 4 until it levels off at time 7 and the 
correlation between TMS and performance is at a maximum around time 3–5. Information 
search and performance show increasing correlation values that become significant from 
time point 5 onwards. Clearly, the patterns of results exhibit a strong temporal element with 
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Random coefficient modeling framework. For our RCM analyses we followed the 
recommendations of Bliese and Ployhart’s (2002) and Singer and Willett (2003). RCM has 
the advantage that it can assess and account for nonindependence of observations measured 
over time and can incorporate time varying, as well as time stable predictors. For a recent 
example of RCM analysis on team performance in a management simulation see Mathieu 
and Rapp (2009). 
To build our longitudinal model of team performance and team information search, we 
followed the guidelines by Bliese and Ployhart (2002). We started with a simple regression 
model without any random effects as a baseline and proceeded with consecutively more 
complex models, at each step adding random effects. According to the recommendation by 
Bliese and Ployhart (2002), at each step in which we added additional random effects, we 
used chi-square difference tests based on the models’ loglikelihood ratios to compare the 
change in fit between the more parsimonious and the more complex model. Consistent with 
the recommendations of Bliese and Ployhart (2002) we applied a two step procedure. In the 
first step—level-1—we established the fixed function for time and in the second step—level-
2— we added our predictor variables in order to test our hypothesized relationships. All 
models were estimated with the open source software R (R Development Core Team, 2004) 
and the random effects models were estimated with the use of the NLME library written by 
Pinheiro and Bates (2000). 
We used orthogonal polynomials to index the linear, quadratic, and cubic growth curve 
parameters. Orthogonal polynomials decompose a trend into different uncorrelated esti-
mates of its temporal components (Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002; Mathieu & Rapp, 2008). 
With orthogonal parameters, the intercept represents the value of the construct at the mid-
point of the team performance episode, the slope parameter represent the linear growth rate 
of the construct, the quadratic parameter represents the quadratic form—u-shape—of the 
trajectory, and the cubic parameter represents the cubic form characterized by two inflec-
tion points—a flat lying reversed s-shape. 
Within and between-team variance in performance and information search. As a first 
step, we examined the ICC(1) for the time varying criteria variables team performance and 
team information search. The ICC(1) indicates how much of the variability in the criteria 
variables is attributable to within versus between team differences over the seven perform-
ance episodes (Bliese, 2000). Our analysis reveals an ICC(1) of .17 for team performance 
indicating that between team variance explained 17% of the total variance in performance 
over time and within team variance explained 83% of the variance over time. The ICC(1) for 
team information search was .18 indicating that between team variance explains 18% of the 
total variance in team information search over time and within team variance explains 82% 
of the variance. These values indicate that considerable between team, as well as within 
team differences exist in team performance and team information search (Bliese, 2000). 
Level 1 analysis 
The next step in our longitudinal analysis is determining the fixed functions for time— the 
sample level (average) development trajectory of team performance and team information 
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search over time. In this step we started with the baseline model and consecutively added a 
random intercept, slope, and quadratic and cubic polynomials. Additionally we tested for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the model error structures. 
Fixed functions of performance and information search. Results for the fixed function 
for team performance, shown in Table 2, show that both the linear (12.22, p < 0.001) and 
quadratic parameter (2.87, p < 0.001) are positive and differ significantly from zero, 
whereas, the cubic parameter (-1.13, p > 0.05) is negative and fails to reach significance. 
Hence, the final quadratic model indicates positive and u-shaped growth in performance. 
Results for the fixed function for information search breadth, shown in Table 3, show that 
both the linear and quadratic parameters are negative and differ significantly from zero (-
9.35, p < 0.001; -3.08, p < 0.001, respectively), whereas, the cubic parameter fails to reach 
significance (-0.47, p > 0.05). Hence, the final quadratic model indicates a declining, and 
inversed u-shaped trajectory of team information search. 
Table 2. Results of Fixed Functions for Time Predicting Team Performance 
Variable  Model 1:Linear  Model 2: Quadratic  Model 3: Cubic 
Intercept -0.87*** (0.06)   0.00  (0.03)   0.00  (0.03) 
Linear 0.29***  (0.02)   12.22*** (0.73)  12.22***  (0.73) 
Quadratic       2.87***  (0.73)   2.87***  (0.73) 
Cubic             -1.13  (0.73) 
                
Goodness of fit                 
Akaike’s information criterion  1019.25      997.33      995.72   
Bayesian information criterion 1031.55     1013.72     1016.20   
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)  -506.62        -494.67        -492.86    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3. Results of Fixed Functions for Time Predicting Information Search  
Variable  Model 1:Linear  Model 2: Quadratic  Model 3: Cubic 
Intercept 0.66***  (0.07)   0.00  (0.04)   0.00  (0.04) 
Linear -0.22***  (0.02)   -9.35***  (0.77)   -9.35***  (0.77) 
Quadratic       -3.08***  (0.77)   -3.08***  (0.77) 
Cubic             -0.47  (0.77) 
                
Goodness of fit                 
Akaike’s information criterion  1066.188      1043.601      1043.915   
Bayesian information criterion 1078.489      1059.994      1064.394   
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)  -530.094        -517.801        -516.958    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
          
Determining variability in growth parameters. The fixed models, reported 
above, assume no variability in the growth parameters across teams. In this random part, we 
loosen this assumption by consecutively allowing for random variability in the intercept, 
slope, quadratic, and cubic parameters. The results of these analyses are reported in table 4 
and table 5. 
First, for team performance the model with a random intercept significantly improved 
the quadratic base model (χ2diff(1) = 117.01, p < 0.001). Second, the model with a random 
slope significantly improved the model with only a random intercept (χ 2 diff(2) = 211.45, p < 
0.001). Third, the quadratic model significantly improved the model with only a random 
slope (χ 2 diff(4) =91.09, p< 0.001). Fourth, we tested whether a model with a random cubic 
parameter would improve upon the model with a random quadratic parameter. In this 
random model the cubic parameter became significant (and -1.13, p < 0.05) and the model 
significantly improved the quadratic model (χ 2diff(5) =47.8, p < 0.001). It is interesting to note 
here that in the random slope model, the intercept parameter is negatively related to the 
slope parameter and in the final cubic model the intercept parameter is negatively related to 
the cubic parameter. 
For team information search, the model with a random intercept significantly im-
proved the quadratic base model (χ  2diff(1) = 180.87, p < 0.001). Second, the model with a 
random slope significantly improved the model with only a random intercept (χ 2diff(2) = 16.32, 
p < 0.001). Third, the model with a random quadratic parameter significantly improved the 
model with a random slope (χ  2diff(4) =18.37, p < 0.001). Fourth, we tested whether a model 
with a random cubic parameter would improve upon the model with a random quadratic 
parameter. However, the cubic parameter was not significant and the model with the cubic 
parameter showed decreased fit (χ 2diff(5) =2.82). 
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Cubic   
Intercept 0.00  (0.06) 0.00  (0.06) 0.00  (0.06) 0.00  (0.06) 
Linear 12.22***  (0.57)  12.22***  (1.04) 12.22***  (1.05) 12.22*** (1.05) 
Quadratic 2.87***  (0.57)  2.87***  (0.41)  2.87***  (0.55)  2.87***  (0.56) 
Cubic           -1.13*  (0.47) 
 Variance components                 
Intercept  0.21   0.02   0.24   0.25   
Linear     0.03   61.85   63.93   
Quadratic        11.07   13.46   
Cubic           7.78   
Residual  0.32   0.17   0.13   0.10   
 Goodness of fit                 
Akaike’s information criterion  882.32    674.88    642.98    605.17   
Bayesian information criterion 902.81    703.56    683.96    666.60   
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)  -436.16     -330.44     -311.49     -287.58    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001.   
Table 5. Results of determining variability in the growth parameters of information search over time 
 
Model 4: 
Intercept   
Model 5: 
slope    
Model 6: 
Quadratic   
Intercept  0.00  (0.07) 0.00  (0.07) 0.00  (0.07) 
Linear -9.35***  (0.54)  -9.35*** (0.70)  -9.35***  (0.70) 
Quadratic -3.08***  (0.54)  -3.08***  (0.50)  -3.08***  (0.60) 
           
 Variance components             
Intercept  0.30   0.29   0.31  
Linear     0.01   17.20   
Quadratic        8.65  
Residual  0.29   0.25   0.23  
 Goodness of fit             
Akaike’s information criterion  864.74    852.42    840.05   
Bayesian information criterion  885.23    881.11    881.03   
Deviance (-2 log-likelihood)  -427.37     -419.21     -410.03    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Determining the error structure. Finally, we tested for autocorrelation and het-
eroscedasticity in the models’ error structures. For team performance, our analyses revealed 
no evidence of first order autoregressive autocorrelation for the cubic model (0.082, χ 2diff = 
0.77, p = 0.38) and a model including test for heteroscedasticity failed to converge. For 
information search, our analyses revealed no evidence of first order autoregressive autocor-
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relation for the quadratic model and the model including test for heteroscedasticity failed to 
converge. 
Level 2 Analyses: predictors of team performance trajectories. 
In the first part of the RCM analyses we examined the relationship of team performance and 
information search with time. In this second part of the RCM analyses we add our predictor 
variables—MM complexity, MM similarity, and TMS— to predict variance in the trajectory 
parameters. All level-2 models include a control variable for team size. In addition, in order 
to assess for longitudinal mediation (Ployhart & Pitariu, 2010) we assessed if (1) MM com-
plexity, MM similarity, and TMS predict team performance, (2) MM complexity, MM simi-
larity, and TMS predict information search, (3) information search predicts team perform-
ance, and (4) the relationship between MM complexity, MM similarity, and TMS decreases 
if information search is added to the equation. In building our models, we first test models 
predicting only the intercept—holding the slope, quadratic, and cubic factors to be fixed. In 
this way we test the effect of our independent variables on the dependent variables without 
accounting for time. Then we test a model predicting all variable components of the level-1 
model—the temporal trajectories of the dependent variables. 
Test of Hypotheses 
Inspection of table 6, reveals that in a model in which the relationship between team cogni-
tion variables and performance is fixed over time (Model 8), MM complexity (0.33, p < 
0.01) and TMS (0.18, p < 0.01) significantly predict team performance. This indicates that 
teams scoring high on these variables—on average over time—perform higher than teams 
scoring low on these variables. However, this model does not take into account that the 
team cognition variables may impact team performance differently at different moments in 
time. Therefore, we ran model 9 with random trajectory parameters that allow the relation-
ships to vary over time. As hypothesis 1 suggests, MM complexity, significantly and posi-
tively predicts the intercept (0.32, p < 0.05) and the slope (6.14, p < 0.001), and negatively 
predicts the cubic parameter (-2.19, p < 0.01) of the performance trajectory. 
Figure 2 depicts fitted curves of the development trajectories of team performance over 
time for teams with low MM complexity (one SD below the average) and teams with high 
mental model complexity (one SD above the average). As the figure shows, performance for 
teams with high mental model complexity, first slightly goes down, but from time period 
one onwards it increases more rapidly than for teams with less complex MMs. Furthermore, 
whereas for teams with lower MM complexity performance growth increases towards the 
final round, growth in team performance of the teams with high MM complexity levels of 
towards the end. 
Following the recommendation of Singer and Willett (2003), we derived Pseudo-R2 sta-
tistics for the variance components associated with each temporal parameter by calculating 
the relative decrease in the residual variance associated with that parameter from the base 
model—including only the control variable—to the present model. The Pseudo-R2 statistics 
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of model 9 indicate that relative to the base model, the model including MM complexity, 
MM similarity, and TMS explains 23 % of the intercept variance, 27 % of the slope variance, 
1 % of the quadratic variance, and 34 % of the cubic variance. Altogether, these results pro-
vide support for hypothesis 1 on the effects of team external alignment on team performance 
trajectories. 
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Table 6. Results of models predicting the temporal trajectory of team performance 
Variable 
Model 8: Inter-
cept Model  9:  Trajectory 
Model 10: Info. 
Search 
Intercept -0.07  (0.47)  0.07  (0.27)  0.13  (0.27) 
Linear 12.22***  (0.56)  12.22*** (0.91)  13.30***  (1.02) 
Quadratic  2.87*** (0.56) 2.87*** (0.55)  3.85***  (0.71) 
Cubic  -1.13* (0.56)  -1.13* (0.42) -0.65  (0.51) 
Size 0.01  (0.08)  -0.01  (0.05)  -0.01  (0.05) 
MM Complexity   0.33**  (0.11)  0.32**  (0.11)  0.30**  (0.11) 
TMS  0.18** (0.06)  0.18** (0.06)  0.17**  (0.06) 
MM Similarity  -0.10  (0.10)  -0.09  (0.10)  -0.09  (0.10) 
Linear x MM Complexity      6.14***  (1.75)  5.77***  (1.67) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity     0.19  (1.06)  0.01  (1.05) 
Cubic x MM Complexity      -2.19**  (0.81)  -2.20**  (0.83) 
Linear x TMS      2.46**  (0.94)  2.20*  (0.89) 
Quadratic x TMS      0.40  (0.57)  0.27  (0.57) 
Cubic x TMS      -1.09*  (0.43)  -1.04*  (0.45) 
Linear x MM Similarity      -2.04  (1.55)  -1.95  (1.47) 
Quadratic x MM Similarity      0.93  (0.94)  0.91  (0.93) 
Cubic x MM Similarity      2.32**  (0.72)  2.25**  (0.73) 
Information  Search       0.06  (0.04) 
Linear x Info. Search          2.01**  (0.76) 
Quadratic x Info. Search          0.79  (0.64) 
Cubic x Info Search          -0.06  (0.48) 
 Pseudo R
2:          
Intercept 0.35    0.23       
Slope parameter      0.27       
Quadratic parameter      0.01       
Cubic Parameter        0.34         
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001.   
     



























Figure 2. Team performance over time for teams with low and teams with high mental model complexity  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the relationship between MM complexity will be mediated 
by team information search. In order for this hypothesis to hold, the following conditions 
should hold: (1) MM complexity should predict the team performance trajectory, (2) MM 
complexity should predict the information search trajectory, (3) information search should 
predict the team performance trajectory, and (4) the relationship between MM complexity 
and team performance should decrease if information search is added to the equation 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). The first condition is true, as we reported above that MM complex-
ity positively predicted team performance trajectories. 
Regarding the second condition, Table 7 shows that in a model in which the relation-
ship between the variables is fixed over time (Model 7), MM complexity does not signifi-
cantly predict team information search. However, as can be seen in Model 8, when the 
trajectory parameters are allowed to vary, MM complexity positively predicts the slope of 
information search over time (2.65, p < 0.05). As can be seen from the fitted curves dis-
played in figure 3, although information search decreases over time for all teams, it de-
creases less for teams with high MM complexity than for teams with low MM complexity. 
The Pseudo-R2 statistics of model 8 indicate that relative to the base model, the model in-
cluding MM complexity, MM similarity, and TMS explains 0 % of the intercept variance, 14 
% of the slope variance, and 17 % of the quadratic variance. 
Regarding the third condition, model 10 of table 6 shows that team information search 
positively predicts the slope of team performance over and above the team cognition vari-
ables (2.01, p < 0.01). Because in this model information search is a time-varying predictor, 
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this changes the meaning of the individual growth parameters, and therefore interpretation 
of R2 values based on the variance components would be meaningless (Singer & Willett, 
2003). Finally, given that the inclusion of team information search to the model only mar-
ginally decreases the beta’s of MM Complexity in predicting team performance (Intercept: 
from 0.32 to 0.30, Slope: from 6.14, to 5.77) and given that the respective beta’s remain 
significant, this does not provide conclusive support that information search actually func-
tions as a mediator in the relationship between MM complexity and team performance. So, 
although MM complexity does predict the team information search trajectory and team 
information search does predict the team performance trajectory, the expected mediation in 
hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Table 7. Results of models using MM complexity, TMS, and MM similarity in predicting Information 
search 
      Model 7:      Model 8:     
Variable     Intercept  Trajectory 
Intercept   0.01  (0.61)  0.38  (0.56) 
Linear -9.35***  (0.54)    -8.47***  (2.09) 
Quadratic -3.08***  (0.54)    -4.55*  (1.80) 
Size   0.00  (0.10)  -0.05  (0.10) 
MM Complexity  0.11  (0.15)  0.09  (0.15) 
TMS   0.14
† (0.08) 0.14
† (0.08) 
MM Similarity  -0.07  (0.13)  0.00  (0.01) 
Linear x MM Complexity      2.65*  (1.29) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity      -0.59  (1.11) 
Linear x TMS      0.65  (0.69) 
Quadratic x TMS       -1.41*  (0.60) 
Linear x MM Similarity      -0.05  (0.10) 
Quadratic x MM Similarity     0.08  (0.09) 
 Pseudo R
2:     
Intercept   0.05    0.00   
Linear parameter      0.14   
Quadratic parameter        0.17    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
    































Figure 3. Information search over time for teams with low and teams with high mental model complexity  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that a team’s MM similarity and TMS positively impact team per-
formance over time. As can be seen from model 9 of table 6, a team’s MM similarity signifi-
cantly and positively predicts the cubic parameter (2.32, p < 0.01) of the team performance 
trajectory. As depicted in figure 4, this implies that teams with low MM similarity have a 
performance trajectory with two inflection points, slightly decreasing initial performance, 
that picks up after time point one and levels of towards the end, whereas teams with high 
MM similarity teams seem to benefit particularly during the beginning and towards the end 
of the team task. As can be seen from model 9 of table 6, a team’s TMS significantly and 
positively predicts the intercept (0.18, p < 0.01) and the slope (2.46, p < 0.05), and nega-
tively predicts the cubic parameter (-1.09, p < 0.05) of the performance trajectory. Figure 5 
depicts fitted curves of the development trajectories of team performance over time for 
teams with low TMS (one SD below the average) and teams with high TMS (one SD above 
the average). As the figure shows, performance for teams with high TMS, first slightly goes 
down, but from time period one onwards it increases more rapidly than for teams with low 
TMS. Furthermore, whereas for teams with lower TMS performance growth increases to-
wards the final round, growth in team performance of the teams with high TMS levels of 
towards the end. Altogether, these results provide support for hypothesis 3 on the effects of 
internal cognitive alignment on team performance trajectories. 
































Figure 4. Team performance over time for teams with low and teams with high mental model similarity 
 

























Figure 5. Team performance over time for teams with low and teams with high transactive memory systems 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that in complex environments, a team’s external alignment and 
internal alignment will interact in predicting team performance trajectories, such that teams 
will benefit more from MM complexity to the extent that they have well functioning TMSs 
and high MM similarity. Model 11 from table 8 shows that the interaction between MM 
complexity and MM similarity does positively predict the cubic parameter of the team per-
formance trajectory (0.88, p < 0.001). In addition, model 12 from table 8 shows that the 
interaction between MM complexity and TMSs does negatively predict the cubic parameter 
of the team performance trajectory (-1.11, p < 0.01). As depicted in figure 6, this implies that 
for teams with both high MM complexity and high TMS, after an initial lag in performance 
growth, these teams show a rapid increase in performance, which levels of again towards 
the final rounds, whereas for teams scoring lower on one of these variables, performance 
continues to increase at a similar pace. However, given that the overall pace of performance 
growth was lower for teams that scored lower on one of these variables the net result of the 
joint effect of MM complexity and TMS on performance remains positive. Altogether, these 
results provide limited support for hypothesis 4 on the interactive effects of teams’ external 
and internal cognitive alignment on team performance trajectories. Significance of the cubic 
parameters indicates that the interaction between internal and external alignment teams 
explains differences in the specific form of the performance trajectories; however, given that 
the intercept and linear and quadratic parameters were not significant, this does not imply 
that the interaction leads to higher performance growth overall.  
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Table 8. Results of models using interactions of MM complexity with MM similarity and TMS in pre-
dicting performance 
      Model: 11       Model: 12  
Variable     Interaction     Interaction  
Intercept   0.09  (0.28) 0.04  (0.26) 
Linear   12.79***  (1.02)  12.29***  (0.93) 
Quadratic  2.55***  (0.59) 2.77***  (0.55) 
Cubic   -1.74***  (0.43) -1.29**  (0.42) 
MM Complexity     0.34**  (0.12)  0.27**  (0.08) 
MM Similarity    -0.08  (0.11)  0.18**  (0.06) 
Size   -0.01  (0.05) -0.01  (0.04) 
Linear x MM Complexity    6.62***  (1.85)  4.79***  (1.28) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity   -0.12  (1.06)  0.33  (0.76) 
Cubic x MM Complexity    -2.73*** (0.78) -1.17*  (0.58) 
Linear x MM Similarity    -1.71  (1.67)     
Quadratic x MM Similarity    0.45  (0.96)    
Cubic x MM Similarity    1.71*  (0.70)    
MM Complexity x MM Similarity  -0.05  (0.04)    
Linear x MM Complexity x MM Similarity  -0.82  (0.56)    
Quadratic x MM Complexity x MM Similarity  0.46  (0.32)    
Cubic x MM Complexity x MM Similarity  0.88***  (0.23)    
Linear x TMS        2.47*  (0.95) 
Quadratic x TMS        0.50  (0.56) 
Cubic x TMS        -0.98*  (0.44) 
MM Complexity x TMS        0.04  (0.04) 
Linear x MM Complexity x TMS      0.49  (0.73) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity x TMS      -0.72
† (0.43) 
Cubic x MM Complexity x TMS      -1.11**  (0.33) 
 Pseudo R
2:         
Intercept   0.01    0.00   
Linear parameter    0.02    -0.01   
Quadratic parameter    0.03    0.05   
Cubic Parameter     0.36     0.26    
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 6. Interaction effects of transactive memory system and mental model complexity 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that in complex environments, team information search and MM 
complexity will interact, such that teams will benefit more from information search to the 
extent that they have higher MM complexity. As can be seen from model 13 on table 9, the 
interaction between team information search and MM complexity significantly and posi-
tively predicts the intercept (0.20, p < 0.001) and the slope (2.52, p < 0.05), and marginally 
and negatively predicts the cubic parameter (-1.46, p < 0.10) of the performance trajectory. 
As can be seen from figure 7 this implies that after an initial lag, performance of teams with 
both high information search and high MM complexity increases much more rapidly than 
performance of teams that score lower on performance on one of these variables. Altoge-
ther, these results provide support for hypothesis 5. 
141 Chapter 4 
 
 
Table 9. Results of model using interaction of team information search and mental model complexity 
in predicting performance 
   Model 13:    
Variable Interaction     
Intercept 0.10  (0.26) 
Linear 13.18***  (1.05) 
Quadratic 3.97***  (0.69) 
Cubic -0.56  (0.53) 
MM Complexity   0.24*  (0.07) 
Information Search  0.08*  (0.04) 
Size -0.01  (0.04) 
Linear x MM Complexity  5.51***  (1.26) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity  1.44
† (0.84) 
Cubic x MM Complexity  0.33  (0.66) 
Linear x Information Search  2.58***  (0.77) 
Quadratic x Information Search  0.72  (0.64) 
Cubic x Information Search  -0.25  (0.49) 
MM Complexity x Information Search  0.20***  (0.05) 
Linear x MM Complexity x Info. Search  2.52*  (1.05) 
Quadratic x MM Complexity x Info. Search  0.07  (0.96) 
Cubic x MM Complexity x Info. Search  -1.46
† (0.78) 
Note. 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Figure 7. Team performance over time for teams with low and with high mental model complexity and with 
low and high Information search  
Discussion 
Although our understanding of individual team cognition concepts is steadily increasing, 
studies designed to explicitly investigate how different types of team cognition influence 
each other and interactively drive team performance are still scarce. Each team cognition 
construct reflects only part of the cognition taking place in a team during task execution. In 
order to attain a full understanding of the relationship between team cognition and team 
performance, constructs should be clearly specified, compared, and integrated. In addition, 
their conjunctive effects on team performance should be investigated. 
We argued that teams functioning in complex dynamic environments require knowl-
edge structures that ensure both external and internal cognitive alignment. An abundance 
of external alignment without the required integration mechanisms is likely to result in 
disintegration, with teams functioning more as separate individuals than as concerted goal 
directed entities (Brodbeck et al., 2007; Cronin & Weingart, 2007). From the other extreme, 
an abundance of internal alignment without external alignment will likely create a myopic 
inward focused team, insensitive to the complexities of its environment and unable to adapt 
to changing external circumstances (Burke, Stagl, Salas, Pierce, & Kendall, 2006). 
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The results of our study; however, provide a more nuanced picture regarding these re-
lationships. On the one hand, both external alignment and internal alignment add unique 
predictive validity in predicting team performance trajectories. Team MM complexity as 
well as MM similarity and teams’ TMSs positively predicted growth parameters of the team 
performance trajectories. On the other hand, the interaction effects of team external and 
internal alignment show mixed results. Whereas MM similarity positively interacted with 
MM complexity in predicting the cubic trajectory of team performance, TMS showed a 
negative interaction with MM complexity and the cubic growth parameter. These effects 
imply that the interaction between external alignment and internal alignment predict the 
form of the trajectories of team performance, however because the linear and quadratic 
parameters were not significant, the interaction does not significantly predict the overall 
growth in team performance. Therefore, we conclude that the external and internal align-
ment have additive but no compensatory effects on overall performance growth. 
The results also point at the role of team information search as an important driver of 
team performance trajectories. The development trajectory of team information search 
indicates that although information search decreased over time for all teams, this decrease 
was less pronounced for teams with more complex MMs. Moreover, the breadth and depth 
of the information that was accessed did become increasingly important as the simulation 
progressed. This general pattern seems to indicate that all teams spent much time in the 
beginning of the simulation on exploring the different information pages of the game; how-
ever, whereas teams with less complex MMs rapidly decreased their search behaviour after 
this initial exploration, teams with more complex MMs remained more motivated to collect 
additional information during the passage of the simulation. Contrary to our expectations, 
team information search did not significantly mediate the relationship between team MM 
complexity and team performance trajectories; however, MM complexity did interact with 
information search in predicting team performance. Consistent with the metaphor of ‘men-
tal model as perceptual filters’ (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988) and the theory of absorptive 
capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), teams with complex MMs seem to benefit most fully 
from accessing a wide variety of information. This interactive effect may also explain why 
teams with more complex MMs continue to engage in information search: relative to teams 
with less complex MMs, teams with more complex MMs, benefit more from information 
search in terms of increased team performance. 
Prior research on shared MMs has aimed to demonstrate the positive impact of shared 
MMs on team performance. The accumulating evidence indicates that similarity in MMs 
indeed is an important antecedent for the quality and effectiveness of team processes. How-
ever, research on shared MMs has mainly investigated action teams for which deep informa-
tion processing and the integration of distributed cognition may not be essential for success-
ful task performance. When studying teams engaged in more complex cognitive tasks con-
sisting of highly dynamic environments, such as project teams or crisis management teams, 
i t  m a y  n o t  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  l o o k  o n l y  a t  s i m i l a r i t y  a n d  a c c u r a c y  i n  M M s  ( U i t d e w i l l i g e n ,  
Waller, & Zijlstra, 2010). Instead, richer and more idiosyncratic aspects of MMs, such as MM 
flexibility and complexity may be more closely related to performance in complex and dy-
namic situations (Curseu, Schruijer, & Boros, 2007). 
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Scholars have argued that sometimes too much similarity in MMs may actually be det-
rimental for performance because in complex tasks it is more efficient if team members have 
diversified MMs, so that each members’ model covers a particular aspect of the overall team 
task (Banks & Millward, 2007; Cooke, Kiekel, Salas, Stout, Bowers, & Cannon-Bowers, 2003; 
Mohammed and Dumville, 2001). However, given the often used similarity ratings approach 
for measuring team MMs, MM similarity and overall coverage of the task environment are 
opposites on the same dimension. Because the number and concepts of the models are fixed 
by the researcher, the more similar team members’ MMs are, the smaller the amount of 
possible structures they cover. In contrast to the similarity rating technique that is most 
often used in MM research (DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010) the free concept mapping 
approach used in this study allows for the independent assessment of MM similarity and 
coverage of the relevant task environment—which we assessed as MM complexity. As can be 
seen from the results of the present study, MM complexity and MM similarity were, al-
though highly correlated, both positively as well as interactively predictive of performance 
trajectories. 
Internal and external alignment and temporal trajectories. A number of scholars have 
argued that we should move away from a static or variable approach of studying team proc-
esses and performance to a more dynamic approach that investigates how team processes 
and characteristics develop and change over time (Marks et al., 2001; Roe, 2008). More in 
particular, scholars have long argued for taking into account not only what relations exist 
between variables, but also of finding out when and how long a variable affects another 
variable (George & Jones, 2000; Mitchell & James, 2001), or as McGrath (1988: 265) indi-
cated “a known time relation between variables of interest is essential to the interpretive 
logic of all of our study designs”. In this study we heeded these calls with the application of 
RCM techniques to our longitudinal data. This made it possible to assess and predict the 
patterns of team information search and team performance over time. Our results clearly 
show the additional benefits of a longitudinal approach. Although, the analyses indicate 
that team internal and external alignment do predict variance in overall team performance, 
the trajectory analyses provides a more nuanced picture of how and at what time points 
these variables have their most crucial impact on team functioning. A number of observa-
tions on the temporal trajectory of team performance are worth noting. 
First, there appears to be a lag before the effects of team cognitive structures become 
visible in our team performance measure. More specifically, consistent with theoretical 
reasoning of Waller and colleagues (2005) teams bifurcate on performance from the third 
session onwards. Second, the team cognition variables most markedly affect the rate at 
which performance increases. Both MM complexity and a team’s TMS quality have some but 
limited impact on initial team performance. The main impact of these variables is on the 
rate of development of team performance over time, in such a way that they distinguish 
teams with moderate from those with accelerated development patterns. Third, this differ-
ence in growth patterns levels off toward the end of the simulation. Whereas, teams with 
less beneficial cognitive structures—and less steep growth curves—continuously grow until 
the end of the simulation, the steeper performance trajectories of teams with more benefici-
ary cognitive constellations level off towards the end. We will now provide a number of 
possible explanations for these differences in temporal trajectories. 
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Lag. In order to reach eventual high performance, teams may need to forgo initial per-
formance. McGrath (1991) noted that apparent inefficiencies in group performance may 
actually indicate that the group is involved in other activities—e.g. member- support func-
tions or technical or political problem solving—that may not directly relate to the type of 
efficiency the researcher is tracking. Teams’ initial actions and choices often have strong 
effects on team development later on in a team’s lifespan (Chidambaram & Bostrom, 1996; 
Ericksen & Dyer, 2004). For example, initial investments in the construction of high quality 
team charters and taskwork strategies or in the construction of a shared understanding of 
the task may greatly benefit later performance (Mathieu and Rapp, 2009; Pearsall, Ellis, & 
Bell, 2010). However, such initial investments often do not immediately translate into hig-
her performance. For instance, early investment of time and resources may dampen initial 
team performance levels but provide teams with salutary mechanisms that later on may 
results in higher levels of team performance (Erickson & Dyer, 2004). 
Differences in the rate of performance growth. An explanation for difference in 
rate of performance growth perceived from the third session onward, may be that the effects 
of team cognition variables becomes more prominent as effects of previous periods accumu-
late and interact over time, causing upward or downward spirals (Lindsley, Brass, & Tho-
mas, 1995). Team performance trajectories follow a path dependent process in which initial 
decisions set in motion a self-reinforcing process that establish the boundaries and condi-
tions for future decisions. The effect of good initial decisions may provide a team with a 
positive basis for subsequent decisions—for example because of an increased availability of 
resources, a wider variety of information, or an increased number of options to choose 
from—while wrong initial decisions may complicate later decisions—for example by deplet-
ing resources or causing unnecessary constraints. In this way a deviation amplifying loop is 
established in which the teams that initially performed well become even better and the 
teams that initially performed less well, become even worse (Hackman 1990). 
Another explanation for difference in growth rate trajectories may be that an inherent 
increase of complexity over time is embedded within the simulation. Teams start with a 
relatively simple company operating in a single country with not yet fully developed compe-
tition. After a few rounds, the companies start to grow, teams become active in multiple 
countries and the industries start to mature. As international competition increases and 
companies become involved in multiple countries, environmental complexity increases 
(Calori, Johnson, & Sarni, 1994; Porter, 1986). Therefore the complexity of the environment 
and the need for higher level information processing is likely to increase over time. Given 
that complex information structures are particularly useful in complex environments (Calori 
et al., 1994; Weick 1979), this would explain the increasing strength of the relationship 
between cognitive structures and team performance over time. 
Negatively accelerating growth. Although, the team cognition variables positively 
impact team performance trajectories, the effects of these variables level off toward the end 
of the simulation. Note that this specific pattern of the performance trajectory is similar to 
those generally observed in studies on individual as well as collective learning curves (Ar-
gote, 1993, Argote, Gruendfeld, & Naquin, 1996; Mazur & Hastie, 1978). The most general 
explanation for this phenomenon is the existence of a ceiling effect: there may be a maxi-
mum on the performance scores teams may be able to attain and the closer teams approach 
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that maximum the more difficult it is to improve. However, several alternative explanations 
may exist for why teams with initial high growth rates show negatively accelerated per-
formance curves towards the end of the simulation. 
First, scholars have pointed out that groups are often aware of the passage of time and 
the approaching end point of their project or groups’ life, and that this time awareness has a 
profound impact on team functioning (Gersick, 1988, 1989; Waller, 2000). The teams in this 
study were clearly aware of the anticipated end time of the simulation. Because teams were 
evaluated based on their final—cumulative—performance, awareness of the approaching 
termination of the simulation may have caused complacency in teams with very high per-
formance scores. If during the final rounds of the simulation, high performing teams per-
ceive that their cumulative performance goals have been reached and their final score is 
secured, they are likely to decrease their effort, which may explain the negative acceleration 
of the performance curves towards the end of the simulation. 
Second, an explanation for this negative acceleration can be found in research by Lan-
dis (2001) on the stability of team performance over time. In a study on professional basket-
ball teams, Landis found that whereas the intercorrelations between performance indicators 
in adjacent periods were positive, the size of these correlations decreased and even became 
negative as the number of intervening time periods increased. Based on this result, Landis 
argued that when a limited amount of resources must be allocated among teams, an organi-
zation may sometimes use a politically driven model in which more resources are allocated 
to more poorly performing teams. The same argument can be applied to the present study. It 
could be possible that whereas instructors may initially have provided more information 
and advice to better performing teams, later on as performance differences between teams 
increased instructors may have started to invest more resources on the poorer performing 
teams in order to keep them from going bankrupt and to keep the variance in performance 
between teams within limits. 
limitations 
A limitation of the present project is that, even though team information search and team 
performance were measured repeatedly over time, team cognitive structure variables were 
not. Our study was based on the assumption that cognitive structures that were formed 
during the initial training phase would remain relatively stable during the subsequent per-
formance episodes; however, the veridicality of this assumption remains untested in the 
present study. Whereas some studies on the effects of cognitive structures—particularly of 
shared MMs—on team performance show stable effects over time (e.g. Edwards et al., 2006; 
Mathieu et al., 2000; 2005) others indicate that teams’ cognitive structures can undergo 
substantial changes during repeated team member interactions (Cooke et al., 2003; Holl-
ingshead, 2001; Lewis, 2004; Levesque et al., 2001). 
Although, several scholars have pointed at the role of team MM accuracy in team effec-
tiveness (e.g. Cooke et al., 2000; Rentsch & Hall, 1994), in the present study we did not 
derive indicators for team MM accuracy. Team MM accuracy refers to the extent to which 
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the MMs of the team members adequately represent the structure of the system it models, 
and is often assessed by comparing participants’ MMs with an optimal or ‘true’ referent 
model (Edwards et al., 2006; Stout, Salas, and Kraiger, 1997). This reasoning; however, is 
based on the assumption that one or more optimal referent models exist and can be derived 
by the researcher (Mathieu et al., 2005). In relatively simple situations in which the number 
of combinations MMs can assume and the amount of contingencies are limited, MM accu-
racy will constitute a meaningful construct. However, in very complex situations, such as 
the one represented in the present study, the sheer amount of different task situations and 
possible linkages between concepts makes it impossible to derive optimal referent models to 
which participants’ models can be compared in order to derive accuracy measures. There-
fore, in this type of situation, MM complexity may constitute a better measure for the quality 
of MMs, as complex knowledge structures indicate that individuals and teams have at their 
disposal a larger variety of possible models, each of which can be most appropriate in a 
different situation. For example, whereas in a market where demand surpasses supply, 
production capacity may be the most important driver for sales volume, in a market where 
supply surpasses demand, marketing efforts may be more crucial. The more complex a MM, 
the higher the chance that it will contain both accurate sub models. Therefore, we pose that 
in complex dynamic task situations MM complexity takes precedence over MM accuracy. 
Finally, we only assessed one type of MMs, while team cognition researchers have gen-
erally agreed that different types of MMs may be active simultaneously in teams (Cannon-
Bowers and colleagues, 1993; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994). MMs have often been classi-
fied into two overarching dimensions, namely task MMs—representing aspects of the task 
itself, such as task processes, strategies, and likely scenarios—and team MMs—representing 
team members’ interaction and communication patterns, roles, and responsibilities 
(Mathieu et al., 2000). The MMs we assessed, most closely resemble task MMs, as they do 
refer to team members’ understanding of the simulation. Several studies show that, in par-
ticular similarity in team interaction MMs may be beneficial for team processes (DeChurch 
& Mesmer-Magnus, 2010). Therefore, the results of the present study only apply to task 
MMs and additional research is needed to unravel the interactions between characteristics 
of both team and task MMs. 
Conclusion 
Gaining an understanding of how teams can leverage and maximally utilize the knowledge, 
skills, and abilities of the individual members, constitutes one of the main challenges for 
team research for the coming years. The last decades have witnessed the introduction of a 
number of emergent team level cognitive concepts, which have significantly improved our 
understanding of team performance. The time has come for research on team cognition to 
go beyond single construct approaches and develop more integrated theoretical frameworks 
that link together these constructs and indicate how they conjunctively influence team 
information processing and performance. One of the main questions surfacing in team 
cognition research is how both convergent and divergent cognitive structures can drive 
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team performance. We have developed and tested a model of the role of team cognitive 
structures in complex and dynamic environments in which we argue that teams require both 
internal and external cognitive alignment. Moreover, we found that a temporal approach to 
analyzing and assessing the effects of these cognitive structures on team performance added 
a more nuanced picture of when and how these team cognition variables impacted team 
performance over time. To conclude, in order to enable teams to prosper and thrive in tur-
bulent environments it should be ensured that teams’ knowledge structures both match the 
requisite variety of the external environment and are sufficiently aligned internally to assist 
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In this chapter we investigate the nature of a team’s cognitive adaptation processes. We 
present a case study on a single team in which we investigate how this team alters its under-
standing of an unexpected dynamic situation over time. We analyzed a sample of the audio 
communication of the operations team of NEADS— the organization responsible for coordi-
nating the air defense of the northeast quadrant of the United States during the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. From our analyses of the data we conclude that in ambiguous 
situations, teams construct temporary ‘working hypotheses’ of the situation that enable 
them to maintain sense and coordinate their actions. The formation and abandonment of 
these working hypotheses over time consisted of an iterative process of using and discarding 
working hypotheses as events unfolded and sensemaking occurred. 
 
152 Talking to the room 
 
Introduction 
For organizations operating in complex, dynamic environments, the ability of operational 
teams to construct an adequate understanding of an evolving situation rapidly is critical for 
timely action. Emergency medical teams gather information, make diagnoses and take 
appropriate action in order to save lives (Marsch et al. 2005). When there is a malfunction, 
nuclear power plant control room crews gather information from multiple systems and 
quickly piece together clues that pinpoint the source before safety is compromised (Waller, 
Gupta & Giambatista 2004). Airline flight crews quickly adapt to unexpected weather and 
mechanical events by reorganizing tasks and responsibilities, and land safely as a result 
(Waller 1999). Clearly, unless the necessary information is collected quickly and appropri-
ate understanding is drawn from it, the probability of taking appropriate action under such 
critical, time-pressured situations is severely compromised. 
It is no surprise, then, that numerous scholars have directed their research efforts to-
ward understanding and improving the ability of teams and organizations to collectively 
‘make sense’ out of evolving crises. Various models have been constructed in different disci-
plines regarding how the formation of collective understanding develops so that relevant 
aspects of a situation are shared and distributed among the different members of an organi-
zation (Endsley 1995; Gorman, Cooke & Winner 2006; Roth, Multer & Raslear 2006; Wel-
lens 1993). The concept of sensemaking seems ubiquitous in work on crisis situations. Sen-
semaking constitutes the social process by which members of an organization collectively 
interpret and explain sets of ambiguous information from the environment (Weick 1995). 
Given that crisis situations typically involve unexpected, complex and dynamic events (Pear-
son & Clair 1998), sensemaking would seem to play a pivotal role in the ability of teams and 
organizations to act quickly and effectively. In fact, several researchers have documented 
the occurrence of behavior termed ‘talking to the room’ during crises, as team members use 
undirected talk to repeat new information to ‘the room’ (i.e., to no particular recipient) in 
order to facilitate collective sensemaking (Pettersson, Randall & Helgeson 2004). 
Sensemaking has its place, but organizations that relied on sensemaking processes to 
ensure timely and effective action during crises would be remiss, if not criminally liable, if 
they failed also to provide their members with adequate training. Naturally, the members of 
responsible organizations receive extensive initial and recurrent training in the use of proto-
cols designed to aid their sensemaking and actions during crisis situations. Most hold pro-
fessional licenses formalizing their levels of expertise and training. For example, most li-
censed nuclear power plant crew members receive recurrent simulator training every six 
weeks, during which they practice noticing, diagnosing and responding to various non-
routine events. In general, training in organizations responsible for addressing crises often 
focuses on the appropriate application of existing protocols to simulated situations (Perrow 
1984). This application not only requires making sense of information, but also requires the 
rapid application of existing protocols once sensemaking provides a working hypothesis. 
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But what happens when information emanating from an emerging crisis begins to form 
a pattern over time that deviates from the expectations of existing protocols and working 
hypotheses? How deviant information, and how much of it, is required to trigger the realiza-
tion that a protocol and its underlying hypothesis are no longer plausible for a given situa-
tion? Weick and Sutcliffe (2001; see also Langer 1992) suggest that ‘mindful’ organizations 
and their actors iteratively revisit working hypotheses in light of incoming information; 
however, given the time constraints faced by organizations reacting to crisis situations, the 
constant questioning of a working hypothesis may introduce interruptions that diminish 
cognitive resources required for implementing complex procedures (Speier, Vessey & 
Valacich 2003). Additionally, the ability of individuals under extreme stress to abandon an 
initial hypothesis in a timely manner may be compromised by reactions such as attentional 
tunneling (Yeh & Wickens 2001) or threat rigidity (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton 1981). 
The purpose of our chapter is to investigate, using a case study, the working hypothe-
ses activated over time in one organization’s operations team during an extreme crisis. Time 
plays a central role in our chapter in two ways. First, we focus on a crisis that emerges, piece 
by piece, over time, and cumulates into an event of previously unimagined proportion. 
Second, the organization charged with responding to the crisis must react to and contain the 
emergent crisis as quickly as possible. It has to fight time, literally. We attempt to ascertain if 
and when this organization’s working hypotheses change as the crisis unfolds, to describe 
this pattern of change, and to understand it in terms of collective sensemaking. The case 
concerns the organization responsible for defending the airspace over the northeast quad-
rant of the United States: Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS). In order to address the 
questions and issues discussed above, we briefly review the literature concerning sensemak-
ing and working hypotheses. We then present an analysis of the communication among 
NEADS members as they attempt to understand and respond to the emergent events of 
September 11, 2001. After discussing that analysis, we close with implications for theory and 
organizations. 
Sensemaking and working hypotheses 
As noted by Weick, “The basic idea of sensemaking is that reality is an ongoing accomplish-
ment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective sense of what occurs” 
(1993: 635). Especially during turbulent critical situations that consist of completely unex-
pected and incomprehensible events, sensemaking is of crucial importance for reducing 
confusion, guiding action and preventing organizational disintegration. In contrast to situa-
tion assessment (Endsley 1995), sensemaking is oriented towards plausibility, not accuracy 
(Weick 1995). A plausible interpretation constitutes an acceptable account of the available 
facts and thereby provides a meaningful basis for actions. Support for this point comes from 
work on recognition primed decision-making (RPD), which focuses on understanding how 
people use experience to make rapid decisions under conditions of time pressure and uncer-
tainty (Pliske, McCloskey & Klein 2001). Descriptions of actual RPD indicate that proficient 
decision makers, in order to make decisions in ambiguous situations, engage in the con-
struction of working hypotheses in the form of rapid ‘story-building’ to mentally simulate 
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the events that they think have resulted in the present conditions (Pennington & Hastie 
1993). For instance, research in complex naval command-and control environments indi-
cates that when situations are too novel or c o m p l e x  t o  c a t e g o r i z e  b y  s i m p l e  f e a t u r e -
matching, decision-makers postulate relationships through very brief stories that link to-
gether the available pieces of information into a coherent whole (Kaempf, Klein, Thordsen & 
Wolf 1996). An essential point to note regarding these conceptualizations of sensemaking is 
the recognition that during crisis situations not all information is presented initially but 
instead becomes available over time. Noting this point, Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (2005) 
describe sensemaking as a process of continually creating, updating and rewriting the work-
ing hypothesis or story of what has occurred, thereby maximally aligning the current plausi-
ble understanding to the available information. 
If interpretation processes are aimed at plausibility, they are likely to be guided by pre-
vious expectations and existing knowledge structures. A large body of research indicates 
that individuals, when interpreting their environments, employ top-down information 
processing structures that are based on past experience in similar situations, and that doing 
so helps prevent information overload and facilitate efficient information processing (Sarter 
& Woods 1991; Endsley 1995; Mogford 1997). The application of knowledge structures 
greatly enhances information-processing efficiency and decision-making (Thorngate, 1980), 
but also imposes severe limitations on decision-makers’ abilities to understand their current 
information environment (Kiesler & Sproull 1982; Walsh 1995). Because top-down knowl-
edge structures are essentially interpretations and simplifications of an external system, 
individuals and groups can fall into the trap of acting on an impoverished or outdated view 
of reality (Weick ,1979). If knowledge structures are linked to (over)trained or routinized 
protocols, adherence to obsolete interpretations may become more likely (Gersick & Hack-
man 1990; Vaughan 1996). Research on the occurrence of disasters has linked the applica-
tion of collectively accepted and rationalized knowledge structures to the failure to discover 
lurking danger (Turner 1976). 
Conversely, the implicit formulation of an incorrect working hypothesis may actually 
facilitate the integration of data and ultimately lead to productive sensemaking. In other 
words, the formulation of a hypothesis – even if incorrect – may be better than having no 
hypothesis at all (Dörner 1996). A working hypothesis may help organizational members 
coordinate information-gathering and task distribution duties, and may induce activation 
(and reduce panic) among individuals facing an unexpected crisis situation, even if task 
distribution and other arrangements must be altered later in the face of new information. 
For example, research on medical diagnostics has indicated that, faced with a limited num-
ber of symptoms and signs, physicians almost instantly develop hypotheses about a patient’s 
illness based on their previous knowledge structures. The generation of hypotheses is fol-
lowed by a stage in which the physician engages in active information search and compares 
and tests hypotheses against the presence or absence of further symptoms (Charlin, Tardif & 
Boshuizen 2000; Elstein, Schulman & Sprafka 1978). Without initial working hypotheses, 
however, the subsequent updating and testing might follow a haphazard path, possibly 
passing over important questions or information. 
In sum, based on the existing literature concerning sensemaking and working hypothe-
ses, we suggest that (1) teams and organizations responsible for responding to crisis events 
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are likely to be well-trained in the application of existing protocols; (2) initial collective 
sensemaking triggers the activation of trained protocols and their underlying hypotheses; 
and (3) in mindful organizations, the appearance of and careful consideration of informa-
tion incongruent with working hypotheses will trigger the updating of those hypotheses. We 




According to The 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 4), ‘On September 11, 2001, 19 men were 
aboard four transcontinental flights. They were planning to hijack these planes and turn 
them into large guided missiles, loaded with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel’. The men hi-
jacked, in order, American Airlines flight 11, United Airlines flight 175, American Airlines 
flight 77 and United Airlines flight 93. The men took control of all four flights within a time-
span of forty-four minutes. 
The organization responsible for coordinating the air defense of the northeast quadrant of 
the United States on that day was the Northeast Air Defense sector (NEADS), based in 
Rome, New York. As part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 
NEADS’ primary mission was to defend its sector against external attacks (9/11 Report, 
2004: 16). In order to facilitate its mission, NEADS could order fighter aircraft into action 
from two locations: Otis Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley 
Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia. 
During an aircraft hijack, NEADS personnel were expected to follow a clear hijack pro-
tocol that involved coordinating information and action with the Federal Aviation Admini-
stration (FAA), mainly through communication with air traffic controllers. As detailed in 
The 9/11 Commission Report (2004: 18), the protocol in place for responding to a hijacking 
presumed that: 
•  The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to 
disappear from radar; 
•  There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate NORAD 
and FAA chains of command; and 
•  The hijacking would follow the traditional form of requests for demands to 
be met, and not follow the form of converting a commercial jet into a guided 
missile. 
The organizational structure of NEADS on that day, in terms of active operational per-
sonal, included a crew of approximately thirty-six (about thirty Americans and six Canadi-
ans) who worked on the NEADS operations center floor (Bronner 2006). These individuals 
worked in separate functional areas, including the ID (information) Section, Radar Control, 
Weapons Team, and hierarchical command positions. They were expecting a day of train-
ing. 
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Data 
In order to examine the pattern of sensemaking at NEADS on September 11, 2001, we used 
data primarily from two sources: The 9/11 Commission Report (2004), and a subsequent 
article titled ’9/11 Live: The NORAD Tapes’ by Michael Bronner (2006). The 9/11 report is 
the final report of the national commission established to investigate the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and much of the initial portion of that 567-page report is based on tran-
scribed audio recordings of conversations among personnel at NEADS, the Federal Aviation 
Administration and other organizations on that day. The Bronner article focuses exclusively 
on communications at NEADS; in the article, the author strives to ‘reconstruct the chaotic 
military history of that day . . . ’ (Bronner 2006). To construct his account, from the perspec-
tive of NEADS, of the 100 minutes during which the hijackings and their aftermath first 
transpired, Mr Bronner transcribed segments from thirty separate audio recordings gleaned 
from the approximately thirty hours of NEADS audio recordings provided to him by 
NORAD. Although our request for the full thirty hours of recordings has not, to date, been 
responded to by NORAD, we were able to access the actual audio recordings of the thirty 
excerpts used by Mr Bronner. 
Coding and analysis 
Of the thirty transcribed audio recordings published by Mr Bronner, we omitted two. The 
first recording concerned non-task communication before the crisis began, and the final 
recording, in our opinion, provided insufficient information to code it for our analysis. Fur-
thermore, we added transcriptions of three recordings not present in the Bronner collection 
but available from The 9/11 Commission Report. The Bronner transcripts appear in order in 
our analysis, numbered beginning with ’2’ and ending with ’29’, while the 9/11 report tran-
scripts are coded ‘a’, ‘b’ and ‘c’, respectively. The Bronner transcripts provided the hour, 
minute and second of the beginning of the recording, but The 9/11 Commission Report pro-
vided only the hour and minute. All transcripts noted the organizational affiliation or iden-
tity of the speaker(s). 
We first coded the thirty-one transcripts in our data set as to sender. The twenty-four 
transcripts of communications by NEADS members appear in Table 1. Only transcripts of 
communications by NEADS members are included in our analysis of working hypotheses. 
The seven remaining transcripts concern information sent by parties outside NEADS, and 
appear in Table 2. Of these seven transcripts, six were taken from the Bronner collection and 
one was taken from The 9/11 Commission Report. 
In the second step of our coding, we examined the twenty-four transcripts for similari-
ties as to the apparent working hypothesis contained in the communications. Examination 
revealed three distinct hypotheses. The most obvious cluster of transcripts (transcripts 2, 3, 
7, 12 and 15) involved comments or questions about training. Given that an actual commer-
cial passenger airplane hijacking had not occurred in the United States in a decade, few if 
any NEADS personnel had ever been involved in responding to an actual hijacking. As the 
events of the morning unfolded, several comments were made to ascertain the training 
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versus ‘real world’ status of the information, indicating the initial belief that the situation 
was a training exercise. 
The training hypothesis quickly gave way to the realization that an actual hijacking had 
occurred, and that trained protocols were the appropriate response (transcripts 4, 6, 8, 10, 
13 and 16). For example, transcript 8 indicates that a classical hijacking script had been 
triggered consisting of the sequence of events in which, after some initial turmoil, the hi-
jackers would land the airplane and make public their demands. Protocols for ‘normal’ 
hijackings, as detailed above, were followed even as news of multiple hijackings was shared 
by NEADS members (transcripts 13 and 16). 
The third cluster of transcripts indicated the realization that the hijackings were actu-
ally attacks and would not follow the normal sequence of diverted aircraft and pronounce-
ments of hijackers’ demands. This cluster of transcripts is anchored by transcript ‘a’, which 
immediately follows the realization of NEADS members that the second aircraft, United 175, 
had crashed into the World Trade Center (although NEADS knew of the first crash, mem-
bers were at this time unsure if the aircraft was a commercial flight or a small civilian air-
craft). After the communication noted in transcript ‘a’, the possibility that the United States 
was under attack gradually began to be accepted as the dominant working hypothesis. In 
fact, only one subsequent transcript, transcript 16, can arguably be categorized as incongru-
ent with this hypothesis. The next transcript, number 17, indicates a clear deviation from 
standard hijack protocol. All following transcripts are consistent either with this deviation or 
specifically with the attack hypothesis. 
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The three working hypotheses, indicated by clusters of transcripts, are depicted over 
time in Figure 1. Our rationale for each coding decision for each transcript is shown in Table 
2. 
Discussion 
Members of organizations responsible for responding to critical events are typically well-
trained in the application of protocols and routines when the detection of a known event is 
registered (Creed, Stout & Roberts 1993). Based on the details provided in the 9/11 Commis-
sion Report, it is evident that NEADS members were well-trained in the hijack protocol 
developed to coordinate operations between NORAD/NEADS and the FAA. This protocol 
included working with a designated FAA hijack coordinator, and assumed that pilots would 
‘squawk 7500’ – the agreed-on universal code for hijack – on their transponders in order to 
facilitate NORAD’s (and thus NEADS’) ability to track the aircraft. Fighter jets would then 
linger five miles behind the hijacked aircraft in order to monitor the aircraft’s flight path 
(The 9/11 Commission Report 2004: 17). 
The members of NEADS clearly expected the scheduled training simulation, which 
would possibly involve practicing the hijack protocol, to take place on the morning of Sep-
tember 11. Their initial queries of others about the ‘real-world’ nature of the unfolding 
events that day, along with their subsequent speculation about the events being part of a 
simulation, is indicative of the initial training mindset. Alerted to a hijacking, NEADS mem-
bers’ initial sensemaking called for the immediate application of the hijack protocol for 
which they had been trained, but the abandonment of the training hypothesis took signifi-
cantly more time. Thus, two hypotheses were simultaneously active – the hypothesis that 
this was an unusual, multi-aircraft hijacking simulation, and the hypothesis that the hijack-
ings were real. The central assumption for both hypotheses was that the hijack protocol was 
the appropriate response. 
Notification of the third hijacking triggered significant and mindful hypothesis updat-
ing at NEADS. At that point in time, the training hypothesis had been abandoned – NEADS 
members realized that the events of the day were real. NEADS members combined informa-
tion about the World Trade Center impacts (including information from a false report that a 
small civilian aircraft had hit the first tower) and the third hijacking, and made sense of the 
situation with a new hypothesis: the area for which they were responsible was under coor-
dinated attack. The normal hijack protocol was subsequently abandoned, as evident in the 
significant deviations from that protocol which subsequently occurred, in terms of request-
ing that fighter jets ‘intercept’ and ‘divert’ hijacked aircraft, rather than simply follow them. 
The hypothesis updating was somewhat tentative at first, and focused only on the defense of 
the New York City area; later efforts to move fighter jets to other locations indicated a 
broadening of the application of the attack hypothesis. The request for authority to shoot 
down the hijacked aircraft was the most significant and dramatic deviation from the hijack 
protocol during the time we investigated. 
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Connections to previous work 
Our analysis indicates that the process of sensemaking under environmental turmoil is not a 
simple unitary process in which the understanding of the situation is constructed in a linear, 
cumulative manner. Instead, at least in terms of the NEADS members, sensemaking pro-
ceeded in a stepwise fashion, with three different working hypotheses consecutively surfac-
ing as more information became available over time. The indication seems to be that an 
organization must first begin the process of discarding previous conceptions of the situation 
in order to fully embrace a new account that is better supported by emergent, accumulating 
evidence. This process of discarding outdated understandings and constructing new ones is 
a process characterized by transition periods in which evidence is interpreted in multiple 
ways and different possibilities are left open. 
Our work is thus quite congruent with Kathleen Sutcliffe’s conceptualization of sense-
making as a non-linear, iterative process in adaptive organizations (Sutcliffe 2001: 219). The 
analysis of collective sensemaking is also congruent with Isabella’s (1990) conclusion that 
“determining what an event means appears to be a process of going through a series of 
interpretative stages” (Isabella 1990: 33) and Weick et al.’s (2005) conceptualization of 
sensemaking as a “continued redrafting of an emerging story” (2005: 415). However, elabo-
rating on this redrafting process, we identify it here as a discontinuous process in which the 
development of ‘the story’ resembled an iterative practice of generating and rejecting work-
ing hypotheses. 
Previous accounts of team behavior dubbed ‘talking to the room’ suggest that sharing 
(shouting) relevant incoming information to the room at large is an effective, economical 
method to facilitate collective sensemaking. That ‘talking to the room’ occurred is evident 
from the actual audio recordings. The pitch and intensity of vocalizations by NEADS mem-
bers announcing, for example, “Okay, he said threat to the cockpit!” make clear that the 
information was intended for multiple people in the room – a point also noted by Bronner 
(2006: 266). 
Future work 
Our work describes a non-linear pattern of working hypothesis activation and updating, 
embedded within sensemaking and facilitated by talking to the room. It is important to note, 
however, that this scenario was most likely transpiring in multiple locations, simultane-
ously, on September 11, 2001. Boston Center FAA, NORAD, NEADS and Air Force bases 
constituted a network of inter-team connections, and teams in each organization activated 
and updated their own, unique versions of working hypotheses during sensemaking. While 
inter-organizational protocols were designed to smooth coordination across these teams 
and their organizations, it seems likely that the timing of activating and discarding or updat-
ing these protocols was different across teams and organizations. The difference in timing, 
coupled with possible differences in the content of working hypotheses, may have led to 
some of the confusion that transpired on that day. Future work should investigate the role of 
meta-sensemaking processes – making sense of multiple, simultaneous versions of the same 
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events – and how networks of teams and organizations might benefit from such processes 
during extreme crises. 
Within teams and organizations, future researchers should closely examine how and 
when working hypotheses emerge, and if and when these hypotheses help or hinder sense-
making efforts. As we discussed previously, some existing evidence suggests that having an 
incorrect hypothesis may be better than having no hypothesis at all; conversely, clinging to 
an incorrect hypothesis in the face of disconfirming information may prohibit an effective 
response under time pressured situations. Future work should investigate the characteristics 
of these working hypotheses, the times at which they emerge, and other pertinent dimen-
sions to develop a more full understanding of the role of working hypotheses during crisis 
situations. 
Similarly, a concentrated research effort should be focused on understanding more 
about the influence of disconfirming information on the motivation of teams and their or-
ganizations to update strongly-held working hypotheses. How much incongruent informa-
tion is enough to reach a threshold of implausibility? How does the timing of receipt and 
other characteristics of incongruent information interact with characteristics of the working 
hypotheses to trigger a reconsideration of plausibility? Finally, how does training in the use 
of standard protocols facilitate or inhibit updating triggers? While researchers have investi-
gated issues inducing individuals to switch from automatic to active cognitive processing 
(e.g., Louis & Sutton 1991), further work could be done in terms of developing a more com-
plete understanding of collective hypothesis updating in ambiguous, complex crisis condi-
tions. 
One way to move toward such an understanding involves the overlaying of objective 
time upon the subjective sensemaking experiences of individuals, teams and organizations, 
as we have attempted to illustrate with our study. Time may seem to speed forward or to 
stand still for the participants embedded within an unfolding crisis, and combining their 
subjective temporal experiences with an objective temporal record of actions and communi-
cations may help to inform our understanding of subjective experiences of objective time – a 
notion that could prove critical in understanding more about what perceptions motivate 
people to drop initial hypotheses in favor of updated ones, and how they do so. For example, 
if subjective time moves more slowly than objective time for individuals experiencing a 
highly ambiguous and consequential situation, their perceptions regarding the amount of 
time remaining to gather more information or re-check existing assumptions may not be 
appropriate for the situation. The match or mismatch between subjective temporal experi-
ence and the unfolding of events in objective time, and the relationship to overall effective-
ness, could prove to be a rich area for future investigation. 
Limitations 
As previously mentioned, our analysis here is limited by our access to data. We used the 
audio recordings and transcripts provided by two sources as our data, but it is possible that 
having access to the complete audio recordings made at NEADS on September 11, 2001 
would add detail to our understanding of sensemaking processes employed that day. Addi-
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tionally, in our analyses of the NEADS audio excerpts, we have assumed that the perceptions 
and interpretations we inferred from the excerpts were more or less shared by all NEADS 
personnel present. This may be a simplification of reality, as different members may have 
concurrently held distinct interpretations about the same event (Gephart 1997). However, 
the practice of ‘talking to the room’ seems to indicate at least basic agreement of the inter-
pretation of events, since we did not encounter evidence of overt disagreement within the 
excerpts. Finally, while we took care in categorizing the transcripted communications at 
NEADS, our categorizing decisions may have been influenced by our own reading and inter-
pretation of the sensemaking literature. 
Conclusion 
As others have noted, there is a certain tension between different schools of thought regard-
ing how organizations should best prepare for crises. One school, referred to as High Reli-
ability Theory (HRT), maintains that, through system redundancy and training, high-stakes 
organizations responsible for keeping complex systems in stasis can safely approach error-
free performance. The other school, referred to as Normal Accident Theory (NAT), is based 
on Perrow’s fundamental view that in complex, tightly-coupled systems, accidents and 
ensuing crises will eventually be unavoidable (Perrow 1984; see also Bain 1999). While it 
seems to us that the schools adopt either a short-term or a long-term view, respectively, of 
potential crisis occurrence, the events of September 11, 2001 certainly underscore the fact 
that even the best protocols and the most highly trained operators cannot possibly anticipate 
all possible permutations of crises they may face. We do not mean to suggest that training is 
therefore of no use. However, leaders and trainers of teams and organizations charged with 
responding to crises may do well to focus extended training effort on simulations that re-
quire the abandonment of normal protocols in order to successfully complete the mission. 
Content area experts may be well-versed in designing appropriate protocols and routines for 
the crises they can imagine or anticipate, but inviting designers outside the content area to 
‘blue sky’ about potential crises (see Mitroff, Pearson, & Harrington 1996) may provide the 
new perspectives necessary in order to train ‘out of the box’ thinking, or ‘mindfulness’ in 
addition to successful protocol activation. 
The day of September 11, 2001 began much as any other in the United States. For 
NEADS, it transformed what was to be just another training day into the ‘real world’ in a 
way that, for all but the most sequestered of strategic defense thinkers in the country, was 
unimaginable. Protocols were in place, but they did not fit the evolving pattern of events. By 
applying objective time to their emergent awareness, we can see the processes of sensemak-
ing in action as the members of NEADS struggle to fit their accounts of themselves as de-
fenders of their sector to the facts as they emerge. They shift their roles from observer to 
defender to pre-emptive attacker through the narrative patterning, through making sense of 
what seems, initially, to be inexplicable. In the space of minutes, and from chaos, they do 
what human beings are still uniquely capable of doing: they make sense. 





1) The portions of each of these excerpts that involve working hypotheses active at NEADS over time form the 
basis for our data. We listened to all of these excerpts and checked them against the transcripts published by Mr 
Bronner. We have no reason to believe that Mr Bronner’s choice of the thirty audio excerpts biases our ability to 
ascertain the working hypotheses at NEADS over time. When possible, we verified the Bronner transcripts with 
information published in The 9/11 Commission Report. Additionally, we augmented the thirty Bronner tran-
scripts with additional information from the 9/11 report, and in one instance added our own transcribed infor-
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Crisis management teams are consisting of highly trained professionals often coming to-
gether for a short time to quickly respond to a situation characterized by high levels of com-
plexity and dynamism. Previous research has indicated the importance for such teams to 
rapidly construct, share, and maintain an appropriate understanding of their task situa-
tion—in other words; they need to establish team situation awareness (Waller, Gupta, & 
Giambatista, 2004; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2005). In the present chapter we take a 
communication perspective to assessing team situation awareness communication (Keyton, 
Beck, & Asbury, 2010). In a study of 12 multidisciplinary crisis management teams perform-
ing a crisis management simulation, we investigate the structure, antecedents, and conse-
quences of team situation awareness communication. Our findings indicate that the team 
communication process can be divided into two phases. An initial phase aimed at setting the 
structure of the meeting and sharing individually held information and a second decision 
making phase in which the teams focus on making decisions on actions to take. Our results 
indicate that, compared to average-performing teams, high performing teams spent more 
time on the initial phase and made decisions more rapidly in the decision making phase. 
Moreover, high-performing teams engaged in more collective interpretation processes dur-
ing the decision making phase compared to average-performing teams and use of the white-
board during the meetings influenced the extent to which teams engaged in collective inter-
pretation processes. 
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Introduction 
Teams are often responsible for managing complex dynamic systems, and especially when 
these systems deviate from their regular functioning, the team members face the vital task 
of diagnosing the state of the system in order to bring it back into stable operation (Weick et 
al., 2005; Waller et al., 2004). For example, crisis management teams must rapidly construct 
an understanding of an emergency situation in order to timely dispatch available re-
sources—e.g. ambulances, fire engines, and emergency facilities—to the appropriate loca-
tions (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977; Smith & Dowell, 2000). Nuclear 
power plant control teams must gain a holistic understanding of the system and its devia-
tions in order to coordinate their actions and bring it back into stasis (Hogg, Knut, Strand-
Volden, & Torralba, 1995; Waller et al., 2004). Medical teams must rapidly form a diagnosis 
of the physical condition of a patient in order to effectively handle a medical emergency 
situation (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Tschan, Semmer, Gautschi, Hunziker, Spychiger, & Marsch, 
2006). And finally, management teams must continuously make sense of their environments 
in order to timely adapt their organizations to rapidly changing external circumstances 
(Bogner & Barr, 2000; Bourgeois, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989; Nosek & McNeese, 1997; Suttclife, 
1994; Thompson, 1967). 
For such teams—operating in complex and dynamic environments, and facing ill-
structured problems—making sense out of the flow of events constitutes an essential aspect 
of their task (Weick et al., 2005). While engaging in active task execution, team members 
must construct and continually update their understanding of the dynamic task situation as 
it unfolds over time. Moreover, in order for the team members to align their actions with 
one another and to function as an integrated entity, team members must share crucial as-
pects of their situation understanding (Endsley, 1995; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha,, 
1995; Rico, Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008). A team’s awareness and understanding of a 
complex and dynamic situation has been referred to in the literature as team situation 
awareness (TSA) and the process teams apply to gain TSA as team situation assessment 
(Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers, & Stout, 2000; Endsley, 1995). In this paper we focus on a 
pivotal aspect of team situation assessment, namely the formation of team situation aware-
ness through communication processes within the team. Although the importance of the 
formation of team level situation awareness has been widely acknowledged (Gutwin & 
Greenberg, 2004; Rico et al., 2008; Roth, Multer, & Raslear, 2006; Waller et al., 2004), little 
is known about the team processes underlying its development. 
In addition, a number of calls have been made for the inclusion of temporal aspects in 
theories and studies of group and team processes, and scholars have posed numerous tem-
poral characteristics of team communication behaviors (e.g. Ancona, Okhuysen, & Perlow, 
2001; Arrow, Poole, Henry, Wheelan, & Moreland, 2004). However, Ballard, Tschan, & 
Waller (2008) noted that, despite these widely recognized calls “this variety of possible 
temporal patterns is not well reflected in group process research, even in studies where the 
group process is directly observed” (p.337). Therefore, in the present study we take a tempo-
171 Chapter 6 
 
ral approach to studying the team communication process. Notably, we investigate three 
temporal aspects of team processes that have been found to be important for understanding 
team functioning: the occurrence of phases in the team communication process (Gersick, 
1988; Poole 1983), characteristics of team interaction patterns—reoccurring sequences of 
team members’ communication actions—(Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009; Waller, 
Zijlstra, & Philips, 2007), and the effect of the timing of specific types of team communica-
tion in the team communication process (Tschan et al., 2006; Waller, 1999). 
We investigate the team communication process aimed at the formation of team situa-
tion awareness and team decision making of 12 multidisciplinary crisis management teams 
performing in an emergency management simulation. Building on the theory of situation 
awareness developed by Endsley (1995) in combination with a communication perspective 
on team cognition (Keyton et al., 2010; Waller, 1999; Tschan, et al., 2009), we investigate 
the structure, antecedents, and consequences of team situation awareness communication 
(TSA-C). The following section details the boundary conditions of the paper. Then, we 
review pertinent literature on TSA and provide a linkage between the cognitive notion of 
TSA and three levels of team communication. After this we present hypotheses and describe 
a study of 12 emergency system command teams. In our analyses we combine an exploratory 
approach—assessing the phase structure in the team communication process—with a hy-
pothesis testing approach—testing the antecedents and consequences of TSA-C. Finally, we 
provide a discussion of the results and implications for future research and practice. 
Theoretical background 
Boundary conditions 
Although the different types of teams enumerated in the introduction of this paper stem 
from rather disparate fields, there are some clear overlapping aspects in the characteristics 
of the teams as well as in the challenges they face. Therefore, we would like to point out five 
characteristics that serve as boundary conditions for the theory development and testing in 
the remainder of this paper. 
A first point to note is that the teams we focus on in this study consist of experienced 
professionals. Whether they are medical teams, pilot teams, or crisis management teams, 
team members have received extensive training and hold an accumulated body of experi-
ence in functioning in comparable task situations. Research on expertise in problem solving 
indicates that experienced task performers are more effective in filtering information and 
more rapid in assessing underlying causes of problems than novice task performers (Larkin, 
McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). Moreover, through extensive training team members 
are likely to develop efficient routines and operating procedures they can rapidly put to 
practice when the situation has been appropriately assessed (Klein, 1993; Rasmussen, 1990). 
Second, the present study concerns temporal “swift starting” teams. McKinney, Barker, 
Davis, and Smith (2005) describe swift starting teams as consisting of well-trained profes-
sionals with no or limited knowledge of others on the team, that must perform immediately 
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as they face high stakes from the beginning. In high-stakes environments—such as medical 
or crisis management environments—where teams have to form rapidly in response to an 
unexpected problem, teams are often composed of those organizational members that are 
available at the moment, and hence may have no or limited previous experience in working 
together (Tschan et al., 2006; Faraj & Xiao, 2006). Swift starting teams do not have time to 
go through typical team development processes and therefore have to rely on pre-existing 
structures and quickly establish interaction patterns in order to immediately engage in task 
performance upon the formation of the team. Waller and co-authors (2007) found in a study 
of aviation crews that these swift starting teams establish patterns of interaction very early 
in their work and that significant differences existed between interaction patterns of effec-
tive and ineffective teams. 
Third, the specific challenges faced by these teams stem, to a large extent, from the 
high levels of complexity and dynamism of the environments in which they function. In 
highly complex environments, a large amount of variety and interrelatedness of elements 
encumbers the formation of an understanding of the situation and therefore necessitates 
that teams engage in extensive interpretive or diagnostic activity in order to be able to take 
effective action (Nosek & McNeese, 1997; Weick, 1995). Environmental dynamism implies 
that “the state of the world changes, both autonomously and as a consequence of the deci-
sion maker’s actions” (Brehmer, 1992: 211). In dynamic environments, information is often 
uncertain or incomplete and crucial facts only become available as time progresses and the 
situation unfolds (Orasanu & Connelly, 1993). Moreover, team actions, task situations, and 
information availability are tightly interconnected; actions may change the task situation as 
well as allow for team members to obtain feedback and acquire additional data (Orasanu & 
Connelly, 1993; Weick, 1988). Since, under such circumstances, failures to make timely 
decisions and take appropriate actions may quickly result in adverse consequences, teams 
are under significant time pressure to rapidly form a practicable understanding of the situa-
tion (Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, 2009; Waller et al., 2004). 
Fourth, as the previous two conditions already indicated a defining characteristic of the 
teams studied in this paper is their preoccupation with speed. Although an accurate and 
shared understanding of a crisis situation is important for effective performance, such high-
reliability teams often do not have sufficient time to exchange and discuss all information. 
Given the rapidly changing dynamics of the task situation, actions must sometimes be taken 
without completely accurate and shared understanding. As Weick (1995) indicated, ‘‘(w)e 
might expect that speed, rather than a ‘constant and close look,’ would dominate whenever 
anyone has to adapt to complex cue patterns’’ (p. 58). Therefore, unlike other teams that 
work under less time-pressure—think for example of policy makers dealing with “global 
warming”—the fact that in these teams time is a very “scarce resources” is likely to have a 
profound impact on the particular dynamics of the communication within these teams. 
Fifth, in the present study we focus on team processes that occur during transition pe-
riods. Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) argue that teams alternate between action and 
transition phases. Whereas during action phases teams engage in the actual execution of 
team goal attainment, during transition periods, teams engage in planning and preparations 
that facilitate the task execution during the action stages. The teams that are the subject of 
the present study should be distinguished from more generally studied work teams in that 
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their purpose lies particularly in the optimization of these transition processes. The teams 
that are studied consist of high-level command teams of a multi-disciplinary multi-team 
system responsible for the management of large scale emergency operations. These com-
mand teams consist of the team leaders of the lower-level component teams. The goals of 
the team meetings are the sharing of information, the development of a shared understand-
ing of the task situation, and the coordination of actions. Whereas these command teams are 
responsible for the execution of the emergency management operation, the actual action 
processes—the processes that are directly related to the combating of the incident—are 
executed by the lower-level field teams. So, during an actual crisis management operation, 
the command team members alternate between in-field periods and team meetings. During 
the in-field periods they gather information and provide commands and instructions to their 
own component team. During the team meetings, which are the focus of the present study, 
they engage in transition processes aimed at facilitating the action processes of the crisis 
management operation (Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2011). 
Team situation assessment and team situation awareness 
Despite the prevalence of teams functioning in such dynamic and complex environments, 
research on team cognition has mainly focused on relatively stable individual and team level 
knowledge structures, without explicitly articulating the cognitive processes in which team 
members individually and collectively engage (Salas & Fiore, 2004). Therefore, as a first 
step towards a dynamic account of team cognition, we make a distinction between the gen-
eral long term knowledge that is embedded in individuals’ cognitive structures—generally 
indicated as schemas, scripts or mental models—and the more specific and short term TSA 
that comprises the dynamic understanding of a specific situation (Bolman, 1980; Cooke et 
al., 2000; Orasanu, 1990; Salas et al., 1995; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996). Bolman 
argued that flight crews develop a ‘theory of the situation’—a set of goals, beliefs, and be-
haviors that provide a coherent picture of what is happening and what action is appropriate” 
(1980: 32). Bolman explicitly distinguished these ephemeral ‘theories of the situation’ from 
the more stable and long-term ‘theories of practice’, which consist of cognitive patterns that 
enable individuals to construct a coherent understanding of a situation. Similarly, Cooke 
and colleagues (2000) refer to team situation models as the team’s collective understanding, 
constructed from the team members’ mental models but also incorporating specific informa-
tion from the current situation. Since task situations change, new information becomes 
available, old information becomes superseded or forgotten, and understanding develops 
over time, TSA is subject to continuous change during a team’s task performance episode 
(Nosek & McNeeese, 1997; Weick, 1995). Therefore, TSA can be characterized as what 
Marks, Mathieu, and Zaccaro (2001) called a team emergent state— a dynamic property of 
the team that varies as a function of team context, inputs, processes, and outcomes. 
Scholars have suggested that team knowledge structures are particularly important for 
team coordination—the attunement of individual team members’ actions toward goal di-
rected performance (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, 
Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Rico and colleagues (2008) argue that the dynamic knowl-
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edge structures a team develops while engaging in task performance constitute a more 
proximal antecedent for implicit coordination—coordination based on the tacit anticipation 
and adjustment to the actions and needs of other team members—than the more general 
team mental models. Agreeing upon a mutually understood label of the situation constitutes 
an important coordination mechanism for teams consisting of interdependent highly trained 
individuals (Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Rico et al., 2008). When team members have different 
roles and are trained to execute different functions within the team they are likely to de-
velop distinct yet compatible procedural knowledge structures, allowing each of them to 
effectively execute their individual tasks while at the same time coordinating their activities 
with the other team members (Banks & Millwards, 2007; Marks, Sabella, Burke, & Zaccaro, 
2002). 
The link between TSA and team coordination proposed by Rico and colleagues (2008) 
can be explained by combining the notions of script theory and coordination. According to 
script theory, different situational labels—so called script headers—are likely to trigger 
different action repertoires from procedural memory (Bowers, Black, & Turner, 1979; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977). Similarly, in an organization in which behaviors are strongly 
guided by pre-established procedures, situation labels will be associated with specific pro-
cedures and procedures of individual members or entities are developed in such a way that 
they are compatible with each other. Therefore, the collective attachment of a specific label 
to the situation ensures that in each team member those unique procedural knowledge 
structures will be triggered that will lead to the interlocking coordinated actions the team 
requires to execute its task as an integrated entity (Poole, Gray, & Gioia, 1990; Zohar & 
Luria, 2003). For example, when a crisis management team categorizes an emergency situa-
tion as ‘class A’, fire fighters will extinguish the fire from a distance and medical personnel 
will stay put until they get the opportunity to take care of casualties, while if the situation is 
classified as ‘class B’ the fire fighters will fight the fire at close quarters and medical person-
nel will take immediate care of the wounded. Although the exact meaning attached to the 
labels may differ among the team members, collective acceptance of the label and compati-
bility in their procedural knowledge structures enables the team members to effectively 
coordinate their activities (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994). 
However, apart from this implicit form of coordination based on relatively automatic 
script based processing, teams may be faced with situations that cannot be directly catego-
rized under predefined labels. In such situations, teams must engage in active TSA-C 
through which they share information about the situation, influence each others’ under-
standing, and co-construct their situation awareness (Stout et al., 1996; Weick, 1995). This 
form of active TSA-C is closely related to team sensemaking “the process by which a team 
manages and coordinates its efforts to explain the current situation and to anticipate future 
situations” (Klein, Wiggins, & Dominguez, 2010, p. 304). In the next sections we discuss 
more thoroughly the nature and the communication practices that may lead to high quality 
TSA. 
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Three levels of TSA-C: facts, interpretations, and anticipations 
The existing literature has indicated two facets of TSA that are important for team function-
ing: TSA similarity and accuracy (Salas et al, 1995). Similarity refers to the extent to which 
TSA is shared (similar) among the team members. TSA accuracy refers to the extent to 
which the awareness of the situation matches the actual state of that situation (Endsley, 
1995; Mosier and Chidester, 1991). However, whereas accuracy may be important in rela-
tively simple and straightforward situations, in more complex and ambiguous situations it is 
often not possible to objectively know what the situation is and to compare team members’ 
understanding of the situation with a ‘true’ accurate view of it. Situation assessment in such 
situations more closely resembles the notion of sensemaking, which emphasizes the idiosyn-
cratic and subjective nature of the processes of giving meaning to and constructing an un-
derstanding of the situation (Weick, 1995). Literature on sensemaking seems to suggest that 
it is not as much TSA accuracy but rather, a rich understanding of the situation that enables 
teams and organizations to be prepared for a wide variety of possible situations (Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Weick et al., 2005). 
In the theory of situation awareness, this richness of the situation understanding is im-
plicitly addressed in Endsley’s (1995) distinction between three levels of situation aware-
ness. Endsley argued that situation awareness can be distinguished into three hierarchically 
ordered levels: the first level pertains to the perception of the individual elements in the 
environment, the second level to the integration or interpretation of the elements into a 
comprehension of the current situation, and the third level refers to the projection and 
anticipation of future states. In the next section we will first introduce a communication 
perspective on team cognition, then we will link the three levels of TSA posed by Endsley to 
teams’ knowledge sharing and collective interpretation processes and we will build hy-
potheses that link these processes to team performance. 
TSA and team communication 
Whereas in the previous sections we have provided a dynamic depiction of the product of 
team situation awareness, we now will turn to a discussion of the process of TSA-C—how 
team situation awareness is created, maintained, and adjusted over time through team 
communication. Keyton and co-authors (2010) propose a communication perspective on 
team cognition that recognizes communication as a macro-cognitive process (Letsky, War-
ner, Fiore, & Smith, 2008) and emphasizes that meaning is developed in interaction. They 
propose a research methodology that takes team communication as a reflection of team 
cognition. Although team cognition may entail team members’ individual knowledge struc-
tures and cognitive processes, collective meaning is created in group dialogue and hence 
communication can be seen as a window into group cognition. Cooke, Gorman, and Kiekel 
(2008) make a distinction between ‘in the head’ and ‘between the head’ approaches to as-
sessing team cognition. Whereas an ‘in the head’ approach to team cognition focuses on the 
characteristics of team members knowledge structures as input to team processes, a ‘be-
tween the head’ approach locates team cognition in the interaction processes occurring 
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among the team members. They conclude that “we . . . propose that communication is not 
just a window into team cognition, but that communication is cognitive processing at the 
team or group level” (p.54, 2008). 
Integrating a communication perspective on team cognition with situation awareness 
theory of Endsley (1995), in the next section we will build a number of hypotheses linking 
specific TSA-C processes to team performance. First, individual team members’ communica-
tion behaviors can be categorized as falling under one of the three levels of TSA information 
and the extent to which team members engage in these types of communication is likely to 
have an impact on team functioning. Second, we argue that not only the amount of TSA 
information a team exchanges but also the extent to which teams engage in collective versus 
individual interpretation processes is likely to have an impact on team performance. Fur-
thermore, we identify antecedents that may influence the extent to which a team engages in 
collective interpretation processes. 
Hypotheses 
Team information sharing is the introduction of members’ individually held knowledge into 
the team’s public space. It refers to the simple exchange of privately held information about 
the task situation with the other members of the team. By exchanging information about the 
situation, teams may not yet create a shared understanding of the task situation but a shared 
body of information may constitute the input for higher level situation awareness formation. 
Studies on cooperative work teams have observed the practice of ‘talking to the room’, in 
which team members express out loud new information not directed at a specific individual 
but instead to the room at large (Artman & Waern, 1999; Heath & Luff, 1992; Waller & Uit-
dewilligen, 2008). By expressing information aloud in this manner, teams create common 
ground—a shared knowledge base combined with the awareness that the knowledge is 
shared—that can serve as an input for collective sensemaking (Clark & Brennan, 1991; 
Krauss & Fussell, 1991). 
A wide variety of studies indicates that information sharing is a pivotal team process 
with a substantial impact on team performance. In a recent meta-analysis, including a wide 
variety of teams and tasks, Mesmer-Magnus and DeChurch (2009) found a consistent posi-
tive relationship between team information sharing and team performance. However, exist-
ing research has not taken into account that different types of information can be shared 
among team members. Therefore, based on the situation awareness theory of Endsley 
(1995) we pose that individual team members’ information sharing behaviors can be catego-
rized as falling under one of the three levels of TSA information. 
Level one TSA information refers to basic factual information about individual ele-
ments of the situation. When team members communicate level one TSA information, they 
forward simple factual information they received about the task situation. Level two TSA 
information, on the other hand, refers to semantically enriched information that is the result 
of the integration of information elements into a comprehension of the current situation. 
Level two TSA information can be distinguished from level one information by the interpre-
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tation processes that have taken place on the information. Interpretation is about giving 
meaning to stimuli; it is the process whereby disjointed information elements are synthe-
sized into a holistic understanding of the situation (Endsley, 1995), or informational ele-
ments are linked to existing knowledge structures (Durso & Gronlund, 1999; Starbuck & 
Milliken, 1988; Weick, 1995). Accordingly some scholars have referred to this process as 
‘running’ mental models, by which they mean that information gleaned from the environ-
ment is inserted into individuals’ mental models and inferences are derived by reasoning 
according to the internal logic of the model (e.g. Banks & Millward, 2000; De Kleer & 
Brown, 1983; Klein, 1993). So, when team members communicate level two TSA informa-
tion, they share information that results from a combination of level one information and 
their previous knowledge. The third level of TSA information pertains to projections and 
anticipations of future states. This level of situation awareness extends interpretations of the 
situation with projections of how the situation will develop in the near future (Endsley, 
1995). 
Combining research on team information sharing and TSA, we expect that sharing in-
formation on the three levels of TSA is likely to contribute to the development of shared and 
high quality TSA, which will have a positive effect on team performance. Therefore, we 
propose that: 
H1: The amount of level one, level two, and level three TSA information that is shared 
within the team during a time interval will be positively related to team performance 
during that interval. 
The information sharing behaviors described above represent individual level con-
structs—they are acts of communication performed by individual team members. Simply 
looking at single communication behaviors ignores the temporal context in which these 
behaviors occur (Weingart, 1997). Although frequencies of the occurrence of these behav-
iors during a specific period may provide us with an estimation of the amount and type of 
information that is shared, it provides no information about how the team processes this 
information over time. Therefore, the exact meaning of a communication behavior should 
be considered in context of the behaviors that precede and follow it in time (Ballard et al., 
2008; Weingart, 1997). For example, level one TSA information provided in response to a 
question may indicate a different type of team communication than the same information 
provided without a specific request (e.g. Rico et al., 2008; Stachowski et al., 2009). There-
fore, we argue that in addition to the extent in which teams engage in information sharing, 
the specific form of this information sharing process also matters. More specifically we 
expect that the extent to which the teams engage in collective interpretation processing will 
be important for team performance. 
The information processing model of groups poses that just like individuals, teams col-
lectively process information by encoding, remembering, processing, and responding to 
information (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997). Much empirical research on information 
processing has focused on the role of sharing information; how group characteristics and 
the distribution of information among the group members influence what information is 
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shared among group members during group discussions (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Studies 
investigating information sharing with a so-called “hidden profile” paradigm often focus on 
the exchange of level one TSA information. In hidden profile studies information is distrib-
uted among team members in such a way that only by incorporating the unique knowledge 
of each member the team can realize the optimal decision (Stasser & Titus, 1985). Whereas 
these studies explore the conditions under which group members effectively share privately 
held information (e.g. Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998), they do not answer 
questions about the extent and form of interpretation team members conduct on informa-
tion before and during their communication with other members. As the information proc-
essing model indicates, apart from sharing information, teams also collectively process 
information by combining and integrating pieces of knowledge into higher order concep-
tions (Hinsz et al., 1997; Wegner, 1995). For example, research on collective induction 
shows that groups can derive general principles from a collection of concrete examples 
(Laughlin & Futoran, 1985). 
Team members can individually process lower level information into higher level un-
derstandings but they can also do this collectively in an interaction process taking place 
among the team members. In an experimental study, Fraidin (2004) showed that teams 
benefited when specialized team members could connect individual information elements 
before sharing them with the other team members. It can thus be efficient if team members 
individually interpret information before they share it with the other members; particularly 
if these team members are more experienced with processing this particular kind of infor-
mation (Wegner, 1991). However, there also is a risk involved in individual processing. 
Because the other members will not have access to the raw information material, they may 
not always be able to check the interpretations (Hutchins, 1995). They will not be able to 
come to different conclusions and disagree on the interpretations of the data. Therefore, 
apart from individually forming interpretations, team members may also explicitly process 
information—by speaking out loud—during interaction, thereby enabling each other to 
adjust, correct, refine and co-create higher order information from lower order information 
elements (van den Bossche, Gijsleaers, Segers, & Kirschner, 2006). Because team members 
have different background knowledge (e.g. mental models) they may apply to the informa-
tion, they may process similar pieces of information differently and consequently come to 
differing interpretations. By asking questions and publicly making inferences, group mem-
bers impact not only their own but also other members’ interpretation of that information, 
thereby engaging in deeper levels of information processing. 
A number of concepts have been posed in the literature, that tap into the notion that 
teams differ in the extent to which they engage in thorough information processing. De 
Dreu, Nijstad, and Van Knippenberg’s (2008) posed the idea of motivated information proc-
essing in groups. This theory poses that the extent to which group information processing is 
deliberate and systematic—versus shallow and heuristic—depends on the extent to which 
group members are motivated to achieve a rich understanding of the situation. Van Knip-
penberg, De Dreu, and Homan use the concept of information elaboration, which they de-
fine as “the exchange of information and perspectives, individual-level processing of the 
information and perspectives, the process of feeding back the results of this individual-level 
processing into the group, and discussion and integration of its implications” (2004, p. 1011). 
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Several studies have indicated a positive relationship between information elaboration and 
performance (e.g. Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2007; van Ginkel, Tin-
dale, & van Knippenberg, 2009). Schulz-Hardt and colleagues (2006) found that discussion 
intensity—coded as the average proportion of information mentioned, the average repeti-
tion rate of information, and the discussion time—was the primary mediator between the 
effects of dissent on group decision quality. 
In sum, in complex and ambiguous environments team information processing cannot 
be represented merely by the amount of information shared within the group but is strongly 
dependent on the extent to which a team collectively engages in higher level processing of 
the available information. We expect that in particular, team processes, in which team 
members engage in an exchange of their interpretations about the situation, will lead to 
shared and high quality TSA. Therefore, we propose that: 
H2: The extent to which the team engages in collective interpretations during a time 
interval will be positively related to team performance during that time interval. 
Team phases and the timing of TSA-C 
Previous studies on team processes over time suggest that particular clusters of team activi-
ties often occur during specific periods in the team process, suggesting the occurrence of 
segments or phases in the team process (e.g. Gersick, 1988; Poole, 1983, Tuckman, 1965). 
Poole and Holmes (1995) define a phase as “a coherent period of group interaction and 
activity that serves an identifiable function, such as a period of problem definition” (p.102). 
An often cited example of a phase structure in the team process is Gersick’s observation that 
team’s shift the nature of their activities when half of the time they have been allotted has 
been surpassed. 
Ballard and colleagues (2008) noted that although group processes are often clearly 
segmented, because the segments are not regularly distributed over time, they may not be 
identifiable by simply dividing the task in evenly distributed time intervals. Therefore, we 
expect that the global structure of the team communication process will manifest the occur-
rence of changes in the concentration of specific types of team communication over the 
complete team task episode. If similar shifts in the concentration of activities occur in most 
of the teams this suggests the existence of a phase structure in the teams’ communication: 
the existence of specific periods in which the teams engage in activities that are qualitatively 
different from the activities in the adjacent periods (Poole, 1983). Note that these shifts in 
the communication structure do not necessarily occur at the same time in all teams; teams 
may differ in the amount of time they spend in each phase and therefore also in the moment 
in time they shift from one phase to another. Previous studies on team communication 
suggest that it is not the total frequency of specific behaviors per se, but the timing of team 
behaviors that is important for successful team performance (Waller, 1999; Tschan et al., 
2006). Therefore we expect that teams will manifest an identifiable phase structure in the 
team communication process and the timing of team communication behaviors within the team 
phases will be important for team performance. Because we cannot a priori establish the 
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phase structure in the team communication processes, we do not propose a formal hypothe-
sis; instead, we will explore the teams’ phase structure to specify more precisely when in the 
teams’ communication process, specific behaviors and processes are most beneficial for 
team performance. 
Communication structuring practices and TSA 
One of the biggest challenges to crisis management teams is the balancing of sometimes 
conflicting needs for comprehensive information processing and the need to return to the 
field as rapidly as possible. In order to comply with these dual purposes, teams should opti-
mize the efficiency of their transition processes in such a way that they can maximize the 
amount and quality of information processing in the minimum amount of time. Important 
factors therefore in explaining team performance are the practices and behaviors a team 
uses to structure its communication process (Hanssen, van de Wiel, Zijlstra, Bauhus, & 
Koopmans, 2010). From the existing literature we identified three practices teams can use to 
structure their communication processes: structuring behaviors, external objects, and stan-
dardized interaction patterns. Below we will provide reasoning for the relationship between 
each type of structure and TSA communication. 
Structuring behaviors. Maier (1967) argued that in order for a group to optimize its 
decision making quality, group leaders should manage the group discussion process by 
managing the topics and information that are entered into the group discussion, by encour-
aging members to speak, by dividing speaking turns, and by managing the time. In other 
words, active structuring of the group communication process is required in order to ensure 
efficient information sharing and the integration of various viewpoints. Studies that have 
looked at the role of structuring during team discussion seem to provide support for this 
notion. Peterson (1997) found that process directiveness—the extent to which the leader 
regulates the process by which the group reaches its decision was consistently positively 
related to the quality of group processes and outcomes. In an experimental study, Stasser, 
Taylor, and Hanna (1988) found that providing a structure for group meetings increased the 
amount of information shared in decision making groups; however, this increase was due 
mainly to an increase in sharing of information that was already held by more than one 
team member. From a study that did an in depth analysis of patient review meetings, 
Hanssen and colleagues (2010) concluded that given the limited amount of time medical 
personnel can spare for meetings and given the high requirements for information sharing, 
meetings should be highly structured and efficiently organized. 
It could be argued that although high amounts of structuring behaviors may be related 
to speed and efficiency, it may also have downsides in terms of reduced openness to new 
information, flexibility and creativity. If a team leader strictly guards the meeting agenda 
and speaking turns, team members may be withheld from sharing thoughts or information 
and from making cross linkages among topics. Whereas when team leaders take a more 
yielding approach to the communication structure in the group, team members may voice a 
wider network of associations, information, and ideas. However, it should be noted that 
whereas structuring the team communication process is often considered an important 
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component of the team leader role (e.g. Maier, 1967) structuring behaviors may be per-
formed by other team members as well. Moreover, with structuring behaviors we do not 
refer to a strict adherence to fixed regulations and procedures; instead they constitute a set 
of behaviors that can be applied by the team leader and other members to control and ac-
tively guide the interaction patterns within the team. For example, structuring can be used 
to terminate a discussion on a low priority issue but also to probe members to more thor-
oughly assess a crucial issue. Instead of fixed and pre-established behavior patterns, struc-
turing actually constitutes adaptive behavior that can be used to actively guide the commu-
nication process. Therefore, we expect that, given the emphasis on speed and efficiency, 
structuring behaviors will be positively related to the extent to which a team engages in 
collective interpretation processes. 
H3a: The amount of structuring behaviors will be positively related to the extent to 
which a team engages in collective interpretation processes. 
Knowledge tool (whiteboard). Apart from structuring behaviors, teams may use 
knowledge tools, such as schema’s and whiteboards to structure the team situation assess-
ment process. In particular work on distributed cognition emphasizes the role of artifacts in 
the formation of TSA (Hutchins, 1995; Heath & Luff, 1992). For example, from an in depth 
anthropological study of a rescue command system, Artman and Garbis (1998), concluded 
that artifacts (a diary, schedule, and a whiteboard with map) played an important role in 
the formation of teams’ situation awareness as they “contain the necessary but not sufficient 
information” and therefore “team members must in addition interpret the information and 
make sense of it” (p.6). 
Use of knowledge tools seems to be beneficial not only because they structure the 
communication behaviors—such as speaking terms and sequence of topics that are dis-
cussed—but more particularly because they can provide team members with a cognitive 
structure that may help them to keep an overview of and efficiently remember the informa-
tion that is presented in the group (Fiore, Cuevas, & Oser, 2003; Suthers & Hundhausen, 
2003). This role of a whiteboard as a cognitive structuring device gains support from an 
experimental study of Rentsch, Delise, Salas, and Letsky (2010), in which they trained half 
of their teams to exchange information on an information board using schema enriched 
communication. They found that, teams in the training condition made significantly more 
use of the information board and consequently had higher quality knowledge and more 
cognitive congruence than teams in a control condition. Maier (1967) suggested that groups 
like individuals can be considered to have working memory in which they keep active the 
information that is relevant for the task. An external knowledge tool, such as a whiteboard, 
can help a team to structure its knowledge and offload the limited working memory capacity 
of the team members (Scaife & Rogers, 1996). Therefore, we suggest that: 
H3b: The use of a knowledge tool, such as a whiteboard, will be positively related to the 
extent to which a team engages in collective interpretation processes. 
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Standardized interaction patterns. A third structuring practice that has been in-
vestigated in the literature refers to the repeated use of standardized interaction patterns 
among the team members (Gersick & Hackman, 1990; Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 
1999). Interaction patterns are defined as “regular sets of verbalizations and nonverbal 
actions intended for collective action and coordination” (Stachowski et al., 2009, p. 1537). 
Interaction patterns provide structure to the team communication process by creating 
shared expectations among the members about the sequence of speaking turns and commu-
nication actions. For example, if a team leader has consistently followed up all explanations 
of a fire officer with a short summary, team members will expect this behavioral sequence to 
prevail and are likely to adjust their own behaviors to it. 
Empirical results on the effects of standardized interaction patterns on team perform-
ance are mixed. On the one hand, in their research on cockpit crew teams, Kanki and col-
leagues found that higher performing teams used more standardized interaction patterns 
(Kanki & Foushee, 1989; Kanki, Folk, & Irwin, 1991). They explain these results by speculat-
ing that closely following standardized operating procedures leads to predictable patterns 
that facilitate coordination because they allow team members to accurately predict each 
others’ behaviors. On the other hand, Stachowski and colleagues (2009), in a study on 
nuclear power plant control teams responding to a simulated crisis, found that better per-
forming teams exhibited fewer, shorter, and less complex interaction patterns. They argue 
that, although routinized interaction patterns may be beneficial under normal routine cir-
cumstance, crisis situations require teams to flexibly adjust their role structures and interac-
tion patterns. Particularly in situations requiring extensive sensemaking of ambiguous in-
formation and consisting of novel circumstances, adherence to standardized behavior may 
be detrimental because it may set teams in an automatic—versus a deliberate—processing 
mode (Louis & Sutton, 1991; Schiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore it is likely to promote 
the acceptance of existing off-the-shelve interpretations and limit a teams’ pursuit of a wider 
possibility of interpretations that may lead to a deeper more nuanced understanding of the 
situation (De Dreu, et al., 2008). Therefore, we expect that: 
H3c: The use of standardized interaction patterns will be negatively related to the ex-
tent to which a team engages in collective interpretation processes. 
Methods 
Sample 
We collected data on 12 multidisciplinary crisis management teams consisting of 9 members 
per team operating in a single inter-organizational emergency management network in the 
Port of Rotterdam region. Each team is headed by an officer of the fire brigade and in addi-
tion is comprised of another officer of the fire brigade, an officer of the police force, an 
officer of the port authority, a chemical specialist from the medical protection service, a 
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representative of the medical emergency service, a representative of the municipality, an 
information manager, and a public relations official of the police department. All partici-
pants in the simulation were active members of their respective emergency organization. 
The participants participated for training purposes and the assignment to teams was based 
on scheduling conveniences. The average age of respondents was 43.98 years (SD = 9.43), 
their average tenure was 16.20 years (SD = 12.52), and they had been member of emergency 
management teams on average for 6.82 years (SD = 6.64). All teams consisted of Dutch 
members. 
Training exercise 
We studied the teams as they performed in a training exercise consisting of a simulated 
scenario of an incident comparable to the type of incidents they would encounter in their 
role as command team members during multi-team system crisis management operations in 
the Port of Rotterdam. The scenario has been developed by a group of experts with repre-
sentatives from the various emergency services involved. Information about the scenario 
was presented to team members at pre-specified times via their individual computer screens 
or collectively via an overhead projector placed in the middle of the room. Team members 
were seated at individual work-stations containing two computers. On the first computer, 
they received role specific information and they could input commands, send messages to 
each other, and ask questions to the simulation leaders. They could use the second com-
puter for accessing the internet or their own databases to collect additional information. At 
regular intervals, team members came together in the corner of the room at a rectangular 
table in Command Place Incident (CoPI) meetings to share information, construct a shared 
understanding of the situation, and collectively make decisions. These sessions were video-
taped using two cameras and three microphones connected to the ceiling of the room. Due 
to variations across team processes, the number of collective meetings teams engaged in 
varied per team. Nine teams engaged in three collective meetings and three teams engaged 
in two collective meetings. 
Procedure 
Team members were invited to attend one of twelve—six morning and six afternoon —crisis 
management simulation sessions taking place in one year. A schematic depiction of the 
room were the exercise took place can be found in Figure 1. At the start of each session team 
members were provided with a presentation instructing them on the purpose and goal of the 
simulation, the simulation procedures, and the use of the simulation interface. In order to 
familiarize the participants with the procedures and simulation interface they started with a 
short practice scenario. After the practice scenario team members were asked to seat them-
selves at their individual work station and the main scenario was started. During the sce-
nario, participants received information about the emergency incident at pre-established 
times. Participants of the emergency services received information that corresponded with 
their role in the simulation and that was comparable to the information they would encoun-
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ter in the field during actual emergency operations. During the simulation participants 
could send short messages to each other and contact the simulation leaders to gather addi-
tional information. Apart from information presented via their computers, participants 
received scripted information from simulation leaders who played the role of field officers 
and representatives of the companies involved. Information provided to the participants 
was scripted; however, the amount and type of additional information team members could 
gather depended upon the questions they asked to the simulation leaders. The main sce-
nario lasted approximately three hours and contained two or three CoPi meetings. The team 
leader was responsible for initiating and deciding upon the duration of the CoPI meetings. 
After the simulation team members filled in a short questionnaire regarding their back-
ground and experience during the simulation. 
 


















The scenario consisted of a large scale traffic incident on a busy traffic intersection, involv-
ing multiple trucks and vehicles, chemicals (formic acid and styrene) leaking from a higher 
to a lower roadway, and multiple casualties. The scenario was developed so that each emer-
gency service organization (each team member role) would be involved in the incident. The 
chemical advisor supervised the measurement of substances and informed the other services 
on the effects and dangers associated with them. The fire brigade was responsible for rescu-
ing casualties and executing all activities that took place directly at the incident location. 
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The Port Authority provided back up of fire extinguishing powers to the fire brigade and, 
given that the location of the incidents was close to the harbor premises, they provided 
blueprints of pipelines and chemical storage facilities that could be affected by the incident. 
The medical service was responsible for treating and transporting casualties. The police 
force was responsible for clearing of the incident location, securing access routes towards 
the incident, leading civilian traffic flows away from the incident, and assessing the liability 
for the accidents. The representative of the municipality was responsible for sheltering 
civilians that had been affected by the incident and the public relations official controlled 
the release of information towards the public and press. 
The emergency services were highly interdependent in the execution of their tasks. For 
example, whereas, the medical services are in charge of treating and transporting casualties, 
they were not allowed to enter the incident area itself and therefore depended upon the fire 
brigade to rescue the wounded from the vehicles and supply initial medical care. Because of 
the complexity of the scenario and the fragmented distribution of information, it was crucial 
for the team members to share information and collectively construct a representation of the 
incident situation during the CoPI meetings. 
Not all information about the scenario became available to the team members immedi-
ately but instead information was released over time as the events in the scenario unfolded. 
The scenario was interactive to a limited extent; contingent on decisions of the team mem-
bers, the scenario could take separate directions (e.g. traffic jams could be limited to the 
extent that teams chose to divert traffic streams early on in the scenario). However, the 
overarching logic of the scenario and the main information elements remained similar inde-
pendent of the decisions taken by the teams. 
Data Coding 
Our measures of TSA-C and team interaction patterns are based on behavioral observation 
of the videotapes of the CoPI meetings. One independent coder, blind to the hypotheses, 
recorded CoPI members’ communication behaviors on activity logs while watching the 
videotapes. A second coder (the first author of this paper) coded one of the twelve simula-
tion sessions, in order to establish inter-rater reliability measures. Inter-rater reliability, 
calculated by Cohen’s Kappa’s ranged from .64 to .79 with an average of .71, indicating 
acceptable inter-rater reliabilities (Fleiss, 1981). Thus, we used the first coder’s activity logs 
for the analysis of the communication. The activity logs contained information about the 
start time of a communication behavior, the role of the team member, and the type of com-
munication behavior. The coders recoded the occurrence of the three individual level TSA-C 
behaviors (level one, two, and three) and seven other communication behaviors—
structuring, questions, affirmations, commands, proposals, decisions, and non-task related 
communication. Details regarding each coded aspect of communication appear below. 
We coded TSA-C as information that was shared with all members during the CoPI 
meetings. Although, individual cognitive processes occur in and among the minds of the 
individual team members and therefore can only be effectively studied with knowledge 
elicitation techniques (Cooke et al., 2000) team cognition processes occur among the minds 
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of team members and can therefore be accessed through analyses of team communication 
structure and content (Kennedy & McComb, 2010). When team members publicly commu-
nicate information in the CoPI meetings it can be reasonably assumed that all team mem-
bers will perceive this information and consequently it will become collective knowledge 
(Uitdewilligen & Waller, 2008; Artman & Waern, 1999). 
As indicated before, we distinguished between the three levels of team situation 
awareness that were identified by Endsley (1995). We coded level one TSA-C as occurring 
each time a team member reported a simple fact. With simple facts we refer to information 
the team members have received almost literally through the simulation and simply forward 
to other members. For example, “The driver of the first truck is heavily wounded.” In addi-
tion this category includes simple information about what actions team members have taken 
as well as informative confirming or disconfirming answers to questions. For example, in 
case a team member would ask whether the chemical substance styrene was involved in the 
incident and another member would answers with “yes” we would code this answer as level 
one TSA-C. We coded level two TSA-C as utterances referring to interpretations of the situa-
tion. With interpretations we refer to an integration of simple information elements or a 
combination of simple information and a team member’s background knowledge (Endsley, 
1995). Examples include, “Given that traffic from these two roads will come together here, 
this traffic route will be heavily overcrowded” and “these chemicals make this situation here 
very explosive.” We coded level three TSA-C as communications behaviors that include an 
anticipation of a future situation or the development of possible scenarios on how the inci-
dent could develop in the near future. Examples of this category include “If that tanker 
remains at that location, it can also catch fire” and “If these people will be in this traffic jam 
for much longer we will have to supply them with food and water.” 
Structure was coded in three ways. First, it was coded every time a behavioral action 
occurred, in which a team member created structure in the team process. More specifically, 
this category included statements specifying the agenda of the meeting, asking/allowing 
someone to talk, urging members to hurry, and inquiring whether the information is clear 
for all members. Example statements are “I propose to make a round.”, “We will come back 
to that later!”, and “Anymore questions?” So, structuring behaviors could occur by the 
leader as well as by the other members of the team. 
Second we measured structure based on whether the team made use of the whiteboard 
in order to structure their communication. We coded this form of structuring as present if 
team members actively noted down information on the whiteboard during their discussion. 
We coded whiteboard structuring as absent if team members did not write anything on the 
whiteboard, only wrote on the whiteboard before the session but not during the session, or 
only drew a sketch of the situation on the whiteboard. Seven teams actively used the white-
board while five teams did not make active use of it during their meetings. Active use of the 
whiteboard implies that the teams used the whiteboard not only before the CoPI meetings to 
write down basic information but that members’ also wrote down information and referred 
to this information during the meeting. 
Third, we coded structure as the extent to which a team’s communication occurred in a 
routinized manner, indicated by their interaction pattern complexity (Stachowski et al., 
2009). In order to assess team interaction patterns, we used THEME, a pattern recognition 
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software algorithm (Magnussen, 1996; Ballard et al., 2008). THEME software searches for 
patterns in temporally ordered event data by first searching for simple co-occurrences of 
events and then combining these into more complex hierarchically ordered patterns. As an 
input for pattern recognition we ordered the communication in a temporally ordered string 
of events containing information on the specific communication behaviors and the team 
member role associated with that communication. Consistent with previous studies using 
THEME software to derive team interaction patterns (Stachowski et al., 2009) we set the 
confidence interval to derive patterns at 0.05, indicating that patterns were only retained if 
they occurred at a less than 5 % probability level. We only retained patterns if they occurred 
at least 3 times. 
Because meeting times as well as the rate of communication to meeting time differed 
between teams, this may have an impact on the pattern statistics derived by a THEME analy-
sis. As THEME retains patterns that occur at least 3 times, the program is likely to find more 
patterns in a team with more communication utterances. For example, if a team with 200 
communication utterances uses a questions-answer-question sequences two times, it will 
not be picked up by the program; whereas, if a team with 300 communication utterances 
uses the same sequences two times in the first 200 utterances and one time in the last 100 
utterances it will be picked up. Because we are interested in the structure of the communica-
tion, independent of the total amount of communication, we first assessed the total amount 
of communication that was used by the team with the least communication utterances. 
Subsequently, for the interaction pattern analyses, we used from each team only the amount 
of communication similar to that of the team with the least communication utterances (205 
utterances). We derived indicators for the total number of different patterns, the number of 
occurrences of patterns, the average length of patterns, the average hierarchy of patterns, 
the average number of actors involved in a pattern, and the average number of switches 
between actors. A factor analysis on these measures indicated that one common factor 
accounted for 88.91 % of the variance. So, we calculated one pattern complexity factor 
consisting of the average of the z-score of these six indicators. 
Decisions were coded as a decision that closes a raised topic or problem. Thus, a deci-
sion always concluded a topic that had been raised and discussed beforehand. Examples, 
include “So, we’ll scale up the incident to level two” or “Ok, then we’ll place two contamina-
tion units, one here and one here.” Questions were coded as occurring when a team member 
requested information, including clarifications. Examples are “What kind of chemicals are 
involved in the incident?” and “What does that mean?” Affirmations were coded as occur-
ring when a person agreed to take a specific action. For example “Yes, I will do that.” Com-
mands were coded as occurring when a team member told other team members what ac-
tions they should take or what information they should gather. Examples include “So if you 
will inquire what will happen on the water then!” and “Could you draw that in here please?” 
Proposals were defined as opinions or suggestions regarding how the incident should be 
dealt with. For example, “Maybe we should call in another CoPI team” and “We can ask the 
company manager to join the meeting.” Finally, non-task related communication was coded 
as all communication behaviors that did not seem to have a direct relationship to the simula-
tion task. This would include communication about general aspects of the job or about 
colleagues, as well as jokes and laughter. 
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Sequences 
The coded communication acts described above represent individual level constructs—they 
are acts of communication performed by individual team members. Aggregation of single 
communication behaviors ignores the temporal context in which these behaviors occur 
(Weingart, 1997). Therefore, the exact meaning of a communication behavior should be 
considered in context of the behaviors that preceded it in time. For example, higher level 
TSA-C information provided in response to a question may indicate a different type of team 
communication than information provided without a specific request. Since in teams, com-
munication behaviors often occur in reaction to behaviors of other team members, we 
measure team level communication behavior as sequences of contiguous communication 
behaviors. Figure 2 displays the sequences of teams’ communication behaviors for all ses-
sions of the twelve teams. Sequences are ordered from left to right according to their tempo-
ral order and each sign represents a specific communication act. If successive communica-
tion acts are located on the same height, this suggests that they are uttered by the same 
person; if communication acts are alternately located low and high, they are uttered by 
different team members. The most basic behavioral patterns are sequences consisting of two 
subsequent communication behaviors and most communication of the CoPI teams can be 
summarized by five main two-behavior sequences: Question followed by TSA-C level 1, 
Question followed by TSA-C level 2, TSA-C level 1 and level 2 alterations, TSA-C level 2 
alterations, and Mono-actor patterns,. Together these sequences cover 65 % of all communi-
cation acts in the teams. 
Question-TSA-C sequences make up large part of the teams’ communication, occurring 
on average 66 times per team. 41 times (SD = 20.82) question- level one TSA-C and 25 times 
(SD = 8.46) question – level two TSA-C combination. The high occurrence of these se-
quences in the data suggests that in the CoPI teams, members actively probe each other for 
additional information about the incident situation. It should be noted that the here pre-
sumed order of first a question and then an information communication is based on com-
mon sense logic as it cannot be derived unambiguously from the data whether the question 
triggers the TSA-C or whether a previous TSA-C triggers a question. As can be seen in Figure 
2 often strings of repeated question-TSA-C occur suggesting the occurrence of small seg-
ments of active question driven information sharing. 
TSA-C following TSA-C by another team member occurs on average 47.22 times (SD = 
19.92) in the teams. These combinations suggest that team members are pooling informa-
tion on a specific topic, for example, as one member provides initial information and an-
other member adds an interpretation. For 32.78 occurrences this constitutes combinations of 
level one and level two TSA-C. In 14.44 (SD = 7.91) cases this constitutes combinations in 
which level two TSA-C of one team member is followed by level two TSA-C of another team 
member. These higher level TSA-C sequences indicate that teams engage in collective inter-
pretation processing, whereby team members build on, correct or add to interpretations 
made by other team members. As can be seen in Figure 2 strings of repeated combinations of 
higher level TSA-C occur suggesting that teams engage in specific periods in which they 
combine their interpretations, thereby engaging in team sensemaking activities (Klein et al., 
2010). 
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A fifth pattern, consisting of sequences of actions cannot really be considered an inter-
action pattern as it relates to sequences of behaviors from one single team member. These 
mono-actor patterns, often consisting of level two TSA-C followed by another level two TSA-
C of the same team member occur on average 24.9 times (SD = 10.65) per team. The occur-
rence of this sequence suggests that one team member is providing explanations to the other 
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Team performance. We measured team performance with a short questionnaire 
that was filled in by the simulation instructors after the team simulation exercise. Team 
functioning was judged by two instructors for six teams and by three instructors for the 
other six teams. Team performance was measured with four questions including questions 
about the general perceptions of team performance—e.g. “Can you indicate how good you 
think the performance of this team was during the crisis management simulation?”—, as 
well as indications of shared understanding of the situation— e.g. “Can you indicate to what 
extent you perceived there to be a shared understanding of the situation by the members of 
the team?” Answers were given on 7 point Likert scales. Cronbach’s Alpha over the 4 items 
was .97. RwgP(j)s calculated with a moderately skewed null distribution—given a tendency of 
the raters to give ratings on the high end of the scale—ranged from .78 to .98, with an aver-
age of .94, indicating acceptable agreement among the raters (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). 
Previous research in this area suggests that the distribution of performance is likely to be 
bimodal (Tschan, 1995; Waller, 1999; Waller et al., 2004). In addition, although the devia-
tion from normality is not significant our performance distribution also shows a bimodal 
shape. Therefore in line with previous research, teams were categorized as average or high 
performing on the basis of a median split on the performance score (Raes, Heijltjes, & 
Glunk, 2009; Tschan, 1995; Waller, 1999). 
Results 
Table 1 displays the relationship between demographic variables, use of standardized inter-
action patterns, whiteboard use, total time used by the teams, and team performance. Nota-
bly, teams with higher average tenure tend to use more time in total for the scenario. None 
of the variables was significantly related to performance.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations Between Demographics and Team Performance 
      Mean  SD  1.  2.  3.  4.  5. 
1. Average  age  43.40  3.33        
2. Average  tenure  15.07  4.40  .79**        
3. Interaction  patterns  0.00  0.94  -.41  -.38      
4. Whiteboard  use  0.58  0.51  .00  -.16 .00     
5. Total  Time  2000.83  499.19 .37  .58* -.38  -.15   
6. Performance  5.64  0.97  .34  .34  .21  .46  -.24 
Note. N = 12, 
†p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Phase structure of the team communication process 
Before our analyses of the antecedents and consequences of TSA-C we conducted an ex-
ploratory analysis to determine the phase structure of the team communication processes. 
An initial starting point for the identification of a phase structure is the division of the team 
communication process into the clearly demarcated sessions. The temporal structure of a 
crisis management operation makes it more likely that different types of TSA-C will be more 
prevalent during different moments in the crisis management operation (Uitdewilligen & 
Waller, 2011). When teams are faced with unexpected deviations from routine operations, 
during the initial team meetings, time is likely to be an extremely scarce resource and team 
members will be bombarded with information. Therefore, we expected that the first team 
meetings will be dedicated mainly to level one information sharing as there is little room for 
more advanced TSA-C. In the second team meeting, as the tempo dictated by the immediate 
demands of the situation slows down, and the amount of new information team members 
face decreases, team members may have more time for higher level information processing. 
Finally, in the last meetings of the incident operation, level three TSA is likely to increase as 
the immediate threat of the incident is under control and teams have constructed initial 
shared understandings of the situation, the focus shifts towards long-term effects and the 
finalization of the crisis management operation. Therefore, as a starting point to analyze the 
phase structure in the team communication process we assess whether the relative occur-
rence of the different types of team situation awareness differs over the three team sessions. 
We used paired sample t-tests to assess whether the relative amount of communication 
behaviors differed within the teams over the three sessions. Note that because three teams, 
only had two sessions, t-tests comparing the second and third session are based on a sample 
of nine teams. As can be seen from Table 2, TSA-C level three significantly increased from 
the first to the second session, structuring was used significantly less in the third session 
than in the second session, and the use of proposals decreased from the first to the second 
session. Altogether, these results indicate that some minor differences exist; however, the 
use of most of the communication behaviors remains stable over the three sessions.  
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Table 2. Time and Percentages of Behaviors, and T Tests per Session 
   Session 1  Session 2  p*  Session 3  p** 
Time (in seconds)  798  744  .47  611  .27 
        
Agreement 0.6  0.7  .67  0.4  .10 
Command 2.7  3.3  .64  2.7  .49 
TSA-C level 1  21.1  23.9  .19  21.9  .31 
TSA-C level 2  25.5  25.4  .96  25.5  .25 
TSA-C level 3  0.2  1.8  .00  1.6  .88 
Question 25.7  26.1  .32  26.7  .61 
Structure 15.3  12.6  .12  14.7  .05 
Proposal 4.4  2.6  .02  2.3  .49 
Decision 4.9  3.5  .11  2.8  .27 
Nontask 0.4  0.6  .31  1.4  .17 
* Significance of difference between session 1 and session 2 based on 12 teams  
** Significance of difference between session 2 and session 3 based on 9 teams  
 
However, as Ballard and colleagues (2008, p. 338) indicated “phases typically are not 
regularly distributed over time.” Whereas, sessions may indicate one form of phase structure 
within the teams, additional phases may exist within specific sessions and extend over mul-
tiple sessions. A direct examination of the team processes may facilitate the development of 
well-informed temporal theories, for example, as it may inform us on phases in team inter-
action, which could not have been identified with simple summary measures of team mem-
ber behaviors (e.g. Gersick, 1988). Our coding method allowed us to analyze such temporal 
patterns in the team communication data. As a first step, we created graphical representa-
tions of the team communication sequences. As Langley (1999, p. 700) noted “Visual 
graphical representations are particularly attractive for the analysis of process data because 
they allow the simultaneous representation of a large number of dimensions, and they can 
easily be used to show precedence, parallel processes, and the passage of time.” She notes 
that visual depictions themselves are not theories but may provide intermediary steps that 
facilitate the translation from the raw data to more abstract conceptualization. We first 
analyzed the team communication data for indications of global patterns—phases—of team 
communication occurring in all teams. We alternated between investigation of the graphical 
representations of the team processes represented in Figure 2 and viewing of the actual 
videos for identification of phases in the communication data. 
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Global phase patterns 
Our analyses of the video data and the communication sequences displayed in Figure 2 
suggest that specific segments can be identified in almost all teams, providing a replication 
of the observed phase structure. Most teams only start making decisions after an initial 
period of providing structure and sharing information. However, the length of this initial 
phase differs among the teams, as for example team one engages in a relatively long initial 
phase whereas team nine immediately engages in decision making actions. As soon as a first 
decision has been made, additional decisions follow more rapidly. This suggests that a dis-
tinction can be made between an initial phase and a subsequent decision making phase. 
The initial phase commences in all but one team with a number of structuring actions, 
typically clarifying team members’ roles and laying out ground rules about the process of 
the meeting. Generally, the leader initiates this structuring but other team members con-
tribute structuring communication as well. After this initial structuring, team members 
share the information they have gathered and provide explanations about this information 
to the other team members without explicitly formulating implications for actions. Often 
team members make a round in which all team members successively share their informa-
tion with the other members. Team members share information as they are given speaking 
turns by the team leader, in response to questions from other team members, or as they add 
details or explanations to information shared by another team member. This initial phase 
resembles laboratory information sharing tasks in which team members have to pool infor-
mation that is distributed to the individual members. The goals of this phase is to create a 
shared understanding of the incident, including aspects such as a spatial understanding of 
the incident location, knowledge of the chemical substances involved, and an overview of 
the amount and severity of casualties caused by the incident. 
The second, decision making, phase is initiated when team communication shifts from 
general information sharing about the incident to communication regarding specific deci-
sion topics. Whereas, the initial phase is aimed at providing a general structure for the ses-
sions and pooling all important information that is held by the team members, the second 
phase is aimed at making decisions that are functional for the teams’ actions and coordina-
tion among the teams. Unlike many laboratory decision making tasks, in which teams only 
have to make one single decision, CoPI teams need to make decisions on a variety of sub-
jects, ranging from determining the optimal location of medical and decontamination units, 
to establishing a strategy for containing spilled chemicals and deciding whether the incident 
should be scaled up to a higher emergency level. Whereas, in the initial phase information is 
shared per person as each team member shares all knowledge they consider relevant for the 
other members’ understanding of the incident situation, in the second phase the team mem-
bers contribute and explicitly interpret information in relation to a specific decision topic. 
In the initial phase team members set out the ground rules and outline of the meetings 
and pool their individually held information without restricting information sharing to 
specific topics. This phase can be identified in the data by the absence of decision making—
the initial period before decisions start to follow upon each other in a rapid succession. In 
the decision making phase team communication is concentrated around specific decision 
topics and often culminates in the team closing of the topic with a decision. This phase can 
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be identified in the data by a regular punctuation of the communication with proposals and 
decisions. Although this broad structure seems to occur in all teams, the time each team 
spends on each phase and the specific activities they engage in within the phases differ per 
team. 
We used paired sample t-tests to assess whether the relative amount of communication 
behaviors differed within the teams among the two phases. As can be seen from Table 3, the 
percentages of all communication behaviors except commands (p = 0.09) and proposals 
differed between the phases. The relative amount of Agreements, Questions, and TSA-C 
level one is higher in the decision making phase, whereas, the relative amount of Structur-
ing and TSA-C level two is higher in the initial phase. TSA-C level three, Decisions, and Non-
task related communication do not occur in the initial phase. Altogether, these results pro-
vide support for the proposed two-phase structure. Therefore, in the subsequent tests of our 
hypotheses we will divide the communication processes not only along the three sessions 
but also along the two phases.  
Table 3. Time and Percentages of Behaviors and T Tests per Phase 
   Initial phase 
Decision making 
phase  p 
Time (in seconds)  346  1655  .00 
      
Agreement 0.1  0.7  .00 
Command 1.5  2.9  .09 
TSA-C level 1  16.4  23.7  .05 
TSA-C level 2  34.7  23.9  .04 
TSA-C level 3  0  1.3   
Question 20.2  26.9  .00 
Structure 24.2  12.1  .00 
Proposal 3.1  3.2  .85 
Decision 0  4.3   
Nontask 0  0.7       
Test of hypotheses 
Our first hypothesis suggested a positive relationship between the amount of level one, two, 
and three TSA-C communication and team performance. Table 4 depicts t-tests comparing 
the amount of all coded behaviors between the average- and the high-performing teams per 
session and Table 5 depicts t-tests comparing the amount of all coded behaviors between the 
average- and the high-performing teams per phase. As can be seen from these tables, none 
of the behaviors significantly predicted team performance, thereby providing no support for 
hypothesis 1.  
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Table 4. Mean Frequency, Standard Deviations, and T Tests of Coded Behaviors per Session for Average- and 
High-Performing Teams 
  Session 1  Session 2  Session 3 
   M  SD  t  p  M  SD  t  p  M  SD  t  p 
Total  Time                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  803  224  0.10  .92  720 208 -0.47  .65  724 445 1.08  .32 
 High Perf. Teams  793  85      768  140      470  149     
Agreement                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.67  0.52  -0.32  .76  1.00  0.89  1.17  .27  0.20  0.45  -0.88  .41 
 High Perf. Teams  0.83  1.17      0.50  0.55      0.50  0.58     
Command                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  3.17  2.04  0.13  .90  3.33 3.14 -0.34  .74  3.40 2.79 1.18 .28 
 High Perf. Teams  3.00  2.45      3.83  1.83      1.50  1.73     
TSA-C  level  1                  
 Av. Perf. Teams  26.17  12.97  0.44  .67  32.83 19.16 0.60 .56 35.20 36.15 1.12  .30 
 High Perf. Teams  22.33  17.24      27.83  7.41      14.25  8.18     
TSA-C  level  2                  
 Av. Perf. Teams  23.83  10.65  -1.49  .17  25.83 12.91 -1.77 .11 23.60 13.13 0.21  .84 
 High Perf. Teams  32.50  9.44      39.33  13.57      22.00  8.12     
TSA-C  level  3                  
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.17  0.41  0.00  1.00  2.50  2.07  0.62  .55  1.80  1.64  0.88  .41 
 High Perf. Teams  0.17  0.41      1.83  1.60      1.00  0.82     
Question                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  30.33  12.53  0.56  .59  31.33  10.71  -0.31 .76 34.60 31.95  0.95  .37 
 High Perf. Teams  27.00  7.62      33.00  7.35      19.00  6.38     
Structure                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  15.83  5.00  -0.67  .52  14.50 5.43  -0.48  .64  13.00 3.08  0.46 .66 
 High Perf. Teams  18.33  7.58      16.17  6.59      11.75  5.12     
Proposal                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  5.50  3.73  0.59  .57  3.50  3.27  0.21  .83  2.40  2.07  0.25  .81 
 High Perf. Teams  4.50  1.87      3.17  1.94      2.00  2.71     
Decision                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  6.00  1.41  1.63  .13  3.17  3.06  -1.96  .08  3.60  3.58  0.94  .38 
 High Perf. Teams  4.50  1.76      6.00  1.79      1.75  1.71     
Non-task                               
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.50  0.55  0.42  .69  0.83  0.75  0.29  .78  1.00  1.00  -0.83  .43 
 High Perf. Teams  0.33  0.82        0.67  1.21        1.75  1.71       
Note, N= 12 teams for session 1 and 2, N = 9 teams for session 3.               
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Table 5. Mean Frequency, Standard Deviations, and T Tests of Coded Behaviors per Phase for Aver-
age- and High-Performing Teams 
  Initial phase  Decision making phase 
   M  SD  t  p  M  SD  t  p 
Total Time                 
 Av. Perf. Teams  281.67 68.53 -3.05 .01  1845.00 594.33 1.40 .19 
 High Perf. Teams  410.00 76.94    1465.00  300.58    
Agreement                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.00 0.00  -1.00  .34  1.83  1.17  0.45  .66 
 High Perf. Teams  0.17 0.41     1.50 1.38    
Command                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.50  0.55 -0.70  .50 8.83  7.63  0.62 .66 
 High Perf. Teams  1.00 1.67     6.83 1.94    
TSA-C level 1                 
 Av. Perf. Teams  4.83 3.76  -0.90  .39  83.50 56.50  1.43  .18 
 High Perf. Teams  10.17 14.03     49.50 14.90    
TSA-C level 2                 
 Av. Perf. Teams  10.83 7.60 -1.60  .14 58.50  27.80 -0.73  .48 
 High Perf. Teams  16.83 5.19    69.67 25.08    
TSA-C level 3                 
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.00  0.00        4.17  1.72  1.55  .15 
 High Perf. Teams  0.00 0.00     2.67 1.63    
Question                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  6.50 4.42  -1.09  .30  84.00 42.03  1.25  .24 
 High Perf. Teams  10.67 8.26    62.00 10.00    
Structure                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  6.83 5.42  -1.47  .17  34.33  8.52 1.21  .25 
 High Perf. Teams  13.67 10.05     28.50 8.12   
Proposal                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  1.00 1.10  -1.00  .34  10.00 5.66 1.06  .31 
 High Perf. Teams  1.83 1.72     7.17 3.31    
Decision                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.00  0.00        12.17  5.71  0.19  .85 
 High Perf. Teams  0.00 0.00     11.67 2.73    
Non-task                   
 Av. Perf. Teams  0.00  0.00        2.17  1.94  0.00  1.00 
 High Perf. Teams  0.00 0.00        2.17 2.14       
Note, N= 12 teams  
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Hypothesis 2 states that the extent to which a team engages in collective interpretation 
will be positively related to team performance. In order to test this hypothesis we investi-
gated the occurrences of the different sequences of communication per phase and per ses-
sion. We specifically considered the frequency of sequences in which one member’s voicing 
of level two TSA was followed by level two TSA from another team member, as an indica-
tion of collective interpretation. As can be seen from table 6 and 7, whereas the average- and 
high-performing teams do not significantly differ in terms of the four other sequences, in the 
first session high-performing teams use significantly (p < .05) more collective interpretation 
sequences (M = 6.17) than average-performing teams (M = 2.67). In the second session a 
substantial difference exists between the occurrence of collective interpretation in the aver-
age- (M = 3.17) and high performing teams (M = 8.17), but the effect is not significant any-
more (p = .15). In addition, a comparison of the use of the collective interpretation se-
quences per phase suggests that whereas there is no significant difference between the 
average- and high-performing teams in the initial phase the difference in the use of collec-
tive interpretation sequences in the decision making phase is marginally significant (p = 
.07). Altogether this provides support for hypothesis 2. In addition, these results suggest that 
the effect of the use of collective interpretation processes depends on the timing of these 
processes in these specific sessions and phases. 
Finally, to assess the extent to which each of these five communication sequences dis-
tinguished between average- and high-performing teams, we conducted discriminant func-
tion analysis, predicting team performance on the basis of the total occurrence of the se-
quences. In combination, the five characteristics do not significantly differentiated the aver-
age- from high performing teams (Wilk’s λ= .243, χ 2(5, N = 12) = 6.26, p =.28). However, 
using the stepwise selection method we find that the TSA-C level 2 alterations (discriminant 
function coefficient = .71) and the Question-TSA-C level 2 sequences (discriminant function 
coefficient = .47), significantly differentiated the average- from high-performing teams 
(Wilk’s λ = .47, χ 2(2, N = 12) = 6.26, p =.03). Using these two variables, we were able to 
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Table 7. Mean Frequency, Standard Deviations, and T Tests of Behavior Sequences (and Time per 
Decision) per Phase for Average- and High-Performing Teams 
  Initial Phase  Decision making phase 
   M  SD  t  p  M  SD  t  p 
TSA-C level 2 – TSA level 2 alterations 
 Av. Perf. Teams  1.00  1.67  0.00  1.00  8.50  5.89  -2.03  .07 
 High Perf. Teams  1.00  1.10      16.50  7.64     
Question - TSA-C level 1 
 Av. Perf. Teams  2.83  2.99  -0.76  1.00  42.17  25.45  0.82  .43 
 High Perf. Teams  4.83  5.71      32.50  13.32     
Question - TSA-C level 2 
 Av. Perf. Teams  3.33  2.73  0.50 .63 26.33 9.44 0.29 .78 
 High Perf. Teams  2.67  1.75      24.67  10.65     
TSA-C level 1 – TSA-C level 2 alterations 
 Av. Perf. Teams  4.33  3.61  -0.33  .17  40.00  20.24  -0.37  .72 
 High Perf. Teams  5.33  6.44      44.33  20.05     
Mono-actor sequence 
 Av. Perf. Teams  3.67  2.94  -1.48  .75  24.67  11.06  0.46  .65 
 High Perf. Teams  6.83  4.36      22.17  7.33     
Time per Decision  
 Av. Perf. Teams            168.27  50.90  1.57  .15 
 High Perf. Teams              129.14  34.04       
Note, N= 12 teams  
             
Hypotheses 3a - 3c relate to the effects of structure on collective interpretation proc-
esses. We expected that the amount of structuring behaviors and the active use of the white-
board will be positively and the use of standardized interaction patterns will be negatively 
related to the extent a team engages in collective interpretation processes. In order to test 
the effects of structuring behaviors, we added the three types of structuring to the equations 
predicting collective interpretation processes. Because of the relatively small sample size we 
consider significance levels of smaller than ten percent as significant. As can be seen from 
Table 8, structuring behaviors and the use of standardized interaction patterns are not 
significantly related to the use of collective interpretation processes, whereas structured use 
of the whiteboard is positively related to the use of collective interpretation processes. The-
refore, only hypothesis 3b is supported. 
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Table 8. Results of Structuring Predicting Collective Interpretation Processes  
   Control  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
   Beta  SD  Beta  SD  Beta  SD  Beta   SD 
Intercept 7.69  6.80  1.37  7.32 1.33  6.83 7.57 7.55 
Total  Communication  0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.02  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Structuring  behaviors    0.39  0.24       
Whiteboard  use       8.06†  4.12    
Standardized  Interaction  patterns          0.15  2.82 
            
Total R
2 0.05   0.28   0.34   0.05   
R
2 Change   0.22   0.28
†  0.00   
Note. N = 12, 
†p < .10. * p < .05.      
Additional analyses 
In addition to the analyses related to our hypotheses we conducted analyses into whether 
differences exist in the phase structures of the average- and high-performing teams. We 
were interested in whether the extent to which the teams adopted the specific generic two 
phase communication structure was positively associated with team performance. There-
fore, we assessed the amount of time teams spent on the initial phase and the average time 
they spent per decision in the decision making phase. 
As can be seen from Table 5, the total time teams spent in the initial phase significantly 
differed (p < .05) between the average- (Mean = 281.67 seconds) and high-performing 
teams (Mean = 410 seconds), suggesting that if teams invested more time in the initial 
phase this had a positive effect on team performance. However, despite the overall positive 
effect of time spent in the initial phase our analyses show no significant effects for the use of 
any of the specific coded communication behaviors in the initial phase on team perform-
ance. So, the beneficial effects of investing time in the initial phase cannot be attributed to 
the use of a single communication behavior type. 
Finally, whereas there were no significant differences between average- and high-
performing teams in the total amount of decisions per meeting or per phase, the data sug-
gests differences in the amount of time teams spent per decision in the decision making 
phase. As can be seen in Table 7, although the average time per decision in the decision 
making phase is substantially higher for the average-performing teams (M = 168.27) than 
for the high-performing teams (M = 129.14), this difference is not significant (p = .15). 
However, as can be seen from Table 6, whereas the time per decision is significantly higher 
for high-performing teams than for average-performing teams in the first session (p = .08), 
it is significantly lower for high-performing teams in the second session (p = .03), and there 
is no significant difference between the teams in the third session (p = .75). Because the 
greater amount of time spent in the initial phase is likely to account for the effect that higher 
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performing teams spent more time per decision in the first session, this suggests that teams 
benefit from minimizing the time they spent per decision, particularly in the second session. 
Discussion 
The general purpose of this study was to assess the structure, antecedents, and conse-
quences of TSA-C in complex and dynamic circumstances. Our analysis of the phase struc-
ture of the teams’ communication processes indicates that the team communication process 
can be divided into two separate phases. An initial introduction phase in which teams set the 
structure for the meeting and share individually held information and a second decision 
making phase in which the teams focus on making decisions on actions to take. Additional 
analyses indicated that, compared to average-performing teams, high-performing teams 
spent more time in the initial phase and made decisions more rapidly particularly during the 
second session in the decision making phase. Furthermore our findings indicate that; al-
though, the frequency of single TSA-C behaviors were not directly related to team perform-
ance, high-performing teams engaged in significantly more collective interpretation proc-
esses—sequences in which one member voices level two TSA, which is followed by level two 
TSA from another team member—than average-performing teams during the decision 
making phase. Moreover, schematic use of the whiteboard influenced the extent to which 
teams engaged in collective interpretation processes. We will now turn to a discussion of 
these findings. 
Two phase structure in team communication process 
Previous studies have indicated that often phase structures can be identified in team com-
munication processes (Poole, 1983). In addition to these previous studies the findings of this 
study suggest that differences in the phase structure among the groups are associated with 
differences in team performance. Compared to average-performing teams, high-performing 
teams had a clear phase structure characterized by a relatively long initial phase and a deci-
sion making phase in which decisions followed each other rapidly. Findings in the literature 
indicate that team processes occurring early on in teams’ life span have long-lasting effects 
on team performance (Ericksen & Dyer, 2004; Gersick, 1988; Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). In 
particular initial planning activities have been related to team performance in later phases 
(e.g. Marks et al., 2001; Mathieu & Rapp, 2009). However, these studies have often looked 
at teams with much longer lifespans than the short-term crisis management teams that are 
the topic of this study. 
A number of explanations can be proposed for the positive relation between the total 
duration of the initial phase and team performance. Whereas, in this phase team members 
are free to contribute all information they consider relevant for the other team members, 
during the subsequent decision making phase, team communication is focused on specific 
decision topics and members may be withheld from sharing information that is not immedi-
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ately relevant to the topic at hand. As some information may not fit to any of the topics a 
team may discuss, it is important that all team members are provided the opportunity to 
contribute to the group information that may be relevant for the functioning of the team. 
Moreover, because the decision topics that will be discussed in the decision making phase 
are not a priori determined, in the initial phase team members may present decision topics 
they consider relevant to be discussed in the subsequent decision making phase. If teams, in 
the initial phase, spend time on establishing a well-considered agenda of decision topics, 
this may lead to more structured communication and more complete coverage of the deci-
sion topics during the decision phase. However, as we did not find significant differences 
between the average- and high-performing teams on specific behaviors, such as the amount 
of information that was communicated or the amount of structuring behaviors in the initial 
phase, the effect cannot be ascribed to a single type of behaviors. 
In addition to the longer initial phase, the high-performing teams made decisions more 
rapidly particularly during the second session in the decision making phase. Although in the 
initial information sharing phase it is important that all team members get the opportunity 
to share their individually held information, in the decision making phase too much infor-
mation sharing may become detrimental to performance. Because teams are under high 
pressure to make their decisions rapidly, it is important that they engage in a focused dis-
cussion of the decision topics and do not spend precious time on sharing information that is 
not directly relevant for the teams’ decisions. As Weick (1995) indicated, it is often not accu-
racy but an acceptable shared understanding of the situation that is important for successful 
team performance in high-paced dynamic situations. Therefore, during this phase, it is 
important that team communication is aimed at formulating decisions that enable actions 
and facilitate coordination. Teams that do not take this pragmatic approach to TSA-C run 
the risk of rambling on about an issue without reaching a pragmatic decision. For example, 
Team 9 in the second session, apart from making two initial decisions, this team engaged in 
a long stretch of information exchange—filling almost the complete session—in which no 
decisions were made. Analysis of the video suggests that during this period the team en-
gaged in an unstructured widely diverging discussion in which a variety of related issues are 
discussed but no clear decisions are made about any of these subjects. 
Collective interpretation processes 
Although, the frequencies of single TSA-C behaviors were not directly related to team per-
formance, high-performing teams engaged in significantly more collective interpretation 
processes than average-performing teams during the decision making phase. This finding is 
in line with Information Elaboration theory, which poses that team decision making benefits 
if team members engage in higher level information processing before making collective 
decisions (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). It also concurs with a study of Van den Bossche 
and colleagues (2006), who found that co-construction of meaning in teams—collectively 
developing an understanding of the situation by refining, building, or modifying publicly 
voiced interpretations—leads to high levels of shared understanding and consequently to 
effective performance. 
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Collective information processing stands in contrast with individual information proc-
essing, where team members individually process information without explicitly discussing 
their interpretations with the other team members. Collective interpretation processes may 
preclude team members from running into misunderstandings, which may occur when 
interpretations are privately reached. When interpretations are communicated within the 
meetings, other team members have the ability to compare the voiced interpretations with 
their own understanding and if needed correct or add to this interpretation, thereby reduc-
ing ‘representational gaps.’ Therefore, collective processing is likely to lead not only to more 
refined but also to more similar TSA. Particularly when team members have varying back-
grounds, they may reach diverging interpretations based on similar information (Rico et al., 
2009). Diverging interpretations of an issue are likely to result in conflict and decreased 
team performance (Cronin & Weingart, 2007). 
Communication structuring practices 
Finally, whereas some teams did not or only marginally made use of the whiteboard, other 
teams made use of the whiteboard in a highly structured fashion, using it to sketch the de-
tails of the situation, and structurally depict information from various sources. Highly struc-
tured use of the whiteboard may benefit teams for three reasons. First, it can be an efficient 
method for communicating the main facts of the situation. For instance, in some teams, the 
officer of the fire brigade—who held most general information about the particulars of the 
incident—already started writing down information before all members had arrived at the 
meeting, thereby economizing on valuable meeting time. Second, use of the whiteboard 
helps teams to structure their communication process and keep an overview of the topics 
that need to be discussed (Artman & Garbis, 1998; Renstch et al., 2010). Third, apart from 
affecting the structure of the team communication process, use of the whiteboard may pro-
mote cognitive similarity by facilitating the adoption of information in members’ individual 
mental models. 
Limitations 
An important limitation refers to our communication measure of TSA. We used coded com-
munication utterances to measure the different levels of TSA and we did not have at our 
disposal a quality measure for the statements. However, the complexity and ambiguity of 
field situations often makes it impossible to derive indications of the correctness of interpre-
tations about those situations. And as Weick and colleagues indicate “Sensemaking is not 
about truth and getting it right. Instead, it is about continued redrafting of an emerging 
story so that it becomes more comprehensive, incorporates more of the observed data, and 
is more resilient in the face of criticism” (2005, p. 425). Our findings seem to be consistent 
with this theoretical assertion that collective information processing will lead to a richer 
understanding of the situation. 
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In addition, by measuring TSA from communication data we cannot infer if and how 
the content of this communication will actually be incorporated in team members’ knowl-
edge structures. We cannot be sure whether communication that is voiced within the group 
will actually become part of team members’ cognitive representations—e.g. team members 
may not understand or simply not pay attention to all information that is communicated. 
Moreover, we do not take into account the part of TSA team members have privately formed 
without explicitly communicating it in the team. However, as Cooke and colleagues (2001) 
noted, team knowledge is a product of team members’ individual knowledge plus communi-
cation processes. Through the communication process, groups make their knowledge ex-
plicit, and it is this expressed knowledge that finds its way into team decisions. So, although 
measuring team cognition from communication gives us an indication of the knowledge that 
is used in collective decision making, we cannot draw definite conclusions about whether 
and how this communication precipitates into team members understanding of the situa-
tion. Therefore, future studies could assess both TSA communication and the TSA knowl-
edge structures in order to find out how collective team information processing is shaped by 
and shapes individual and team level knowledge structures. 
Limitations also arise from the small sample size of the study. First, the small sample 
size limits the possibility to find small and medium sized effects. Given the semi-exploratory 
nature of the study we therefore opted not to adopt a strict criteria using Bonferroni correc-
tions—controlling for the increased probability of finding significant results when testing 
multiple hypotheses—in testing differences between average-and high-performing teams 
(Shaffer, 1995). Therefore, the findings from the present study should be considered as 
initial indications and additional research with larger sample sizes is needed to test the 
robustness of these effects. Second, the small sample size limits the possibility of identifying 
heterogeneity in the phase structure among the teams. Although the basic two phase struc-
ture could be identified in almost all teams, the existence of variation among the teams in 
the length of the phases and the type of activities within the phases suggests that there may 
exist additional heterogeneity in the global communication structures, which has not been 
fully captured by the two phase structure. For example, the longer time periods between the 
decisions during the decision making phase may indicate that some teams actually reverted 
back to the initial phase after making their first decisions. Larger samples of teams are re-
quired to identify such, more fine-grained aspects of heterogeneity in teams’ phase struc-
tures. 
Finally, a limitation related to the specific sample of this study concerns the fact that 
the teams did not spent an equal of amount of time for the sessions. This divergence in the 
use of time may have had an impact on the team processes. However, we did not find sig-
nificant effects of the amount of time used on team performance. 
Conclusion 
Weingart (1997) distinguished between analyses of what groups do—relating to the fre-
quencies of specific behaviors—and analyses of how groups do it—focusing on the sequen-
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tial nature of team member interaction. Whereas an increasing number of studies investi-
gate group processes over time, these studies still often use perception based summary 
measures or frequencies of behaviors summarized over a period of time (e.g. Jehn & Man-
nix, 2001; van der Kleij, Schraagen, Werkhoven, & De Dreu, 2009). Although these studies 
provide information on the dynamics of team processes over time they do not give us insight 
into how teams actually execute their task; they do not provide information on the actual 
sequences of behavior that make up the team process. In order to gain more insight in the 
‘how’ of team processes, Ballard and colleagues (2008) made a call to more explicitly incor-
porate time in the analyses of team communication data. With this study we answered this 
call in four ways. First, we analyzed the team communication data for indications of a global 
structure—phases—of team communication occurring in all teams. Second, apart from 
looking at frequencies of behaviors, we identified local patterns—sequences—of contiguous 
communication acts that indicated collective interpretation processes. Third, we compared 
average- and high-performing teams on their use of both frequencies and sequences in the 
different sessions and phases of the group communication process. Fourth, we assessed the 
extent to which teams communicated using standardized interaction patterns and related 
this to team collective interpretation processes. The results of these analyses clearly indicate 
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Introduction 
Due to a collection of convergent factors—e.g. global competition, technological develop-
ments, market deregulations—many organizations nowadays are faced with environments 
that are turbulent and complex to a degree that was hitherto unimaginable (Waller & Rob-
erts, 2003). For these organizations change has become the norm instead of an exception in 
their everyday reality and many have reverted to teams to deal with such challenging cir-
cumstances (Burke, Stagle, Salas, Pierce, Kendall, 2006; Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & 
Jundt, 2005). Given the pivotal role of teams for the functioning and survival of organiza-
tions, this challenges teams to sense changes in the wider environment and be able to rap-
idly adapt to a variety of expected and unexpected circumstances. In this dissertation I 
argued that adaptation has an important cognitive component; perceiving, interpreting, and 
planning for environmental changes are cognitive processes that are shaped and influenced 
by team member knowledge structures. 
However, despite of its pivotal role, research on the cognitive aspects of team adapta-
tion is still scarce. Therefore, the main questions that guided this dissertation related to the 
role of team cognition in team adaptation. This dissertation had three aims. First, to unravel 
the relationship between characteristics of the described cognitive structures and team 
adaptation and to investigate how team cognitive structures interact with team processes in 
predicting team adaptive performance. Second, to investigate the nature, antecedents, and 
consequences of change and development of cognitive structures. Third, to investigate the 
nature of teams’ cognitive adaptation processes and their effect on team adaptation to novel 
circumstances. 
In this concluding chapter, I will first give an overview of the main findings of this dis-
sertation with respect to these questions. Second, I will discuss implications for theory, 
methods, and practice. Third, I discuss limitations of the present research and provide direc-
tions for further research. 
Main findings 
Chapter 2, contains an extensive review of the three main team cognition constructs of 
shared mental models, transactive memory systems, and team situation awareness. A con-
clusion from this review is that although these cognitive structures are often considered 
beneficial, they may not always facilitate team adaptation. In addition, it was concluded 
that research regarding the most investigated team cognition concept of shared mental 
models should go beyond similarity and accuracy and take into account characteristics of 
team mental models that may be more closely related to team adaptation, such as complex-
ity and flexibility. 
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Chapter 3 and chapter 4 concerns research that is set out to investigate this assertion by 
measuring these aspects of team cognition and investigate their relationship with adaptive 
team performance. In chapter 3, a study is presented that explores the role of mental model 
updating on team adaptive performance using the task change paradigm. Findings of the 
study indicate that whereas team mental model change per se did not have a significant 
effect, system mental model updating—mental model change in line with changes in the 
task environment—is an important precursor to team adaptation. Moreover, this relation-
ship was partially mediated by team interaction patterns. 
In chapter 4, a model is presented and tested that delineates the effects of team internal 
and external cognitive alignment on task performance over time. Findings of the study 
indicate that both internal and external cognitive alignment are crucial for team perform-
ance trajectories. Although team mental model complexity predicts team information search 
trajectories and team information search predicts team performance trajectories, no conclu-
sive evidence was found for a mediation effect of team information search. Finally, evidence 
was found for a moderation effect of team mental model complexity on the effect of team 
information search on team performance trajectories. 
Whereas chapter 3 and 4 focus mainly on cognitive structural aspects, the focus in 
chapter 5 and 6 is on team cognitive processes in team adaptation. Chapter 5 presents analy-
ses of the sensemaking process of a team faced with an unexpected ambiguous high-impact 
crisis situation. It was found that the team made sense of the situation by formulating work-
ing hypothesis of the situation, which they revised in an iterative fashion. 
Chapter 6, zooms in on the cognitive team processes of the command teams of an 
emergency management system. In this chapter the communication data of the multidisci-
plinary command teams performing in a crisis management simulation was analyzed. It was 
found that the team communication process can be divided into a two-phase structure. An 
initial phase aimed at setting the structure of the meeting and sharing individually held 
information, and a second decision making phase in which the teams focus on making deci-
sions on actions to take. The results indicate that, compared to average-performing teams, 
high-performing teams spent more time on the initial phase and made decisions more rap-
idly in the decision making phase. Moreover, high-performing teams engaged in more col-
lective interpretation processes during the decision-making phase compared to average-
performing teams and use of the whiteboard influenced the extent to which teams engaged 
in collective interpretation processes. 
Implications 
Theoretical implications 
In the previous chapters, I have highlighted implications and discussions of the various 
finding of the individual studies reported in this dissertation, so I will not repeat the details 
in this section. Instead I will present the main theoretical implications of the present disser-
tation in terms of the contributions to the team cognition and team adaptation literatures. 
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Team cognition. First, focusing on adaptation, I draw attention to aspects of team 
mental models that have been underdeveloped in the team cognition literature. Research on 
team mental models has focused on properties of similarity and accuracy of team members’ 
mental models (Mohammed, Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010). However, the review of the 
literature indicates, and the first two empirical studies support that apart from these often 
studied properties, other characteristics of team mental models such as complexity and 
flexibility may also be important for team functioning and adaptation. The reported re-
search on these characteristics of team mental models provides insight in how mental mod-
els function in complex and adaptive environments. For instance, the finding that average 
mental model complexity interacted with team information search in predicting perform-
ance trajectories, provides support for a ‘perceptual filter’ theory of mental models, which 
indicates that mental models serve as ‘filters’ that influence the extent to which a team can 
effectively process information cues (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). The study on the effects of 
mental model updating indicates that it is not so much accuracy of mental models per se 
but, the ability to readjust mental models to in response changes in the external environ-
ment that is important for adaptive performance. 
Second, I present a model of team cognitive structures that provides an answer to con-
troversies in the literature regarding the effects of similarity and diversity in knowledge 
structures (Ilgen et al., 2005). By applying the notion of complexity (Driver & Streufert, 
1969) and the differentiation-integration logic developed in the organizational design litera-
ture (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), it is proposed that elements of similarity and variety are 
often complementary instead of opposing. Cognitive variety contributes to teams’ external 
alignment, which teams require in order to deal with complex environments. At the same 
time cognitive similarity contributes to teams’ internal alignment, which they need to coor-
dinate information processing within the team. The empirical results from the study re-
ported in chapter 4 provide preliminary evidence for this notion. 
Third, the results of the study on the effects of team knowledge structures over time 
suggests that team mental models and a team’s transactive memory system may differen-
tially impact team outcomes at different time points in the team life cycle. Research on team 
knowledge structures has often implicitly assumed a generic effect over time, in the sense 
that the strength of the relationship between, for example shared mental models or transac-
tive memory systems and team performance, does not depend on the specific time point or 
phase in a team’s lifecycle. The results of chapter 4 indicate that this view does not seem to 
hold. For example, it was found that mental model complexity only started to have an effect 
on performance about halfway the teams’ performance period, whereas transactive memory 
systems had an effect on team performance in the first session, which disappeared towards 
the midpoint and then picked up again. Although research already hinted at time-varying 
effects (Levesque, Wilson, & Wholey, 2001), empirical testing on when teams benefit most 
from high quality team knowledge structures is still in its infancy. 
Team adaptation. The research presented in this dissertation contributes to team 
adaptation research by underlining the pivotal role of change in team members’ knowledge 
structures in explaining team adaptation. Although, researchers have included cognitive 
constructs in their models of team adaptation (e.g. Burke et al., 2006; Marks, Zaccaro, & 
Mathieu, 2001), little research has been conducted on how team cognition contributes to 
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team adaptation over time. In chapter 1, I presented an integrated model outlining the ef-
fects of cognitive structures and processes on team adaptation and aspects of that model 
were investigated in the various chapters of this dissertation. The findings of these studies 
provide support as well as additions to this model. Evidence was found that cognitive struc-
tures (mental model complexity and a team’s transactive memory system) and cognitive 
processes (team information search and collective team situation awareness communica-
tion) depicted in the model are related with team adaptation. The results reported in chap-
ter 3 also provide evidence for a mediating role of team interaction patterns in the relation-
ship between team cognition and team adaptation. In addition, the findings indicate that 
cognitive structures and processes sometimes interact in driving team adaptation. Most 
importantly, I conclude that emphasis should be placed on the temporal development and 
change of cognitive structures over time, and on the factors that promote, and the factors 
that hinder adaptive change in team knowledge structures. 
This dissertation taps into and adds to a recent stream of research that focuses on the 
importance of cognitive updating for understanding adaptive performance (Christianson, 
2009; Rudolph, Morrison, & Caroll, 2009; Weick, 2010). For instance, Christianson (2009) 
investigated how healthcare providers updated their understanding regarding patient con-
ditions in response to changes in patients’ symptoms over time. Rudolph and colleagues 
(2009) study updating as a diagnostic sensemaking task in which individuals iteratively 
postulate and test hypotheses about the situation, and take actions over time. The present 
dissertation adds to this stream of research that updating may occur in response to two 
types of change in the entity’s environment and that it may be worthwhile to disentangle the 
two resulting types of updating. First, momentary changes in the environment—for exam-
ple, the spreading of a specific fire—requires updating in team situation awareness. Second, 
changes in the recurring structural relationship between elements of the environment—for 
example, alterations in the use of construction materials that change how building fires 
spread in general—requires updating in team mental models. Furthermore, I have indicated 
the existence of a number of cross-linkages among updating of team mental models, situa-
tion awareness, and interaction patterns. 
Methodological implications 
In addition to theoretical contributions mentioned above, a number of novel methods were 
applied for measuring the cognitive constructs reported on in this dissertation. Although, 
more research is required to further investigate the reliability and validity of these ap-
proaches, they provide some fruitful avenues for furthering research in team cognition. 
In Chapter 3 a method was introduced for analyzing adaptive updating in mental mod-
els. Updating was assessed as the change in centrality of pivotal concepts in team members’ 
mental models. This method enabled the explication of the effects of specific changes in the 
structure of team members’ mental models on team adaptive performance. Whereas, previ-
ous research has indicated the importance of mental model change (e.g. Marks et al., 2000), 
this seems to be the first study that explicitly operationalized these concepts into a variable 
that can be used to test hypotheses on cognitive flexibility. 
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In chapter 4 a measurement method for mental models was introduced that enables re-
searchers to separately assess external alignment and internal alignment in team cognitive 
structures. With the often used similarity rating approach for assessing mental models 
(DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 2010), similarity and diversity are opposite poles on the 
same dimension. Therefore, aspects of external alignment and internal alignment have 
often been considered as opposing constructs. In contrast, with the free concept mapping 
approach used in chapter 4, external alignment (mental model complexity) and internal 
alignment (mental model similarity) could be separately assessed. As can be seen from the 
results of this study, these factors were not opposing but were actually correlated and both 
constructs explained unique variance in team performance trajectories. 
In chapter 5 and in chapter 6 a communication approach to assess team level situation 
awareness processes was used. In chapter 5, an approach of content coding was used, which 
made it possible to trace patterns of emergence and transition of situation hypotheses over 
time. In chapter 6, a typology of communication actions was developed that differentiates 
between the levels of team situation awareness communication. Moreover, not only single 
communication utterances were identified but sequences of team situation awareness com-
munication that appeared to be related to team performance. Finally, this research goes 
beyond comparative methods in applying idiosyncratic methods to explore the temporal 
structure of the teams’ communication processes. The combination of visual depiction com-
bined with statistical testing made it possible to identify structural aspects of the team com-
munication processes which could not have been identified with traditional comparative 
methods. Although the approaches applied in these chapters are still in their infancy they 
provide promising new possibilities for analyzing team meta-cognition processes from ongo-
ing communication data. Such online assessment of team cognition as it emerges in real 
time can help team researchers to more closely approach a truly temporal account of team 
adaptation (Ballard, Tschan, & Waller, 2008; Keyton, Beck, & Asbury, 2010). 
Practical implications 
In highly dynamic environments, teams need to be increasingly able to adapt and change to 
novel circumstances. The reported studies indicate that cognitive factors in team perform-
ance may play an important role in team adaptation. Both internal and external alignment 
were positively related to team performance. The results of this study seem to support the 
utility of cognitive complexity for team performance in complex dynamic environments. 
Hence organizations may benefit from selecting team members with rich knowledge struc-
tures. This may imply that they take into account not only members’ specific skills but also 
their more general understanding of a complete system. Moreover team members could be 
encouraged to continuously refine their mental models in order to maintain the requisite 
variety for acting in complex dynamic environments—or using Weick’s terms: they should 
be encouraged to ‘complicate themselves’ (Weick, 1979). Also, team training may be di-
rected at increasing the internal alignment of team members’ knowledge structures. For 
example, by encouraging team members to express and discuss their mental models among 
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each other they may not only increase the amount of concepts and linkages within their 
individual mental models but also increase the overlap among their mental models. 
In addition to increasing internal and external alignment, practitioners interested in 
promoting team adaptation should attempt to leverage team members’ ability to adaptively 
change their mental models and the adaptive processes that were found to be associated 
with adaptive mental model change. Teams may benefit from flexibility in their knowledge 
structures. Several ways may exist that may facilitate cognitive flexibility. For example, 
managers may promote critical or counterfactual mindset in team members, challenging 
them to continuously look for anomalies and question and update their mental models and 
situation awareness (Kray & Galinsky, 2003; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). Another 
way to promote flexibility may be to encourage team members to regularly elicit and criti-
cally reflect on their own and each others’ knowledge structures (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, 
& Nagele, 2007). 
Finally, Chapter 6 indicates the importance of collective interpretation processes dur-
ing the team decision-making phase. This suggest that training team members to engage in 
communication practices, aimed at explaining their expertise information to others and 
collectively stating their interpretations of the situation, may facilitate collective decision 
making and adaptive performance. In addition, use of a whiteboard during group discussion 
led teams to engage in collective interpretation processes. Therefore, managers aiming to 
improve high level team information processing should provide teams with knowledge 
tools, such as whiteboards and encourage team members to make use of them in order to 
structure their communication (see also Rentsch, Delise, Salas, & Letsky, 2010). 
Limitations and suggestions for further research 
Of course there are several limitations that restrict the conclusions that can be drawn from 
the studies reported in this dissertation. Moreover, for the sake of parsimony I was bounded 
to address a confined number of topics and perspectives in this dissertation and there may 
be other issues that are relevant as well to the field of cognition and adaptation. Therefore, 
in this section I will address limitations of the present dissertation and give some sugges-
tions for future research. 
An important limitation refers to the use of time in this dissertation. Important charac-
teristics of team adaptation and team cognition are that they both are temporal phenomena 
(Roe, 2008). Adaptation constitutes a change in configuration that occurs over time. Cogni-
tion also has a temporal nature in that communication, sensemaking, and information proc-
essing are processes with beginning and end points that manifest specific dynamics over 
time and knowledge structures develop and are adjusted over time. In the present disserta-
tion I have tried to acknowledge and integrate these temporal aspects of team adaptation 
and team cognition as much as possible; however, due to limitations in scope, time, and 
data collection possibilities there were also limits on the extent to which a truly temporal 
perspective on team adaptation and cognition could be attained. These limitations mainly 
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refer to the time scope and to the extent to which the focal constructs were measured repeti-
tively over time. 
First, as I indicated in the introduction to this dissertation, adaptation refers to a single 
adaptive instance—a team adapting to a change in task circumstances—as well as, to a 
more continuous form of repeatedly adapting to a continuously changing environment. 
Whereas, in contemporary organizations, teams often will have to adapt recurrently in 
response to their highly dynamic environments, empirical studies on team adaption—
including some of the studies in the present dissertation—often focus on a single or a lim-
ited amount of adaption requiring situations (Lepine 2003; 2005; Waller, 1999; 2004). Sin-
gling out an instance of adaptive performance enables researchers to closely scrutinize the 
processes occurring during adaption. However, it does not allow us to draw conclusions 
about what provides teams with adaptive capability that facilitates them to remain adaptive 
in the long run. As Zaheer, Albert, and Zaheer indicated “theory that is valid for one time 
interval may not be valid for another.” (1999, p. 725). Teams, performing under dynamic 
circumstances, repetitively or even continuously adapt and thereby are likely to develop 
particular capabilities to facilitate adaptation (Burke et al., 2006; Kozlwoski et al., 1998). 
For example, they may develop specific structures and processes for keeping track of and 
interacting with their environments (Ancona, 1990; Ancona & Caldwell, 1992), develop 
flexible interaction patterns and knowledge structures (Kozlowski, Gully, Nason, & Smith, 
1999; Stachowski, Kaplan, & Waller, 2009), and introduce reflective meta-cognition proc-
esses (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nagele, 2007; Hinsz, 2004). Future research could in-
vestigate teams with a longer duration, which experience more adaptive episodes, to iden-
tify characteristics and processes that enable these teams to remain adaptive in the long run. 
Second and related to this first point, a longitudinal perspective implies measuring fo-
cal constructs repetitively over time in order to assess development and changes in these 
constructs (Chan, 1998; Roe, 2008). In that respect, the present dissertation is longitudinal 
to a limited extent. In chapter 3, team members’ mental models were assessed at two time 
points, which enabled the investigation of the changes that occurred in these mental models 
from before to after a task change. However, because there were only two measurement 
points, it was not possible to assess the dynamic trajectory of these changes or pinpoint 
when in time these changes actually took place. For chapter 4 measurements were collected 
for team performance and information search on seven consecutive periods, making it pos-
sible to investigate the dynamic trajectories of these variables and to predict parameters of 
these trajectories with a number of team cognition variables. However, because the team 
cognition variables were only measured at a single time, it was not possible to assess the 
dynamics of these variables over time or to analyze how these dynamics were related to 
team adaption. The here mentioned limitations are mainly due to constraints in the possibil-
ity to collect high-density repetitive data on team cognition with existing measurement 
methods, as these methods are often very intrusive and time consuming (Mohammed, 
Klimoski, & Rentsch, 2000). However, recent advances in textual and behavioral analysis 
methods may open up new ways to analyze team cognition that may lift the field to “truly 
longitudinal” understanding of team cognition (Ballard et al., 2008; Cooke, 2004). 
Another limitation of the present dissertation is that whereas both a structural perspec-
tive on team cognition—mainly in chapter 3 and 4—and a communication perspective on 
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team cognition—in chapter 5 and 6—were applied, the data of the studies provide only 
limited possibilities for an integrated analysis including both perspectives. Team cognitive 
structures and team cognitive processes are closely interrelated—they are influenced by and 
influencing each other in an intricate manner. For instance, diversity in knowledge struc-
tures is expected to impact team performance as it enables team members to bring to bear to 
a problem a wide variety of ideas and perspectives. This indicates that the composition of 
team members’ cognitive structures would be represented in the specific pattern and con-
tent of team communication. Although this seems a plausible proposition, research that 
explicitly links such cognitive structures to actual team communication is scarce. On the 
other hand, in depth communication regarding higher level interpretations of a task situa-
tion is likely to lead to deeper, higher level understanding of that situation. In order to test 
such cognitive structure-communication interrelations more studies are needed that meas-
ure both structures and communication at several points in time. 
Another limitation of the empirical studies in this dissertation is the use of simulation 
and observation studies in measuring the relationship between cognition variables and team 
adaptation. Because, observation studies do not enable us to rule out reversed causality and 
possible confounding variables, it is not possible to draw definite conclusions regarding 
causality of the role of team cognition in team adaptation. For example, it is not possible to 
conclude that the association between the change in mental models and team adaptive 
performance found in chapter 3, indicates a causal relation. It might as well have been the 
case that high team performance in the moments after the change afforded teams with some 
slack time to consciously readjust their mental models of the system and hence this would 
represent more a reflection than a cause of adaptation. Limitations regarding knowledge on 
causality is not only a limitation in the present study but extends to large areas of team 
cognition research, and in particular the field of shared mental model research. Therefore, 
this field could greatly benefit from studies that experimentally test some of the relations on 
team cognition that are up to now only been observationally established. 
Another limitation refers to the fact that teams generally do not function in isolation 
but often constitute parts of larger organizations. Organizational factors, such as the specific 
structure in which the teams are embedded, the type of leadership, and institutional prac-
tices are likely to impact team adaptation and the cognitive aspects that are the topic of this 
dissertation. These factors may constitute important antecedents as well as moderators of 
the findings of this dissertation. Therefore, additional research is required to investigate the 
impact of the larger organizational context on team cognition and adaptation. 
Finally, the studies reported on in this paper present interesting findings on the effects 
of interaction patterns that warrant additional research. Whereas previous research sug-
gests that recurring team interaction patterns negatively affect team performance during 
crisis circumstances (Stachowski e t  a l . ,  2 0 0 9 ) ,  i n  t h i s  d i s s ertation recurring interaction 
patterns were found to have positive effects (chapter 3) and non-significant effects (chapter 
6) on team performance in non-routine situations. The findings of a positive effect of inter-
action patterns on performance are congruent with research of Kanki and colleagues (Kanki 
& Foushee, 1989; Kanki, Folk, & Irwin, 1991) who found that higher performing teams had 
less variance in interaction pattern than less well performing teams. A possible explanation 
for these contradictory findings may be that it depends on whether the repeated action 
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sequences are mindlessly constructed routines or deliberately adopted efficient standard 
operating procedures. Moreover, a high level of recurrence in interaction patterns during a 
non-routine period can be the result either of a mindless commitment to standardized re-
sponse patterns or it can be an indication of the rapid development and recurrent imple-
mentation of newly developed situation appropriate interaction patterns. Because in the 
previous studies as well as in the studies reported in the present dissertation it could not be 
derived whether teams repeated existing action patterns or developed new interaction 
patterns, future research should more closely trace the development of and changes in 
interaction patterns over time in reactions to changes in the relevant task environment. 
Conclusion 
The opening example of this dissertation demonstrates the importance of adaptation for 
teams functioning in dynamic high-reliability environments. Not only are teams crucial for 
the functioning of many contemporary organizations, they are also often the final safe-
guards responsible for the health and safety of many individuals. The research presented in 
this dissertation aims to further our understanding of how such teams adapt to novel and 
unexpected challenging circumstances. In this dissertation I have taken a perspective of 
team adaptation as a process occurring over time in which cognitive structures and process 
play a pivotal role. The results of the studies reported on in this dissertation support this 
view and suggest that in order to predict if a team adapts and understand how it adapts, we 












Organizations often deploy teams to cope with the ever increasing dynamism, complexity, 
and uncertainty of their environments. As a result, it is crucial for these teams to maintain 
high levels of performance not only under routine circumstances but also in case of complex 
and unpredictable non-routine situations. This is all the more critical since it is particularly 
during novel non-routine situations that effective team performance becomes most crucial 
and at the same time most difficult to uphold. Team adaptation refers to the effective proc-
ess whereby, in response to changes in its task situation, a team changes its configuration— 
in terms of structures, behaviors, and cognitions—, over a specific period.  
Although researchers have in their reasoning often applied team cognition concepts to 
explain team adaptation, studies that explicitly investigate the role of team cognition con-
structs in team adaptation are relatively scarce. With team cognition, I refer to both the 
cognitive structures—structured knowledge team members have regarding their task or 
team—and cognitive processes—activities such as information gathering, interpretation, 
and decision making that are performed by the team members during the performance of 
their task. Cognitive structures may facilitate or hinder adaptation and often have to be 
changed in order for a team to adapt and cognitive processes are generally considered to lie 
at the heart of the team adaptation process. Therefore, in order to add to our understanding 
of how such teams adapt to dynamic and challenging circumstances, this dissertation fo-
cuses on the role of cognition in team adaptation. More specifically, the aims of the disserta-
tion are to investigate how characteristics of team members’ cognitive structures impact 
team adaptation, how these cognitive structures change over time, and which role team 
cognitive processes play in team adaptation to novel task situations. 
A literature review described in Chapter 2 focuses on the role of three team cognition 
constructs in predicting team adaptation: shared mental models, a transactive memory 
system, and team situation awareness. Mental models are organized knowledge structures 
of a specific domain or system, and the notion of shared mental models refers to specific 
compilation on the team level of the mental models of the individual team members. A 
transactive memory system refers to the division of cognitive labor in a team and the knowl-
edge of what information is held by other members of the group. Team situation awareness 
refers to the momentary understanding team members have about a specific task situation. 
The findings of this chapter show that overall much of the research in the extant literature 
suggests that these cognitive structures facilitate the coordination and communication 
necessary for teams to adapt in turbulent and dynamic task settings. However, we conclude 
with a critical note, questioning the basic assumption that these structures always facilitate 
team adaptation. Moreover, we find that research on team mental models has mainly fo-
cused on characteristics of similarity and accuracy whereas aspects such as mental model 




Chapter 3 describes a laboratory study into the relations among team cognition, team 
interaction patterns, and team adaptation. In the study, 46 three-person teams performed in 
a fire fighting simulation that was programmed so that the team task structure changed 
halfway the simulation. The results indicate positive relationships among the extent to 
which team members update their mental models in line with changes in the task environ-
ment, post-change team interaction patterns, and team adaptive performance. In addition, 
post-change team interaction patterns mediated the relationship between mental model 
updating and adaptive performance. 
Chapter 4 describes how theories that advocate cognitive similarity and theories that 
advocate cognitive diversity seem to lead to opposing inferences regarding team perform-
ance under dynamic circumstances. The chapter introduces a model of team cognition that 
integrates these divergent viewpoints. It is proposed that teams require external alignment 
in order to deal with complex environments and internal alignment to coordinate their 
internal information processing. The chapter describes a study that tests this notion with a 
sample of 64 teams performing in a dynamic complex management simulation. The chapter 
adopts a longitudinal approach in that team information search processes and team per-
formance are measured repetitively over time and team cognition variables are used to 
predict the temporal trajectories of these variables. Findings of the study indicate that both 
internal and external cognitive alignments are crucial for team performance development 
over time. Team mental model complexity, transactive memory systems, and shared mental 
models had an influence on team performance trajectories. Finally, evidence was found for 
a moderation effect of team mental model complexity on the effect that team information 
search has on team performance trajectories. 
In chapter 5 the nature of teams’ cognitive adaptation processes was explored. A case 
study is presented on a single team in which it is investigated how this team alters its under-
standing of an unexpected dynamic situation over time. A sample of the audio communica-
tion of the operations team of the organization responsible for coordinating the air defense 
of the northeast quadrant of the United States during the terrorist attacks of eleven Septem-
ber 2001 was analyzed. It is concluded that in ambiguous situations, teams construct tempo-
rary ‘working hypotheses’ of the situation that enable them to maintain sense and coordi-
nate their actions. The formation and abandonment of these working hypotheses over time 
consisted of an iterative process of using and discarding working hypotheses as events un-
folded and sensemaking occurred. 
Chapters 6 contains an investigation of how the central command teams of an emer-
gency management organization developed an understanding of the unfolding crisis man-
agement situation and made decisions on what actions to take. This chapter takes a com-
munication perspective on team cognition as team situation awareness formation was as-
sessed from the communication among the team members. The data for this study contains 
video recordings of emergency management command teams as they performed in a crisis 
management simulation. The findings indicate that the team communication process can be 
divided into a two phase structure. An initial phase aimed at setting the structure of the 
meeting and sharing individually held information and a second decision making phase in 
which the teams focus on deciding which actions to take. Compared to average-performing 
teams, high-performing teams spent more time on the initial phase and made decisions 
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more rapidly in the decision making phase. Moreover, high-performing teams engaged in 
more collective interpretation processes during the decision making phase compared to 
average-performing teams, and schematic use of the whiteboard influenced the extent to 
which teams engaged in collective interpretation processes.  
Together the studies reported in this dissertation highlight the pivotal role of team 
cognitive structures and processes in team adaptation. Specifically the role of change in 
team members’ knowledge structures turns out to be an important and under-investigated 
aspect of team cognition. In addition to these theoretical contributions, the dissertation also 
introduces a number of novel methods for measuring the cognitive structures and processes 
relevant to team adaptation. Although more research is required to further investigate the 
reliability and validity of these approaches, they provide some fruitful avenues for further-













Om het hoofd te bieden aan de alsmaar toenemende dynamiek, complexiteit en onzeker-
heid van hun omgeving worden er door organisaties steeds vaker teams ingezet. Daarom is 
het cruciaal dat deze teams niet alleen in routine situaties maar ook in complexe en onvoor-
spelbare niet-routine situaties een hoog prestatieniveau kunnen handhaven. Dit is des te 
kritisch gezien dat tijdens niet-routine situaties een goede team  prestatie vaak zeer belang-
rijk is en tegelijkertijd zeer moeilijk te handhaven. Teamadaptatie is gedefinieerd als het 
effectieve proces waarmee, in reactie op een verandering in de taak situatie, een team zijn 
configuratie (in termen van structuren, gedragingen en cognities) aanpast gedurende een 
specifieke periode. 
Hoewel teamonderzoekers vaak concepten uit de cognitiewetenschappen toepassen 
om teamadaptatie te verklaren zijn er nauwelijks studies die expliciet de rol van teamcogni-
tie in teamadaptatie onderzoeken. Met teamcognitie verwijs ik zowel naar de cognitieve 
structuren (de gestructureerde kennis van teamleden betreffende hun taak of team) als naar 
de cognitieve processen (activiteiten zoals het verzamelen van informatie, het interpreteren 
hiervan, en het maken van beslissingen door de teamleden gedurende het uitvoeren van de 
taak). Cognitieve structuren kunnen adaptatie zowel bevorderen als hinderen en moeten 
vaak worden veranderd zodat een team zich kan aanpassen en cognitieve processen worden 
vaak beschouwd als een centraal aspect in het adaptatieproces. Om ons begrip over hoe 
teams zich aanpassen aan dynamische uitdagende situaties te vergroten richt ik in deze 
dissertatie de aandacht op de rol van teamcognitie in teamadaptatie. Meer specifiek zijn de 
doelen van de dissertatie om te onderzoeken hoe kenmerken van de cognitieve structuren 
van de teamleden invloed hebben op teamadaptatie, hoe deze cognitieve structuren veran-
deren over tijd en welke rol team cognitieve processen spelen in de aanpassing van teams 
aan nieuwe situaties.  
  
Hoofdstuk 2 geeft een overzicht van de literatuur over de rol van drie teamcognitie 
constructen in het voorspellen van teamadaptatie: team mentale modellen, een transactief 
geheugen systeem en team begrip van de situatie. Mentale modellen zijn de georganiseerde 
kennisstructuren die mensen hebben van een specifiek domein of systeem en het construct 
team mentale modellen verwijst naar de specifieke samenstelling op het team  niveau van de 
mentale modellen van de individuele teamleden. Een transactief geheugen systeem verwijst 
naar de verdeling van cognitieve taken in een team en de kennis van wie over welke infor-
matie beschikt. Het team begrip van de situatie verwijst naar de kennis over en het begrip van 
de situatie dat teamleden hebben op een bepaald moment. De bevindingen van het hoofd-
stuk laten zien dat het merendeel van de publicaties in de literatuur suggereert dat deze 
cognitieve structuren de coördinatie en communicatie die nodig zijn voor teams om zich aan 
te passen in turbulente en dynamische situaties bevorderen. We concluderen echter met een 
kritische noot waarin we de basale aanname dat deze structuren teamadaptatie altijd be-
vorderen in twijfel trekken. Een bijkomend bevinding is dat onderzoek over team mentale Samenvatting 
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modellen vooral gefocust is op de kenmerken van gelijkheid en accuraatheid terwijl aspec-
ten zoals de complexiteit en de aanpasbaarheid van mentale modellen, die waarschijnlijk 
ook belangrijk zijn voor teamadaptatie, onderbelicht zijn.  
Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een laboratorium studie naar de relaties tussen teamcognitie, 
teaminteractiepatronen en teamadaptatie. In deze studie namen 46 teams van drie personen 
deel aan een computersimulatie waarin zijn bosbranden moesten blussen. De simulatie was 
zo geprogrammeerd dat de taakstructuur halverwege de taak veranderde. De resultaten 
laten positieve relaties zien tussen de mate waarin de teamleden hun mentale modellen 
aanpassen in overeenkomst met de veranderingen in de taaksituatie, de interactiepatronen 
van de teams na de verandering en de adaptieve prestatie van de teams. Verder mediëren 
teaminteractiepatronen gedeeltelijk het effect van het aanpassen van de mentale modellen 
op de adaptieve prestaties van de teams.  
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft hoe theorieën die cognitieve gelijkheid voorstaan en theorieën 
die cognitieve diversiteit voorstaan tot tegenstrijdige conclusies lijken te leiden over team-
functioneren onder dynamische omstandigheden. Het hoofdstuk introduceert een teamcog-
nitie model waarin deze verschillende perspectieven worden geïntegreerd. Er wordt geop-
perd dat teams externe cognitieve afstemming nodig hebben om te kunnen functioneren in 
complexe omgevingen en dat ze interne cognitieve afstemming nodig hebben om hun inter-
ne informatieverwerkingsprocessen te coördineren. Het hoofdstuk beschrijft een studie 
waarin dit idee getest wordt met 64 teams die deelnemen aan een dynamische en complexe 
managementsimulatie. In het hoofdstuk wordt gebruik gemaakt van een longitudinale 
aanpak waarin teaminformatieverzamelingprocessen en teamprestatie herhaaldelijk over 
tijd worden gemeten en teamcognitie variabelen gebruikt worden om het temporele traject 
van deze variabelen te voorspellen. De resultaten van de studie geven aan dat zowel interne 
als externe afstemming van cruciaal belang zijn voor de ontwikkeling van teamprestatie 
over tijd. De complexiteit van de team mentale modellen, transactieve geheugen systemen 
en gedeelde mentale modellen waren van invloed op de teamprestatie trajecten. Ten slotte 
was er bewijs voor moderatie van team mentale modellen op het effect van teaminformatie-
verzamelingprocessen op teamprestatie trajecten.  
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt de aard van team cognitieve adaptatie  processen onderzocht. Er 
wordt een casestudie gepresenteerd, over een enkel team, waarin wordt onderzocht hoe in 
dit team het begrip van een onverwachte dynamische situatie wordt aangepast over tijd. Het 
betreft een analyse van een selectie van de audiocommunicatie van het operatieteam van de 
organisatie die verantwoordelijk was voor het coördineren van de luchtverdediging in het 
noordoostelijke kwadrant van de Verenigde Staten tijdens de terroristische aanvallen van 11 
September, 2001. De conclusie is dat teams in ambigue situaties tijdelijke ‘werkhypothesen’ 
over de situatie construeren die ze in staat stellen om een gevoel van betekenis te behouden 
en hun acties te coördineren. Het vormen en loslaten van deze werkhypothesen over tijd 
verloopt volgens een iteratief proces van het gebruiken en verwerpen van werkhypothesen 
terwijl de gebeurtenissen zich ontvouwen en de teamleden een begrip proberen te vormen 
van de situatie.  
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een onderzoek naar hoe de centrale commandoteams van een cri-
sismanagementorganisatie zich een begrip vormen van een zich ontwikkelend incident en 
hoe ze beslissingen nemen over te nemen acties. Dit hoofdstuk gaat uit van een communica-Samenvatting 
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tie perspectief van teamcognitie waarin de vorming van het team situatie-begrip wordt 
afgeleid uit de communicatie tussen de teamleden. De gegevens van de studie bestaan uit 
videoopnamen van de crisismanagement commando  teams terwijl ze deelnamen aan een 
crisismanagement simulatie. De bevindingen geven aan dat het teamcommunicatieproces 
opgedeeld kan worden in twee fasen. Een initiële fase gericht op het structureren van de 
bijeenkomst en het delen van informatie die is verzameld door de individuele teamleden en 
een tweede beslisfase waarin de nadruk ligt op het nemen van beslissingen over te nemen 
acties. Vergeleken met matig presterende teams, besteden goed presterende teams meer tijd 
aan de initiële fase en nemen zij hun beslissingen sneller in de beslisfase. Verder hielden de 
goed presterende teams zich meer bezig met collectieve interpretatieprocessen gedurende 
de beslisfase vergeleken met matig presterende teams en het gebruik van een whiteboard 
bevorderde de mate waarin teams zich bezig hielden met collectieve interpretatieprocessen.  
Samengenomen leggen de studies die beschreven zijn in deze dissertatie de nadruk op 
de centrale rol van team cognitieve structuren en processen in teamadaptatie. In het bijzon-
der de rol van een aanpassing in de kennisstructuren blijkt een belangrijk en weinig onder-
zocht aspect te zijn van teamcognitie. Behalve de theoretische contributies introduceert de 
dissertatie ook een aantal nieuwe methoden voor het meten en analyseren van cognitieve 
structuren en processen die relevant zijn voor teamadaptatie. Hoewel meer onderzoek 
nodig is om de betrouwbaarheid en validiteit van deze methoden verder te testen, lijken ze 
een veelbelovende benadering te zijn voor het bevorderen van onderzoek naar teamcognitie 
and specifiek het ontwikkelen van een werkelijk temporele uiteenzetting van teamadapta-
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